

SIMON J. JOSEPH

Jesus, Q,  
and the Dead Sea Scrolls

*Wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen  
zum Neuen Testament 2. Reihe*

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**Mohr Siebeck**

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Simon J. Joseph

# Jesus, Q, and the Dead Sea Scrolls

A Judaic Approach to Q

Mohr Siebeck

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*For Jennifer*



## Preface

This monograph is a thorough revision of my Ph. D. dissertation, “Q, the Essenes, and the Dead Sea Scrolls: A Study in Christian Origins,” submitted to the School of Religion at Claremont Graduate University in April, 2010. Special thanks are due to James M. Robinson, who directed my Q studies at Claremont. Dr. Robinson kindly supported and encouraged my work for the International Q Project and the Institute for Antiquity and Christianity on the Q 12:22b–31 database for the *Documenta Q* series and graciously described my dissertation project as reaching “a new stage in the academic study of first-century Judaism and Christianity.” Special thanks are also due to Vincent L. Wimbush, whose support and encouragement were instrumental in my pursuit of doctoral research while I was completing a Master’s degree in Religious Studies at New York University. Dr. Wimbush served as the second reader for my Master’s thesis on Asceticism and the Jesus Tradition in Q, and encouraged my engagement with the political and ideological implications of contemporary biblical scholarship. I am also grateful to Kristin de Troyer, whose ability to navigate Q Studies, Second Temple Judaism, and postmodern critical theory with wit and grace was inspiring. Her careful readings and comments were invaluable. Thanks also go to Karen L. Torjesen for her assistance throughout my coursework and qualifying exams and for serving as the third member of my committee.

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July, 2012

Simon J. Joseph

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## Chapter 1

# Introduction and Methodology

### 1.1 Introduction

“Judaism” and “Christianity” are commonly regarded as two distinct, separate categories and religions in biblical scholarship.<sup>1</sup> Yet the Jesus movement originated as a *Jewish* movement.<sup>2</sup> The relationship between Judaism and Christianity, therefore, is both complex and paradoxical and the (re)description of Christian origins has become a central site of debate in biblical studies.<sup>3</sup> The study of the relationship between Judaism and Christianity is a particularly pertinent example of how social and religious difference is constructed. Jonathan Z. Smith has shown that a “dichotomous agenda of division” has frequently been employed in the classification of religions, which tends to render such classifications “useless.”<sup>4</sup> Smith has also drawn attention to the comparative process in relation to the construction of the “other.”<sup>5</sup> For

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<sup>1</sup> Some recent scholarship has begun to challenge this assumption. See Adam H. Becker and Annette Yoshiko Reed, eds., *The Ways that Never Parted: Jews and Christians in Late Antiquity and the Early Middle Ages* (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2007); Daniel Boyarin, *Dying for God: Martyrdom and the Making of Christianity and Judaism* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999); *Border Lines: The Partition of Judaeo-Christianity* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004); Stephen G. Wilson, *Related Strangers: Jews and Christians 70–170 C.E.* (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1995); Jacob Neusner, *Jews and Christians: The Myth of a Common Tradition* (Philadelphia: Trinity Press International, 1991).

<sup>2</sup> Jacob Neusner, *Judaism in the Beginning of Christianity* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1984); Bruce Chilton and Jacob Neusner, *Judaism in the New Testament* (London: Routledge, 1995).

<sup>3</sup> See, for example, Ron Cameron and Merrill P. Miller, eds., *Redescribing Christian Origins* (SBLSymS 28; Atlanta: SBL, 2004); Elizabeth A. Castelli and Hal Taussig, eds., *Reimagining Christian Origins: A Colloquium Honoring Burton L. Mack* (Valley Forge: Trinity Press International, 1996); James G. Crossley, *Why Christianity Happened: A Sociohistorical Account of Christian Origins (26–50 CE)* (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 2006); Ward Blanton, *Displacing Christian Origins: Philosophy, Secularity, and the New Testament* (RP; Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007).

<sup>4</sup> Jonathan Z. Smith, “Fences and Neighbors: Some Contours of Early Judaism,” in *Imagining Religion: From Babylon to Jonestown* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), 1–18, esp. 6.

<sup>5</sup> Jonathan Z. Smith, “What a Difference a Difference Makes,” in *To See Ourselves As Others See us”: Christians, Jews, “Others” in Late Antiquity* (SH; eds. J. Neusner and E. S. Frerichs; Chico: Scholars, 1985), 3–48.

