Emotion and Persuasion in Classical Antiquity

Ancient History

Franz Steiner Verlag

Edited by ED SANDERS
and MATTHEW JOHNCOCK



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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This volume arose out of a conference held at Royal Holloway, University of London (RHUL) on 27th–28th June 2013, as part of a series of annual conferences organized by the Centre for Oratory and Rhetoric (COR), a sub-division of the RHUL Classics department but with interests extending to all forms of oratory and rhetoric, ancient and modern. The conference was largely funded by generous donations from the Leverhulme Trust, the Institute of Classical Studies, and RHUL itself, and we thank these organizations for making it possible.

The papers included in this volume are, of course, among the strongest of those delivered at the conference, but more importantly those that best fitted together into a coherent collection, whose voices form a collaborative and constructive conversation. One of our guest speakers, Catherine Steel, whose other commitments have not allowed her to contribute to this volume, nonetheless kindly gave us copious advice on structuring it, and we have to a large extent gratefully accepted her suggestions (though of course we bear full responsibility for any criticism of the result!).

While both organizing the conference and putting together a book proposal, we received good advice from Lene Rubinstein, Jonathan Powell, Chris Kremmydas and Ahuvia Kahane. Lene Rubinstein, Jonathan Powell, Chris Carey and Angelos Chaniotis all kindly read a draft of the volume introduction and made helpful suggestions. We are grateful to all of them for their advice and support. Finally, we thank Franz Steiner Verlag for publishing the resulting volume.

ABBREVIATIONS

Chr.Wilck.	Mitteis, L. and U. Wilcken (1912) *Grundzüge und Chrestomathie der Papyruskunde* (Leipzig and Berlin)
CT I–III	Hornblower, S. (1991–2008) *A commentary on Thucydides* (Oxford, 3 vols)
DK	Diels, H. and W. Kranz (eds) (1964) *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker* (Berlin, 11th edition, 3 vols)
DT	Audollent, A. (1904) *Defixionum Tabellae* (Paris)
F.Delphes III	(1909–85) *Fouilles de Delphes, vol. 3. Épigraphie* (Paris)
FGrH	Jacoby, F. (ed.) (1923–58) *Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker, vols 1–3C* (Berlin and Leiden)
GL	Campbell, D. A. (ed., trans.) (1982) *Greek Lyric* (Cambridge, MA)
GV	Peek, W. (1995) *Griechische Versinschriften, vol. 1* (Berlin)
HCT I–V	Gomme, A. W., A. Andrewes and K. J. Dover (1945–81) *A historical commentary on Thucydides* (Oxford, 5 vols)
IACP	Hansen, M. H. and T. H. Nielsen (eds) (2004) *An inventory of Archaic and Classical poleis* (Oxford)
I.Assos	Merkelbach, R. (1976) *Die Inschriften von Assos*. *Inschriften griechischer Städte aus Kleinasien* 4 (Bonn)
I.Cret	Guarducci, M. (1935–50) *Inscriptiones Creticae* (Rome)
I.Ephesos	Wankel, H. *et al* (1979–81) *Die Inschriften von Ephesos*. *Inschriften griechischer Städte aus Kleinasien* 11–17 (Bonn)
IG	(1873–) *Inscriptiones Graecae* (Berlin)
IGBulg	(1956–97) *Inscriptiones Graecae in Bulgaria repertae* (Sofia)
IGR	Cagnat, R. (1911–27) *Inscriptiones Graecae ad res Romanas pertinentes* (Paris)
IGUR	Moretti, L. (1968–90) *Inscriptiones Graecae urbis Romae* (Rome)
I.Heraclea Pontica	Jonnes, L. (1994) *The Inscriptions of Heraclea Pontica*. *Inschriften griechischer Städte aus Kleinasien* 47 (Bonn)
I.Kyzikos	Schwertheim, E. (1980) *Die Inschriften von Kyzikos und Umgebung*, *vol. 1*: *Grabtexte*. *Inschriften griechischer Städte aus Kleinasien* 18 (Bonn)
I.Labraunda	Crampa, J. (1969–72) *Labraunda: Swedish excavations and researches, vol. 3: The Greek inscriptions* (Lund)
IMT Skam/ NebTaeler	Barth, M. and J. Stauber (eds) (1993) *Inschriften Mysia & Troas,* M. Leopold Wenger Institut. Universität München. Version of 25.8.1993 (Ibycus). Packard Humanities Institute CD no. 7, 1996. – Troas, 'Skamander und Nebentäler', nos. 101–398. Includes: Frisch, P. (1975) *Die Inschriften von Ilion*. *Inschriften griechischer Städte aus Kleinasien* 3 (Bonn)

