Kant¿s Concept of Dignity

Nearly all philosophers refer to Kant when debating the concept of dignity, and many approve of Kant¿s conception, unaware of the tensions between Kant¿s conception and the modern idea of dignity intimately connected to the idea of human rights. What exactly is Kant's conception of dignity? Is there a connecting tie between dignity and the legal sphere of human rights at all? Does Kant¿s concept refer to a superior status human beings seem to own in comparison to non-rational beings? Or does it refer to an absolute value? The contributions of this volume are organised in five broader topics. In the first section tensions within the Kantian conception of dignity are discussed (C. Horn, D. Birnbacher, G. Schönrich). The second group of articles illuminates the intimate connections between dignity and human rights (R. Mosayebi, M. Kettner). The third group discusses the prevailing moral conception of dignity (S. Yamatsuta, S. Shell, O. Sensen). The fourth group focuses on the relation of dignity and end in itself (T. Hill, D. Sturma, A. Wood). The central theme of the fifth group of contributions are the social, political, and cultural dimensions of dignity (Y. Kato, K. Ameriks, K. Flikschuh, T. Saito).