Smith, “Difference is not a matter of comparison between entities judged to be equivalent; rather, difference most frequently entails a hierarchy of prestige and ranking.”<sup>6</sup> Distinctions are drawn between “near neighbors” and the “proximate other.” Otherness is “a relativistic category,” a “term of interaction,” “a political and linguistic project, a matter of rhetoric and judgement.”<sup>7</sup> Since the “other” is a socio-cultural construct, the greatest tension is located in cases where the other is perceived as being “*too-much-like-us*, or when he claims to *be-us*.”<sup>8</sup> The problem is not so much with how to locate or place the “other,” but rather how “to situate ourselves.” The problem is not “otherness,” but similarity. This is pressed home when we consider that Jews are thought of as being “near-Christians.”<sup>9</sup> Ancient Jews, like many other groups, saw the world in bipolar terms, i.e., as Israel and the nations, Jews and Gentiles.<sup>10</sup> Daniel Boyarin argues that Paul constructed a set of binary oppositions in which “Christianity” became the symbolic religious marker of the universal, transcendent, and trans-local while Judaism assumed the role of the other, embodying the particular, the ethnic, the local.<sup>11</sup> Judaism was the “promise,” Christianity the “fulfillment.” Judaism had the “law,” Christianity the “gospel.” Judaism was “particularistic,” Christianity “universal.” The construction of the “hermeneutical Jew” also facilitated a contrast between Jews and Christians and shaped the history of Christian apologetics, sermons, heresiological works, commentaries, histories, historical fictions, martyr stories, and impe-

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<sup>6</sup> Smith, “What a Difference a Difference Makes,” 15, 16, with the result that constructed difference has often “supplied a justificatory element for a variety of ideological postures, ranging from xenophobia to exoticism, from travel, trade and exploration to military conquest, slavery and colonialism.”

<sup>7</sup> Smith, “What a Difference a Difference Makes,” 46.

<sup>8</sup> Smith, “What a Difference a Difference Makes,” 47. See also William Scott Green, “Otherness Within: Towards a Theory of Difference in Rabbinic Judaism,” in *To See Ourselves As Others See us”: Christians, Jews, “Others” in Late Antiquity* (eds. J. Neusner and E. S. Frerichs; Chico: Scholars, 1985), 50; Brian Stock, *The Implications of Literacy: Written Language and Models of Interpretation in the Eleventh and Twelfth Centuries* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), 90; Jacob Neusner, ed., *Take Judaism, For Example: Studies Toward the Comparison of Religions* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983).

<sup>9</sup> Smith, “What a Difference a Difference Makes,” 48.

<sup>10</sup> Shaye J. D. Cohen, *The Beginnings of Jewishness: Boundaries, Varieties, Uncertainties* (HCS 31; Berkeley, Calif: University of California Press, 1999), 1. See also Erich S. Gruen, “Jewish Perspectives on Greek Culture and Ethnicity” in *Ancient Perceptions of Greek Ethnicity* (ed. I. Malkin; Cambridge, Mass.: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 347–73; Tim Whitmarsh, *Greek Literature and the Roman Empire: The Politics of Imitation* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001). See also Edith Hall, *Inventing the Barbarian: Greek Self-Definition through Tragedy* (Oxford: Clarendon), 1989, 56–69.

<sup>11</sup> Daniel Boyarin, “Semantic Differences; or, “Judaism”/“Christianity,” in *The Ways That Never Parted: Jews and Christians in Late Antiquity and the Early Middle Ages* (eds. A. H. Becker and A. Y. Reed; Minneapolis: Fortress, 2007), 65–85, esp. 73; *A Radical Jew: Paul and the Politics of Identity* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), 14.

rial decrees.<sup>12</sup> Christianity was perceived as “superseding” Judaism.<sup>13</sup> The construction of Judaism in New Testament scholarship came to be rooted in a conception of Judaism as *antithetical* to Christianity.<sup>14</sup> Facilitated by the construction of a “parting of the ways” model that mirrored “the configuration of disciplinary boundaries,” Judaism and Christianity came to be seen not as two mutually interrelated religious traditions, but as separate, oppositional paradigms.<sup>15</sup> The ancient invention of the “Jew” and “Judaism” emerged in the service of identity politics, social conflict, and “Christian” theology. The gentile constituency of the early Jesus movement came to regard itself as a new *ἔθνος*,<sup>16</sup> claiming that there was now “neither Judean nor Greek” *ἐν χριστῷ*.<sup>17</sup>

The separation between Judaism and Christianity was facilitated by the idea that Jews were a different *ἔθνος* from (gentile) Christians. Those “*Jewish Christians*” who maintained Judean practices *and* revered Jesus undermined the dichotomous theological construction of Jew/Christian and functioned as a constant reminder of the constructed opposites, blurred boundaries, and inherent hybridity of the new “Christian” *ἔθνος*. This is why both groups sought to expel such “heretics” from their midst: the “Christians” fighting the Gnostics and “Jewish Christians,” the “Jews” rejecting their own as *minim*.