I.Priene	Hiller von Gaertringen, F. (1906) *Inschriften von Priene* (Berlin)
I.Smyrna	Petzl, G. (1982–90) *Die Inschriften von Smyrna*, v*ols I–II 1/2*. *Inschriften griechischer Städte aus Kleinasien* 23–24 (Bonn)
KA	Kassel, R. and C. Austin (eds) (1983–2001) *Poetae comici Graeci* (Berlin and New York, 8 vols)
LIMC	(1981–97) *Lexicon iconographicum mythologiae classicae* (Zürich and München)
Milet	(1908–) *Milet: Ergebnisse der Ausgrabungen und Untersuchungen seit d. Jahre 1899* (Berlin)
ML	Meiggs, R. and D. Lewis (1988) *A selection of Greek historical inscriptions to the end of the fifth century BC* (Oxford, revised edition)
MW	Merkelbach, R. and M. L. West (1967) *Fragmenta Hesiodea* (Oxford)
NGCT	Jordan, D. R. (2000) 'New Greek curse tablets', *Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies* 41, 5–46
OCD	Hornblower, S. and A. Spawforth (eds) (2003) *Oxford classical dictionary* (Oxford, 3rd edition)
OED	Simpson, J. and E. Weiner (eds) (1989) *The Oxford English dictionary* (Oxford) (also www.oed.com)
OGIS	Dittenberger, W. (1903–5) *Orientis Graeci inscriptiones selectae* (Leipzig)
OLD	Glare, P. G. W. (2012) *Oxford Latin dictionary* (Oxford, 2 vols)
P.Cair.Zen. I–III	*Zenon papyri: Catalogue général des antiquités égyptiennes du Musée du Caire*, C. C. Edgar (ed.) (1925–31) *vols 1–4*; O. Guéraud and P. Jouguet (eds) (1940) *vol. 5* (Cairo)
P.Enteux	Guéraud, O. (ed.) (1931–2) *Requêtes et plaintes adressées au Roi d'Égypte au IIIe siècle avant J.-C.* (Cairo) (nos. 1–113 and appendix of four texts) [MF 1.52]
PGM	Preisendanz, K. and A. Henrichs (eds) (1973–4) *Papyri Graecae magicae: Die griechischen Zauberpapyri* (Stuttgart, 2nd edition)
P.Oxy	(1910–) *The Oxyrhynchus papyri* (Oxford)
RO	Rhodes, P. J. and R. Osborne (2003) *Greek historical inscriptions, 404–323 BC* (Oxford)
SEG	(1923–) *Supplementum epigraphicum Graecum* (Leiden and Amsterdam)
SGD	Jordan, D. R. (1985) 'A survey of Greek *defixiones* not included in the special corpora', *Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies* 26, 151–97
SM	Daniel, R. W. and F. Maltomini (eds) (1990–2) *Supplementum magicum, vols 1–2* (Opladen)
Syll.^{3}	Dittenberger, W. (1915–1924) *Sylloge inscriptionum Graecarum* (Leipzig, 3rd edition)
TAM	(1901–) *Tituli Asiae Minoris* (Vienna)
West	West, M. L. (ed.) (1989–92) *Iambi et elegi Graeci ante Alexandrum cantata* (Oxford, 2nd edition, 2 vols)

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Jennifer Winter recently received her PhD from Royal Holloway, University of London, on the topic of *The rhetoric of leadership in Xenophon's* Anabasis. The thesis interprets the roles and effects that the speeches assigned to leaders in the *Anabasis* had, in relation to the work's aims and agenda.

INTRODUCTION

Ed Sanders

EMOTIVE TECHNIQUES AND PERSUASIVE GENRES

Emotion arousal played an integral role in Greek persuasion at least as far back as the Homeric epics, the earliest surviving Greek literary texts. At the start of the *Iliad*, the priest Chryses seeks to persuade Agamemnon to give up his enslaved daughter Chryseïs. He prays for Agamemnon's and his army's military success and safe return home, before offering a boundless ransom in exchange. We might expect this wish and exchange offer to arouse emotions: goodwill or possibly friendship, gratitude, perhaps desire for the goods. Homer does not mention these, but does say that while the other Achaians are won over to Chryses' side – shouting their approval (ἐπευφήμησαν, 1.22) – Agamemnon is not pleased (οὐκ ... ἤνδανε, 1.24) and refuses. Agamemnon utters a harsh threat against the priest, which in turn arouses his fear (ἔδεισεν, 1.33) and persuades him to do as commanded, i.e. leave. Chryses then calls on the god Apollo for support: he addresses him by a variety of flattering epithets, lists all the things he has done for Apollo, and asks that the god avenge his tears. Whether or not the flattery and reminders arouse Apollo's goodwill or gratitude (not stated), they certainly arouse his anger on Chryses' behalf (χωόμενος κῆρ, 1.44; χωομένοιο, 1.46), and he punishes the Achaian army in revenge.[1]

Emotive argumentation had, therefore, long been part of persuasive strategies. However, our interest for this volume begins with the *conscious reflection on and practice of* emotive techniques of persuasion: i.e. the art, skill or science (*technê*) of rhetoric, and oratory that knowingly incorporates such techniques. These were well established by the time Aristotle complained waspishly, in the introduction to his treatise *The art of rhetoric* (usually called simply *Rhetoric*),[2] about rhetoricians' tendency to over-focus on emotional arousal. Aristotle says that 'Slander, pity, anger and such emotions of the soul have nothing to do with the facts, but are merely an appeal to the juror' (*Rh*. 1.1, 1354a16–18: διαβολὴ γὰρ καὶ ἔλεος καὶ ὀργὴ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πάθη τῆς ψυχῆς οὐ περὶ τοῦ πράγματός ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸν δικαστήν), and again that 'one should not lead the juror into anger, envy or pity – it is like warping a carpenter's rule' (*Rh*. 1.1, 1354a24–6: οὐ γὰρ δεῖ τὸν δικαστὴν διαστρέφειν εἰς ὀργὴν προάγοντας ἢ φθόνον ἢ ἔλεον· ὅμοιον γὰρ κἂν εἴ

1 Arist. *Rh*. 2.2, 1378a30–2 tells us that anger involves a desire for revenge. Rubinstein (2004) shows how often calls for punishment or retribution (*kolazein*/*timôreisthai*) are coupled with calls for anger (*orgê*) in Attic courtroom oratory.

2 Written probably in the third quarter of the fourth century BCE – see Kennedy (2007) 6.

τις ᾧ μέλλει χρῆσθαι κανόνι, τοῦτον ποιήσειε στρεβλόν), and he complains that those who write treatises on rhetoric treat of little else (*Rh*. 1.1, 1354a11–16).

