Strategic Analysis of Two Joint Contingency Operations: Lebanon 1958 and Dominican Republic 1965

This study compares the United States use of military power to achieve political aims in Lebanon 1958 and the Dominican Republic 1965. The study uses the Strategic Analysis Model, developed at the Command and General Staff College, to integrate historical data to determine if alternative policy options existed. The alternative options are compared and contrasted against the option chosen to reveal lessons which may be applied to future crises. The study examines U.S. interests and the history of events in Lebanon and the Dominican Republic leading to U.S. military intervention. The development of alternative policy options explores other solutions in light of U.S. frequent use of military power to achieve national objectives since WW II. While military power seems to accomplish short term goals it has not provided long term peace and stability necessary to provide security of U.S. interests. The conclusions recommend integrating elements of national power, other than military, to provide U.S. long term goals. This is necessary since history has shown that military power does not provide for long term solutions. However, lessons learned from the crises indicate when military power must be applied, it must be strong and flexible, maintain neutrality during employment and be followed by political negotiations with participation by all factions.