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<sup>12</sup> Paula Fredriksen, “What ‘Parting of the Ways’?: Jews, Gentiles, and the Ancient Mediterranean City,” in *The Ways That Never Parted: Jews and Christians in Late Antiquity and the Early Middle Ages* (eds. A. H. Becker and A. Y. Reed; Minneapolis: Fortress, 2007), 35–63. On the hermeneutical Jew in patristic theology, see Ora Limor and Guy G. Stroumsa, eds., *Contra Iudaeos: Ancient and Medieval Polemics between Christians and Jews* (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1996); Graham N. Stanton and Guy G. Stroumsa, eds., *Tolerance and Intolerance in Early Judaism and Christianity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Judith Lieu, *Image and Reality: The Jews in the World of the Christians in the Second Century* (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1996). Gregory Baum, introduction to *Faith and Fratricide: The Theological Roots of Anti-Semitism*, by Rosemary Radford Ruether (New York: Seabury, 1974), 1–22, esp. 12–13.

<sup>13</sup> Adolf von Harnack, *Die Mission und Ausbreitung des Christentums in den ersten drei Jahrhunderten* (2 vols.; 3d ed.; Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs, 1915), 1:70–71; ET: *The Mission of Early Christianity* (trans. J. Moffatt; 2 vols; New York: G. P. Putnam, 1904-05), 1:81–82. For a critique of Harnack, see L. Michael White, “Adolf Harnack and the ‘Expansion’ of Early Christianity: A Reappraisal of Society History,” *Second Century* 5 (1985–86): 97–127.

<sup>14</sup> E. P. Sanders, *Paul and Palestinian Judaism: A Comparison of Patterns in Religion* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1977), 2.

<sup>15</sup> Becker & Reed, *The Ways that Never Parted*, 20; John J. Collins, “Cult and Culture: The Limits of Hellenization in Judea,” in *Hellenism in the Land of Israel* (eds. J. J. Collins and G. E. Sterling; Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 2001), 38–61, esp. 38.

<sup>16</sup> Aristides, *Apol.* 2; Tertullian, *Ad Nat.* 8; *Scorp.* 10. See also Marcel Simon, *Verus Israel* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), 107–11.

<sup>17</sup> David G. Horrell, “‘No Longer Jew or Greek’: Paul’s Corporate Christology and the Construction of Christian Community,” in *Christology, Controversy and Community: New Testament Essays in Honour of David R. Catchpole* (eds. D. G. Horrell and C. M. Tuckett; NovTSup 99; Leiden: Brill, 2000), 321–44, esp. 343.



Early Christians defined their boundaries in numerous ways. One way was the founding of a canon, a rule, or “standard.” The creation of a canon excluded noncanonical texts and the communities that produced those texts. Jewish Christian texts did not survive because they did not contribute to a “Christian” identity defined in opposition to Judaism. The texts that did survive tended to support a sense of Christian difference.<sup>18</sup> Early Christianity is characterized by the creativity of its literary production.<sup>19</sup> Since the production of texts involves acts of power, exclusion, and inclusion, it is within the production of texts that identity is most prominently displayed. Texts not only construct identity, they also shape and are shaped by a community’s self-understanding.<sup>20</sup> Texts construct worlds, and new textual worlds become part of the reality within and out of which new constructions are made.<sup>21</sup>

The New Testament documents the emergence of a new “Christian” identity. By the time the synoptics were written, a systematic “othering” of Jews had become a regular literary feature, if not a social event, of early Christianity. By the time of Justin, “Christian” self-definition was normative: Christians were not “Jews” and did not follow “Jewish” practices or observances. For early Christians, the role of the “other” was thus played, often unwittingly, by Jews.<sup>22</sup> The construction of Christian identity is therefore to be understood in relation to the separation between Judaism and Christianity.<sup>23</sup>

There is no need to document an age-old Christian dislike for things Jewish.<sup>24</sup> Christianity defined itself as different from Judaism,<sup>25</sup> and Judaism was made into the signifier of (that which was not) Christianity.<sup>26</sup> Jews, Jewish Christians and gentile Christians all claimed identity as “true Israel.” It was inevitable that conflict would be the result of such contestation. It was also inevitable that those conflicts would become embedded in Christian discourse and biblical scholarship.<sup>27</sup> The study of the relationship between Judaism and

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<sup>18</sup> Lieu, *Christian Identity*, 299.