Such rhetorical theorists were included among, or were direct intellectual descendants of, the sophists – itinerant teachers who wandered Greece from the mid-fifth century BCE taking on paying pupils, mainly the sons of the leisured classes.[3] Many of the most famous sophists gravitated to Athens which, thanks to the revenues of its empire, had a large wealthy/leisured class in this period, who wanted their sons trained (*inter alia*) to address the Assembly.[4] Sophists had a variety of interests, but rhetoric was frequently one of the subjects on their curricula. This interest is foregrounded in the most famous depiction of sophists in literature, in Aristophanes' comedy *Clouds* (dated 423 BCE), in which Socrates is lampooned as representative of the sophistic agenda: corrupting the young, not believing in the traditional gods, introducing new divinities,[5] and teaching his pupils to wield morally wrong arguments so well as to overcome morally right ones.[6]

One of the most important sophists – and most influential rhetoricians – was Gorgias. He features as one of Socrates' interlocutors in Plato's *Gorgias*, but in this dialogue his description of oratorical technique concentrates on the persuasive exposition of an argument, not arousing emotions. Socrates, in contrast, stresses the affective aspect when he says that oratory consists of the knack of producing gratification and pleasure in the audience through flattery (Pl. *Grg*. 462c3–7: ἐμπειρίαν ἔγωγέ τινα … χάριτός τινος καὶ ἡδονῆς ἀπεργασίας; 463a8–9: καλῶ δὲ αὐτοῦ ἐγὼ τὸ κεφάλαιον κολακείαν). Gorgias's own *Encomium of Helen*, however, certainly recognizes the importance of emotional persuasion, advising that:

> Speech is a powerful lord that … can banish fear and remove grief and instill pleasure and enhance pity. (8) … The power of speech has the same effect on the condition of the soul as the application of drugs to the state of bodies; for just as different drugs dispel different fluids from the body, and some bring an end to disease but others end life, so also some speeches cause pain, some pleasure, some fear; some instill courage, some drug and bewitch the soul with a kind of evil persuasion. (14)[7]

It is perhaps this sort of approach that Aristotle complains about.

By the late 420s, oratorical appeals to emotion were common enough to be satirized at length in Aristophanes' comedy *Wasps* (dated 422). Early in the play we get a report that Kleon – a demagogue, described by the hostile historiographer Thucydides as 'very violent' (βιαιότατος, 3.36.6.4) – has enjoined jurors to turn

3 See Gagarin (2002) 9–36 on the sophists.

4 On the sophists in Athens, see Wallace (1998).

5 The real life Socrates was in fact executed on just these charges, according to Plato (*Ap*. 24b). See Hansen (1995) from the Athenian point of view.

6 See Dover (1968) xxxii–lvii on the association of these charges with the sophist movement, and Aristophanes' choice of Socrates to represent them. In the play Unjust Argument (*Adikos Logos*), as his name implies, wins through mastery of eristic reasoning rather than emotional techniques.

7 Trans. Kennedy (2007) 253–4.

up with three days' worth of grievous anger, in order to punish offenders (Ar. *Vesp*. 243–4: ὀργὴν … πονηρὰν … ὡς κολωμένους ὧν ἠδίκησεν). The enthusiastic juror Philokleon later describes how defendants ask for pity (οἴκτιρόν μ', 556), then try everything they can to get off a charge: they bewail (ἀποκλάονται) their poverty and attribute their misfortunes to it; they quote myths, fables and jokes to make him laugh; they drag their children out front to bleat (βληχᾶται) in concert, while the defendant himself trembles (τρέμων) and entreats him as a god to approve his accounts, asking him to have pity on hearing his son, or be persuaded by his daughter – this, he says, makes him relax his anger a little (562–74). And in the mock trial later in the play, Bdelykleon entreats Philokleon to have pity on (οἰκτίρατ') the dog Labes, and brings in Labes' puppies, whom he instructs to beg and entreat while whimpering (κνυζούμενα) and crying (δακρύετε) (975–8).

While this could be dismissed as comic fantasy, the fact that it could be staged in front of an Athenian audience suggests it is unlikely they would find such behaviour unrecognizable. Firmer evidence comes from [Lys.] 20 (*For Polystratos*), a lawcourt speech delivered not many years after this,[8] in which the speaker says: 'Nevertheless, gentlemen of the jury, we see that if somebody brings forward his children and weeps and laments (κλαίῃ καὶ ὀλοφύρηται), you take pity (ἐλεοῦντας) on the children … and pardon the father's crimes on account of the children' (20.34); he then begs: 'we [not having children to bring forward, but an aged father] bring forward our father and ourselves, and beg (ἐξαιτούμεθα) … pity (ἐλεήσατε) on our father, who is an old man (γέροντα ὄντα), and on us' (20.35).[9] The language and the behaviour are almost identical to that described in *Wasps*.[10]

Other theatrical techniques were also available to orators. In Aristophanes' comedy *Acharnians*, Dikaiopolis seeks leave to dress up for his trial, so as to look totally wretched (Ar. *Ach*. 383–4: ἐάσατε ἐνσκευάσασθαί μ' οἷον ἀθλιώτατον). In both this play (711) and very frequently in Aristophanes' *Knights* (274, 276, 285–7, 304, 311, 626, 1380), speakers use shouting, shrieking or a thunderous voice to terrify audiences. Perhaps the most striking example of this in a real speech comes not from Classical Athens, but from an Assembly speech given in the Sicilian city of Enguion in the late third century BCE. The speaker Nikias fakes possession by supernatural beings in order to freeze other citizens in fear long enough for him to flee the city safely (Plut. *Marc.* 20.5–6).[11] Other emotions can be aroused in this

8 Todd (2000) 217 dates the speech to 'probably 410 or possibly 409'.

9 Trans. Todd (2000) 226–7; the appeal for pity is repeated, slightly amplified, at 20.36; cf. also, e.g., Dem. 21.99, [Dem.] 53.29 for further comments on this theme. On appeals to pity, see particularly Johnstone (1999) 109–25, Bers (2009) 77–98; more generally across the ancient world, Naiden (2006).

