Formulating Principal-Agent Service Contracts for a Revenue Generating Unit
Autor: | Dror, Moshe Zeng, Shuo |
---|---|
EAN: | 9783319186719 |
Sachgruppe: | Wirtschaft |
Sprache: | Englisch |
Seitenzahl: | 140 |
Produktart: | Kartoniert / Broschiert |
Veröffentlichungsdatum: | 14.07.2015 |
Schlagworte: | Entscheidungstheorie Operations Research Unternehmensforschung |
53,49 €*
Die Verfügbarkeit wird nach ihrer Bestellung bei uns geprüft.
Bücher sind in der Regel innerhalb von 1-2 Werktagen abholbereit.
This book examines contractual options for a performance based contract between an owner of a revenue generating unit and a repair agent for such unit. The framework of the analysis is that of economists' principal-agent problem. The contractual options of a principal and an agent are modeled as a Markov process with an undetermined time horizon. For a risk neutral principal, the authors identify the conditions under which a principal contracts with a risk-neutral, risk-averse, or risk-seeking agent and derive the principal's optimal offer together with the agent's optimal service capacity response. In essence, the book provides an extensive formulating analysis of principal-agent contracts given any exogenous parameter values. Ultimately a small number of formulas cover a large spectrum of principal-agent conditions.