<sup>19</sup> Lieu, *Christian Identity*, 48.

<sup>20</sup> Lieu, *Christian Identity*, 25–27.

<sup>21</sup> Lieu, *Christian Identity*, 61.

<sup>22</sup> Lieu, *Christian Identity*, 307.

<sup>23</sup> Lieu, *Christian Identity*, 3.

<sup>24</sup> Peter Richardson, David Granskou, eds., *Anti-Judaism in Early Christianity* (2 vols.; Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier: University Press, 1986); Rosemary Redford Ruether, *Faith and Fratricide: The Theological Roots of Anti-Semitism* (New York: Seabury, 1974), 64–116; Samuel Sandmel, *Anti-Semitism in the New Testament?* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1978); Charlotte Kleio, *Anti-Judaism in Christian Theology* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1978).

<sup>25</sup> John F. A. Sawyer, *Sacred Languages and Sacred Texts* (London: Routledge, 1999), 85.

<sup>26</sup> Susanna Heschel, *Abraham Geiger and the Jewish Jesus* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), 21.

<sup>27</sup> Shawn Kelley, *Racializing Jesus: Race, Ideology, and the Formation of Modern Bibli-*

Christianity thus requires considerable sensitivity to the social, political, and theological implications involved in the comparative process.

## 1.2 On the Comparative Method

The comparative process is a fundamental characteristic of human intelligence, the basic method underlying classification, cognition and information processing.<sup>28</sup> It is the “omnipresent substructure of human thought” without which we could not speak, learn, perceive or reason.<sup>29</sup> Comparison has the capacity to help us see the world in new ways and make connections which often lead to scientific breakthroughs when new perspectives on familiar materials are reached.<sup>30</sup> In the field of religion, it also has the capacity to examine and explore many common elements of the human experience.<sup>31</sup> Unfortunately, comparative studies often appear deceptively simple.<sup>32</sup> Comparison

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*cal Scholarship* (London: Routledge, 2002), 24, explores how Hegel’s narrative of world history constructed a binary opposition between Jews and Christians in order to assuage Europe’s anxiety about its own origins.

<sup>28</sup> Jonathan Z. Smith, “Adde Parvum Parvo Magnus Acervus Erit,” *HR* 11 (1971): 67–90, esp. 67. See also *Map is Not Territory: Studies in the Histories of Religions* (SJLA 23; Leiden: Brill, 1978); *Imagining Religion: From Babylon to Jonestown* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982).

<sup>29</sup> Smith, “Adde Parvum,” 67.

<sup>30</sup> Jonathan Z. Smith, *Drudgery Divine: On the Comparison of Early Christianities and the Religions of Late Antiquity* (JLCR 14/CSHJ; Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), viii. For Smith, progress is made in this “not so much by the uncovering of new facts or documents as by looking again with new perspectives on familiar materials.” Alternative approaches often provide new insights that challenge our assumptions even when existing theories appear to account for much of the data before us. After all, it is frequently readings “against the grain” of accepted or common interpretations that expose the “gaps, breaks, inconsistencies and problems” which underlie ideologically or theologically driven readings of texts, and it is these gaps which are more interesting than the systematic structures. Consequently, we should not be afraid of scientific inquiry that breaks old rules. Throughout history, scientific advances have been made because certain scientists “decided not to be bound by certain ‘obvious’ methodological rules, or because they unwittingly broke them.” See also Mieke Bal, *Death and Dissymmetry: The Politics of Coherence in the Book of Judges* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), 34; Paul Feyerabend, *Against Method: Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge* (New Jersey: Atlantic Highlands, 1988), 23. See also Thomas Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962).

<sup>31</sup> Charles H. Long, *Significations: Signs, Symbols, and Images in the Interpretation of Religion* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1986), 141: “it is in the religious life of humankind that we are best able to discern the human mode of being.”