10 On emotional arguments paralleled in oratory and (satirized in) Old Comedy, see Carey (this volume).

11 See Chaniotis (1997) 234–5 on this episode.

way too: e.g. Aristotle describes how voice and other delivery techniques such as gesture, dress and dramatic actions can engender pity (*Rh*. 2.8, 1386a32–b5).[12]

Despite his quibbles about the extent and manner in which other rhetoricians advised orators to manipulate emotions, Aristotle was perfectly happy for emotions to be aroused through proofs (*pisteis*).[13] He argues: 'Of the modes of persuasion furnished by the spoken word there are three kinds. The first kind depends on the personal character [*êthos*] of the speaker; the second on putting the listeners into a certain frame of mind [ἐν τῷ τὸν ἀκροατὴν διαθεῖναί πως]; the third on the proof, or apparent proof, provided by the argument [*logos*] of the speech itself' (*Rh*. 1.2, 1356a1–4), then confirms *re* the second that 'persuasion may come through the listeners, when the speech stirs the emotions [*pathos*]' (*Rh*. 1.2, 1356a14–15: διὰ δὲ τῶν ἀκροατῶν, ὅταν εἰς πάθος ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου προαχθῶσιν).[14] Having spent some time talking of other issues, he returns to emotions in a lengthy section of the treatise (*Rh*. 2.1–11), which he introduces as follows:

> The emotions are all those feelings that so change men as to affect their judgements, and that are also attended by pain or pleasure. Such are anger, pity, fear and the like, with their opposites. We [i.e. Aristotle] must arrange what we have to say about each of them under three heads. Take, for instance, the emotion of anger: here we must discover what the state of mind of angry people is, who the people are with whom they usually get angry, and on what grounds they get angry with them.… The same is true of the other emotions.[15]

The following chapters are devoted to discussions of one emotion or a pair of 'opposite' (*enantion*) emotions: 2.2 and 2.3 respectively on anger (*orgê*) and calming down (*praünsis*); 2.4 on friendship (*philia*) and hatred (*misos*); 2.5 on fear (*phobos*) and confidence (*tharsos*); 2.6 on shame (*aischunê*) and shamelessness (*anaischuntia*); 2.7 on gratitude (*charin echein*) and briefly ingratitude (*acharistein*);[16] 2.8 on pity (*eleos*); 2.9 on indignation (*nemesis*); 2.10 on envy (*phthonos*); and 2.11 on emulation (*zêlos*) and scorn (*kataphronêsis*).[17] The order of these emotions is somewhat indiscriminate. With the exception that emotions relating to others' bad or good fortune are grouped together at the end,[18] there is no obvious reason for the order selected, and Aristotle does not advise directly on

12 On aspects of performance in Greek and Roman oratory, see Kremmydas, Powell and Rubinstein (2013). Hagen (this volume) explores the emotionally persuasive use of tears in Roman oratory and historiography.

13 Dow (2007) is persuasive on resolving the 'contradiction' between *Rh*. 1.1's criticism of emotional techniques and *Rh*. 1.2's advocacy of emotional proofs; cf. Dow's bibliography for further scholarship on this issue.

14 Trans. Rhys Roberts (1984) 2155, slightly modified.

15 *Rh*. 2.1, 1378a19–26, trans. Rhys Roberts (1984) 2195. See Leighton (1996) on the ways in which emotion can contribute to alteration of judgment. Frede (1996) discusses how emotions are 'attended' by pain and pleasure.

16 Agreeing with Konstan (2006) 156–68 that these are the emotions discussed, rather than kindness (*charis*) and unkindness as favoured by most previous scholars, e.g. Grimaldi (1988) 128; Cope (1877) II.89 agrees with gratitude.

17 He describes a number of unnamed emotions too.

18 On this group, see Sanders (2014) 59–64.

which emotions may be appropriate for different sorts of speech,[19] or which will work well together. A second surviving rhetorical treatise from the Classical period, probably by Anaximenes,[20] also discusses emotion arguments – primarily in the chapters on deliberative and judicial oratory (respectively chs 34 and 36), in which he describes three friendly emotions (pity, goodwill and gratitude) and three hostile ones (anger, hatred and envy) as particularly important.[21]

The second set of ancient source material of particular relevance to this volume is oratory, beginning with the group of speeches written and (mostly) performed in Athens in the period c. 420–322 BCE, known as the 'Attic oratorical corpus'. This corpus contains approximately 105 judicial speeches (both prosecution and defence speeches, on matters of both public and private law, as well as adjudications),[22] sixteen deliberative speeches (delivered to the Athenian Assembly), and a handful of display speeches (mostly funeral speeches, delivered by a leading politician to honour the war dead), as well as some letters,[23] political tracts and rhetorical exercises. Unlike the rhetorical treatises – the extent of whose relation to practical oratory is debatable – this corpus tells us how persuasion was actually 'done' in this very fruitful literary period: these speeches, letters and tracts demonstrably use emotional techniques as part of their persuasion strategies.[24] Such techniques are both overt, with emotions explicitly called for, and covert, with emotions aroused indirectly by the judicious use of words and phrases that act as psychological triggers.[25]

Both these types of evidence – theoretical (rhetoric) and practical (oratory) – have their counterparts in later antiquity too. Survivals from the Hellenistic eastern Mediterranean are limited,[26] but a large number of speeches survive from the Imperial period, mostly given in a civic context (e.g. the speeches of Dio of Prusa). More relevant to this volume are rhetorical treatises and speeches from the Roman Late Republic and Principate. The Ciceronian corpus is vast,[27] and contains many speeches utilizing emotional techniques.[28] Of interest too are his

19 Judicial, deliberative and display being the three subdivisions he discusses at *Rh*. 1.3 – other types such as hortatory, supplicatory etc. presumably being hybrids.

