Does Corporate Governance Affect Firm Value?

Inhaltsangabe:Abstract: This thesis provides evidence that companies showing stronger corporate governance performance are on average also valued higher in terms of Tobin?s q. This evidence is found using a dataset of 242 of Europe?s largest corporations listed in the FTSE Eurotop 300 index. For each of these corporations, a dataset of over 300 corporate governance rating variables is analysed to establish a detailed overview of a firm?s corporate governance performance. These 300 rating variables result out of a corporate governance standard established by an independent rating agency in cooperation with the largest European institutional investors and in reference to the respective national corporate governance codes of the companies in the sample. The final regression model containing independent score components for Corporate Governance performance and financial performance proxied by ROA represents an R square adjusted of 42 per cent, thereby making the model and the inherent coefficients highly representative. The coefficient of the corporate governance score component suggests that, ceteris paribus, a one point increase in the value of the score component leads on average to a 0.3 point increase in Tobin?s q. The statistical findings are tested in depth for their practical validity in the subsequent Interview with the DWS Investment Group. Inhaltsverzeichnis:Table of Contents: Abstractiii 1.Introduction1 2.An Introduction to Corporate Governance6 2.1The Agency Problem6 2.1.1Transaction Conditions8 2.1.2Incentive Mechanisms10 2.1.3Economic Importance11 2.1.4Intermediate Conclusion12 2.2The Stakeholder Impact on Corporate Governance12 2.2.1Corporate Governance, contractual governance, and work governance13 2.3Culture, ownership concentration and law15 2.4Corporate Governance: A Definition18 3.The Corporate Governance Rating Framework20 3.1Rights and Duties of Shareholders20 3.1.1Academic Review21 3.1.2Key Criteria and Best Practice Recommendations21 3.1.3Code Review24 3.2Range of Takeover Defenses24 3.2.1Academic Review24 3.2.2Key Criteria and Best Practice Recommendations25 3.2.3Codes26 3.3Disclosure on Corporate Governance27 3.3.1Academic Review27 3.3.2Key Criteria and Best Practice Recommendations28 3.3.3Code Review30 3.4Board Structure and Functioning31 3.5Conclusion36 4.Statistical Analysis38 4.1Data39 4.1.1Corporate Governance Rating Data39 4.1.2Financial Data39 4.1.3Analysis of Omission [¿]