20 This treatise, the *Rhetoric to Alexander*, is contained within the Aristotelian corpus. Its attribution to Anaximenes of Lampsacus is longstanding and probably correct.

21 See further Sanders (this volume).

22 Griffith-Williams (this volume) considers two adjudications in inheritance disputes.

23 For emotive persuasion in literary letters, see Westwood (this volume).

24 For a brief introduction to emotion in Classical Greek rhetoric and oratory, see Konstan (2010).

25 On explicit *versus* covert emotion arousal, see further Sanders (2012a) 160–1 and (2014) 88–98.

26 Though on this period see particularly Kremmydas and Tempest (2013).

27 There are only two non-Ciceronian complete speeches in Latin pre-200 CE: a panegyric by Pliny praising Trajan, and a (self-)defence speech by Apuleius on a charge of seduction by magic – see Powell (2011).

28 Cicero's use of emotional techniques has tended to be taken for granted in scholarly studies. The use of emotion has been highlighted especially in the closing sections of his defence speeches, where an appeal to pity (*commiseratio*) is a standard ingredient; cf. Winterbottom (2004). Gildenhard (2010) 36 notes Cicero's at first sight surprising tendency to pre-

rhetorical works, in particular (for our purposes) *De oratore*, which contains a large section discussing emotional techniques (2.178–216), partly a recapitulation of Greek rhetorical ideas, but particularly adding deeper discussions of voice, gesture and dress.[29] A second important Roman rhetorician is Quintilian, who also discusses emotional techniques at length (*Institutio* 6.1.7–2.36).

A third type of evidence of great importance to this volume is literary representations of speeches. These primarily occur in historiography.[30] Ever since Herodotus, it was a recognized part of ancient historiography to include speeches – especially deliberative and hortatory speeches (those used to effect political-strategic decisions, and to encourage armies before battle) – that contributed to the unfolding of the events portrayed. They are more or less prominent in different historiographers, but they appear to be universally used, and are frequently reported in direct speech (*oratio recta*) – though sometimes in indirect (*oratio obliqua*).[31] Historiographers were not merely recording facts, but creating works of literature, and accordingly they had a choice both of which speeches (out of the vast number actually given) to include,[32] and how accurately or not they wished to portray those speeches.[33] Literary representations of persuasion are not confined to historiography: speeches appear in a wide variety of other genres,[34] and other forms of verbal interlocution can also be persuasive.[35]

One other type of persuasive literature should be discussed, and that is the technical or didactic treatise, which seeks to persuade the reader. Treatises survive from at least as early as the Classical period (fifth to fourth centuries BCE), and become increasingly common in the latter part of that period and into the Hel-

sent himself as in the grip of strong emotion. On emotion in Ciceronian oratory, see also Webb (1997); Powell (2007); Craig (2010).

29 For a brief introduction to emotion in Roman rhetoric and oratory, see Hall (2007).

30 See in particular Sanders, Fragoulaki, Winter, Knight and Hagen (this volume).

31 The inclusion of speeches in *oratio recta* and *obliqua* as a narratological technique significantly predates the historiographic genre, going back at least as far as Homer – see Fox and Livingstone (2010) 544–6.

32 E.g. Finley (1972) 26–7, in turn quoting Dion. Hal. *Thuc.*: 'Why this particular Funeral Oration, he asked? The occasion was neither glorious nor significant. The answer, he suggested, is that Thucydides wanted a Funeral Oration by Pericles at any price. Or why, he asked, are we given the long debate on the *reconsideration* of the decision to put all Mytilenian males to death, when we properly ought to have had the original debate?'

33 Thucydides is famously ambiguous about the accuracy of the speeches he records, saying: 'I have found it difficult to remember the precise words used in the speeches which I listened to myself and my various informants have experienced the same difficulty; so my method has been, while keeping as closely as possible to the general sense of the words [ἐγγύτατα τῆς ξυμπάσης γνώμης] that were actually used, to make the speakers say what, in my opinion, was called for [τὰ δέοντα μάλιστ' εἰπεῖν] by each situation'; trans. Warner (1972) 47.

34 For example, see Johncock (this volume) on speeches in Ovid's epic poem *Metamorphoses*.

35 Iurescia (this volume) discusses quarrels in Roman comedy, manufactured by one character for the purposes of persuading another.

lenistic (third to first centuries BCE) and Roman.[36] They cover a very wide range of topics, from medical through military to mathematical or economic. The Hippocratic and Galenic corpora are examples of the first. Xenophon was also a prolific author, whose surviving works include several treatises.[37] Treatise writers might attempt to arouse a reader's emotions, as part of their persuasive technique. Other genres too can arouse a reader's emotions, most particularly poetry.[38]

Finally, we should be aware of the very many types of persuasion that are not literary. These include personal letters (preserved on papyri) and petitions (on papyri or carved in stone). They also include prayers or curses addressed to gods (also on papyri or inscribed), left at religious sanctuaries or in graves, or thrown down wells. They also include civic inscriptions, intended to persuade a variety of readers. While some of these types of source material might be written by men (or women) with some degree of learning, many more were written by those with little learning, and were not crafted using literary techniques of persuasion – albeit that they might have generic conventions of their own.[39]

THE SCOPE AND CONTENT OF THIS VOLUME

This volume addresses the variety of ways in which emotions form part of strategies of persuasion, both within societies and between groups and individuals in the ancient world. It considers different strata of society (civic equals, armies and their commanders, emperors and their subjects, gods and humans), and diverse media of communication. Persuasion may be effected by narrative, exhortation (explicit or covert), or physical actions. Emotional strategies can be aimed at superiors, inferiors or one's equals; to strangers or friends; and deployed for personal gain or the public good. As we have seen, they can appear in oral communications (judicial, deliberative, display, hortatory, supplicatory etc.) designed to be heard once, their representations in literature, or in written communications that can be read again and again (e.g. treatises, other literary works, letters, inscriptions).

No single volume could cover the usage of emotion in persuasive strategies in the entirety of ancient written literary and non-literary media, and this book does not attempt to take such a 'handbook' approach. Rather (and reflecting its origin as a selection of the best papers from a recent conference),[40] the volume presents exciting new thinking in areas of this subject that are currently commanding research (and growing public) interest.

In recent years scholarship on emotive persuasion techniques has focused primarily on two areas: rhetorical techniques as propounded by technical treatises

36 On technical treatises in the Hellenistic period, see Gutzwiller (2007) 154–67.
37 See e.g. Winter (this volume).
38 See Johncock and Hammond (this volume) for examples.
39 See Chaniotis, Dickey and Salvo (this volume).
40 Held by the Centre for Oratory and Rhetoric (COR) at Royal Holloway, University of London, on 27–28 June 2013.

(Aristotle, Anaximenes, Cicero, Quintilian);[41] and explicit exhortation to feel a small group of emotions (anger, hatred, envy, gratitude, pity, goodwill) in Attic forensic oratory.[42] This volume is consciously designed to move beyond these two areas of scholarship, to examine the use of emotion in rhetorical *practice* in a wide variety of literary genres, non-literary (inscriptional and papyrological) texts, and even physical movement.[43] And it does so, in some cases, by employing a range of theoretical methods (such as conversational analysis, speech act theory and pragmatics)[44] that have proved effective in other areas of classical scholarship, or in emotion studies in other disciplines (e.g. linguistics, sociology, psychology).

Part I recognizes that our first significant evidence for the Greek understanding of, theorizing about and use of emotion as a rhetorical technique comes from the specific historical society of Classical Athens. This is both because of the unusually wide participation in oratorical practice thanks to the radical democracy, and due to the establishment of philosophical schools in that city during that particular period. Accordingly the first section of the book is devoted to that one society. However, it looks at types of speeches never before examined in connection with emotions, and draws connections to other contemporary genres. **Carey**'s chapter explores arguments, in both forensic and deliberative oratory and with supporting evidence in historiography and Old Comedy, that play to hostility towards a politically dominant individual or faction as part of the competition for power. **Griffith-Williams** considers the choice of using, or not using, emotional arguments alongside rational ones in speeches in inheritance cases, a specific class of forensic speech so far largely ignored in studies of emotion. **Sanders** turns to deliberative speeches, arguing that a completely different set of emotions (fear, confidence, hope, shame and pride) is pertinent to this branch of oratory than those used in forensic speeches, evidenced by both the Attic corpus and representations of speeches in Thucydidean historiography. **Westwood** considers Demosthenes' *Letters*, written in his exile to the Athenian Assembly and Council, showing that in their emotional strategies – narrative of nostalgia to arouse pity

41 E.g. Aristotle: Fortenbaugh (1975) and (1979); Grimaldi (1980) *re Rh*. 1.1–2 and (1988) *re Rh*. 2.1–11; Conley (1982); Leighton (1996); Nussbaum (1996); Viano (2003); Ben-Ze'ev (2003); Konstan (2003) and (2006); Sanders (2014) 58–78; Dow (2015). Aristotle and Anaximenes: Konstan (2010). Aristotle to Cicero: Wisse (1989). Cicero: Fjelstad (2003); Powell (2007); Craig (2010). Cicero and Quintilian: Schrÿvers (1982); Webb (1997); Hall (2007). Quintilian: Cockcroft (1998); Katula (2003a) and (2003b).

42 E.g. Johnstone (1999) 109–25 on pity; Allen (2000) and (2003) on anger; Rubinstein (2000) 212–31 on gratitude; Fisher (2003) and Cairns (2003) on envy; Kurihara (2003) on hatred; Rubinstein (2004) on anger and hatred; Bers (2009) 77–98 on pity; Sanders (2012b) on anger, hatred and envy; Rubinstein (2014) on anger and pity; Sanders (forthcoming) on goodwill. On the Roman side, see Webb (1997) on indignation and pity; Craig (2010) on indignation. Also *re* invective, which implicitly has emotional aspects, see e.g. Steel (2006) 50–2; Powell (2007); Seager (2007).

43 See Jackson (this volume) on the last of these.

44 On which see respectively Hammond, Iurescia and Dickey (this volume). Eckert (this volume) uses sociological theories of 'trauma'.

and goodwill, and arousal of nostalgia in the reader/listener – they function very like actual speeches.

While Part I necessarily concentrates on (Classical) Greece, the attention of the remainder of the book is divided almost equally – though not symmetrically – between Greece (of all periods) and Rome. The following three Parts focus on three different directions in which study has spiralled out from Attic oratory. While it will become apparent that there is a range of interconnections between chapters in different sections, the organization that has been chosen highlights three particularly notable thematic groupings.

Part II examines a variety of ways in which emotion is used in the formation of community identity. **Chaniotis** considers how the authors of epigraphic texts from *poleis* across the Greek eastern Mediterranean sought to create a feeling of community through emotional arousal – a form of purportedly communal emotional performance. **Fragoulaki** returns to Thucydides, and considers two dramatic rhetorical occasions, in which emotional persuasion techniques are (or are consciously not) used internally between speaker and audience, and externally between Thucydides and his readers. **Eckert**'s is the first chapter to take us to Rome, with an interdisciplinary approach to the emotional response to cultural trauma (arising from Sulla's proscriptions), and its rhetorical use in Ciceronian forensic oratory and a range of later genres that borrow from and extend Cicero's techniques. Finally, **Jackson**'s chapter examines Plato's description of how emotions could be incited, moulded and instilled in a community through participation in choral dance techniques, leading to their socialization and mass persuasion to behaviour appropriate to the *polis*.

Part III considers emotive persuasion strategies in situations of unequal power. **Winter** compares Xenophon's *Hipparchicus* (*Cavalry Commander*), a technical treatise containing instruction in the manipulation of the emotions of one's men, political superiors and the enemy, but no examples, with practical examples in the same author's historiographical *Anabasis*. **Knight** examines narratives of *ira Caesaris* in poetry, philosophy and historiography, showing how Roman emperors could judiciously use displays of anger to persuade their subjects to submit to imperial control, and how this technique could be abused. **Hagen**'s chapter provides a counterfoil, moving from Cicero's theoretical advice on the rhetorical use of tears – as a somatic indicator of a variety of emotions – to practical examples in Roman historiography of emperors using tears as an emotive tool to persuade and control their subjects. **Johncock** takes us from the human to the divine, examining speeches in Ovid's *Metamorphoses* in which frequently a human tries, but fails, to persuade a god; however, Ovid succeeds in persuading his reader of the speaker's case, and inspiring him or her to pity.

Part IV has two foci, contributing to a greater or lesser extent to each chapter: linguistic formulae used to generate emotion, and genre-specific emotive persuasion. **Dickey** uses pragmatic theories of politeness to examine a shift from making requests via bald imperatives (Classical period) to the emergence of a language of politeness (Hellenistic period, both literary and papyrological texts), which reflects changes in language suggesting heightened emotion. **Salvo** exa-

mines how curses and magic spells (inscriptions and papyri) addressed to gods aimed to arouse the god's emotions to persuade him/her to make a mortal fall in love with the writer; the god's methods of doing this effectively comprise a secondary persuasion strategy that also might include emotion arousal – though different emotions to those aroused in the god. **Iurescia** takes a multi-disciplinary theoretical approach to quarrels in Roman comedy, exploring linguistic techniques through which negative emotions (anger and fear) can be aroused to throw a collocutor's judgment off-balance and manipulate them. Finally, **Hammond** uses discursive psychology to examine Catullus's emotional discourse – his choice of language and invention of linguistic terms – which both expresses the emotions of characters in his poems, and arouses the reader's emotions to persuade them of the verisimilitude of the depicted conversations.

As well as the connections between chapters in the same Part, a wide range of further thematic links will become apparent (and the reader's attention will be directed to these by the frequent cross-references between chapters). It is worthwhile here drawing attention to some of these thematic interconnections. While most of the chapters deal with *arousing* emotions in order to persuade, some (Chaniotis, Fragoulaki, Knight, Hagen, Dickey) instead/also deal with *displaying* or *performing* emotions – truly felt or otherwise – to persuade. Griffith-Williams and Fragoulaki both compare in depth two attempts at persuasion, one of which is made using emotional arguments, the other (at least at the surface level) avoiding them. Several chapters (Chaniotis, Hagen, Salvo, Johncock) focus on or refer to persuasion of gods. And several (Fragoulaki, Salvo, Johncock) involve persuasion of the reader.

We hope *our* reader is persuaded – emotionally or not – of the value of this collection.

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PART I:

EMOTION IN CLASSICAL GREEK ORATORY – NEW DIRECTIONS

BASHING THE ESTABLISHMENT

Chris Carey

Politics in Classical Athens (479–322 BCE) was in many respects unlike politics in modern democracies. In the modern world even in systems where the hold of government on power is shaky, or where power is exercised through coalitions, there is a degree of stability which allows for the continued exercise of power. There is also a single target for attack, in that power is consistently exercised by a definable (usually collective) entity. In Athens in contrast power was much more fluid. The absence of a concept of a state, for which Athens substitutes the *polis*, means that the government is the *dêmos*. Power amounts to influence over the *dêmos*. The existence of multiple competing groupings without the explicit ideological underpinnings of modern political parties means that influence can move around the system more freely. However, even within this system there is room for continuity. Fluidity is not chaos. Political factions could maintain a degree of influence for finite but extensive periods of time and we can at certain points in the fifth and fourth centuries identify the dominant group. So though there is no government in our sense, there is an approximation to what we would call 'the establishment'.[1] The notion itself, then as now, is itself both fluid and subjective. It can be the most influential faction, or more radically it can be the political class (*hoi politeuomenoi*) as a whole. The system is not binary, since we may have half a dozen or more factions operating at any time. Unlike the courts, where we have an explicit contest between named individuals, in the Assembly the need to focus on public policy, and the absence of a simple two-way contest limits (though it

1 The Oxford English Dictionary defines the establishment in this socio-political sense as 'a social group exercising power generally, or within a given field or institution, by virtue of its traditional superiority, and by the use esp. of tacit understandings and often a common mode of speech, and having as a general interest the maintenance of the *status quo*'. The claim to first use is disputed but the *OED* finds it as early as Rose Macauley's *Told by an idiot* in 1923: 'Thus, it will be observed, do the moderns of one day become the safe establishments of the next'. There is no Greek equivalent. But there are a number of terms which can be used to express the notion of a larger or smaller group which exerts influence on a regular basis, usually as a broad category rather than as a subset: *hoi politeuomenoi* ('the politicians'), *[hoi] rhêtores* ('the Assembly speakers'); this can then be narrowed to *hoi nun politeuomenoi* ('the current politicians'). Probably the term that comes closest to expressing the notion of a narrower circle again with a grip on policy is the term used by Demosthenes at 4.1, *hoi eiôthotes [legein]* 'the regular speakers', which suggests a recognizable group to whom less well known people will defer, or his *hoi tauta politeuomenoi* (3.1, 'the people responsible for these policies'), which indicates the dominant political configuration. In general however it is context usually which identifies the scope of the target group and the nature of its influence.

does not remove) the space for explicit group competition and individual abuse.[2] The focus has to be on policy failure. But it is still important for anyone seeking to enter the sphere of influence to align not just the ideas but also the feelings of the audience with himself and create a commensurate affective gap between the audience and those most likely to influence it. This chapter looks at ways of creating this emotional divide, specifically in the Assembly, though I make occasional forays into forensic oratory for illuminating parallels and to show the essential continuity across the spectrum of civic debate.

One useful tactic within this process of alienation and realignment is to set up a binary antithesis between the insider and the outsider. This is seen at its simplest, and at its least emotive, in the apologetic opening of the *First Philippic*, where Demosthenes explicitly draws attention to his status as a relative newcomer and justifies his decision to speak early in the debate on the ground that the policies of 'the usual speakers' have failed to deliver:[3]

> If the question to be debated were a new one, men of Athens, I should have waited until most of the usual speakers had declared their opinions, and if I was satisfied with any of their proposals, I should have stayed silent, and if not, I should then have tried to express my own views. But since the case is that we are still debating a point on which these people have often spoken before, I can reasonably be excused if I rise first to address you. For if in the past they had offered the right advice, there would be no need for deliberation today.[4]

The antithesis is developed with more overt appeal to the emotions in the attacks on those in charge of policy in the speech on the *Syntaxis* (speech 13) and the *Third Olynthiac* (speech 3):

> But, it may be said, this was the only respect in which things were better then than now, but in other respects they were worse. Not a bit of it; but let us examine any instance you choose. The buildings they left behind them to adorn the city – temples, harbours and their accessories – were so fine and so splendid that they have left no room for those who come after to surpass them; the Propylaea there, the docks, the colonnades and the other buildings, with which they beautified the city which they handed down to us. But the private houses of those who held power were so modest and so suited to the title of our constitution that if any of you knows the homes of Themistocles and Cimon and Aristides and the illustrious men of the day, he can see that they are no more splendid than those of their neighbours. But today, men of Athens, in its public works the city is happy with the provision of roads and fountains, stucco and nonsense (and I blame not those who proposed these constructions – far from it – but you, if you suppose that these are enough for you), while personally the individuals who control any of the public funds have some of them set up private houses which are not just prouder than those of the masses but more magnificent than our public building, and others have bought up and cultivated estates more vast than they ever dreamed of before. The reason for all this change is that then the people was lord and controller of everything and the rest were happy to accept

2 That the effect is, however, to limit the space rather than to preclude is nicely illustrated by Demosthenes, *Exord*. 53, who criticizes the constant squabbling among the regular speakers before going on to engage in a little mudslinging himself.

3 Translations of Demosthenes and Isocrates are based on the Loeb edition, with adjustments, sometimes substantial. Other translations are my own.

4 Dem. 4.1 = *Exord*.1.

> from them some share of honour and authority and reward; but now, on the contrary, these men control all these benefits and manage everything, while the people are in the position of lackey and appendage, and you are happy to accept whatever they dole out to you.[5]
>
> Alternatively let someone come forward and tell me what has made Philip powerful if not ourselves. 'But, my good man,' he might say, 'if our position abroad is bad, things in the city itself at least are better.' And what could one say by way of proof? The fortifications we are plastering, the streets we are paving, the fountains and such nonsense? But turn and look at the men whose policies have produced these results; some of them have gone from rags to riches, others from obscurity to eminence, some have set up their private houses more magnificent than the public buildings, and as the city's prosperity has declined, so theirs has increased.
> And what is the reason for this and why is it that everything was good then and not right now? Because then the people had the nerve to take action and march out itself and was lord of the politicians and controller of all the benefits and each of the rest was happy to receive from the people a share of honour and office and other good things. But now on the contrary the politicians control the benefits and manage everything, while you the people are hamstrung and stripped of money, allies and are in the position of lackey and appendage, happy if these people dole out the Theoric money to you and celebrate the Boedromia, and – most manly thing of all – you even feel grateful for what belongs to you.[6]

But within this more overtly adversarial approach there is room for further variation. Both speeches condemn the current policies and politicians in strong terms. But where the *Syntaxis* speech puts the emphasis throughout on the dominant group, the *Third Olynthiac* takes a broader approach, in that it expands the focus to attack the role of politicians generally and their relationship with the people. This in a sense is the ultimate presentation of the outsider position, since it implicitly contrasts the speaker not just with a subset of those active in politics but with the whole political establishment in the largest sense. The effect is almost to take him outside politics, though Demosthenes had in fact by this time been politically active for at least half a dozen years. The same gesture of stepping back from the political process can be seen in *Exord*. 53.1, where Demosthenes castigates the mutual recrimination of the Assembly speakers:

> The hubbub of bickering, men of Athens, which has tended throughout time to damage the city has now arisen from the same quarter as always. It's not so much these people who deserve to be criticized (they do it perhaps from anger and competitiveness, and above all because it is in their interests) but you, if when you have assembled for matters of great public significance you sit and listen to personal abuse and cannot reason in your heads that the constant traded insults from all the orators when nobody is on trial make you pay the price for their mutual attacks.

This basic antithesis between insider and outsider forms the foundation for a number of other antitheses designed to generate audience hostility and isolate and unseat the opponents. These show a striking persistence over time and across contexts or genres; evidently it was felt that they worked.

5 Dem. 13.28–31.
6 Dem. 3.28–31.