<sup>32</sup> Jeffrey Carter, “Comparison in the History of Religions: Reflections and Critiques.” *M TSR*, 16/ 1 (2004): 3–11, esp. 5, defines comparison as “the consideration of how two apparently distinct entities are similar and different for the purpose of determining the degree to

has often been used for apologetic purposes, to emphasize or suppress difference, affirm and/or deny relationship.<sup>33</sup> Comparative approaches have also been accused of misrepresentation and essentialism as well as suppression of cultural difference, neglect of historical context, superficiality, and impressionism.<sup>34</sup> As a result, comparative studies are often rejected in favor of culturally specific “area studies,” where the object of study is limited to specific traditions in their historical context(s).<sup>35</sup>

Jonathan Z. Smith has called for a renewed focus not only on the history of the use of comparison in scholarship but on how to address the “deeper questions of method and the underlying implications of comparison” that many disciplines have ignored.<sup>36</sup> Since comparison is a fundamental expression of human intelligence, it does not seem that human beings, let alone scholars, can avoid comparison. The challenge is establishing sound criteria to facilitate methodologically legitimate comparisons.<sup>37</sup> Sound comparative study must balance and accommodate both the general and the particular,<sup>38</sup> recognizing

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which they can be intellectually grouped or separated.” Smith, “Adde,” 67, also defines comparison as “the bringing together of two or more objects for the purpose of noting either similarity or dissimilarity.”

<sup>33</sup> Some comparative approaches have been characterized by rationalist or universalist agendas. For example, James G. Frazer’s *The Golden Bough*, an encyclopedic opus of world ritual and myth, attempts to document the universal (hence, pre-Christian) motif of the symbolic death and resurrection of the divine king. Similarly, Mircea Eliade proposed that religion is characterized by the use of universal patterns, symbols or motifs that correspond to a higher, transcendent reality known as “the sacred.”

<sup>34</sup> Carter, “Comparison in the History of Religions,” 3. For critiques, see Samuel Sandmel, “Parallelomania,” *JBL* 81 (1962): 1–13; L. Michael White and John T. Fitzgerald, “Quod est comparandum: The Problem of Parallels,” in *Early Christianity and Classical Culture: Comparative Studies in Honor of A. J. Malherbe* (eds. J. T. Fitzgerald, T. H. Olbricht and L. M. White; NovTSup 110; Leiden: Brill, 2003), 13–39; Shemaryahu Talmon, “The ‘Comparative Method’ in Biblical Interpretation—Principles and Problems,” in *Congress Volume: Göttingen 1977*, VTSup 29; Leiden: Brill, 1978), 320–56; Jacob Neusner, “Contexts of Comparison: Reciprocally Reading Gospels’ and Rabbis’ Parables,” in *The Missing Jesus*, 45–68.

<sup>35</sup> Smith, *Drudgery Divine*, vii. Smith notes how comparison has come to be “the sign of unscientific procedure, abjured in the name of responsibility towards the concrete specificity of their objects of study.”

<sup>36</sup> Smith, “Adde,” 90.

<sup>37</sup> Carter, “Comparison in the History of Religions,” 6–7, argues that comparison requires theoretical justification because a parallel, “divorced from a conscious stipulation of theory is little more than happy coincidence, random relationship, insignificant noodling, and hence is easily criticized.” As Carter notes, “both similarity and difference are at work in the cognitive process of categorization. Neither concept, neither ‘similarity’ nor ‘difference,’ can exclude the presence of the other because each requires a selection between possible entities, cognitive contents, or features of entities. It is in this selection process that we negotiate the complex possibilities of similarity and difference, consider alternatives, and ultimately stipulate which features constitute similarity and which do not.”

<sup>38</sup> Jeffrey Carter, “Description is not Explanation: A Methodology of Comparison,” *MTSR*

both precise points of reference while simultaneously affirming difference.<sup>39</sup> Accordingly, Smith calls for replacing the category of the “unique” with the recognition of distinctiveness and the affirmation of difference, an approach that “invites negotiation, classification and comparison, and avoids too easy a discourse of the ‘same.’”<sup>40</sup> The comparative enterprise always involves “the stipulation of similarity and difference.”<sup>41</sup>

For Smith, comparison does not seek the equation or identity of two things, but rather a “disciplined exaggeration” of two phenomena in order to shed light on unrecognized aspects of one or both items.<sup>42</sup> *Comparison requires the recognition of difference.* The scholar brings certain features of differences together and asks “with respect to what” is identity and difference being noted?<sup>43</sup> The essence of comparison “consists of a mixture of identity and difference.”<sup>44</sup> While Smith recognizes that comparing texts, rituals and commu-

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10/2 (1998): 133–148, esp. 133. Carter acknowledges “a problematic contrast between the concern for particularity . . . and a desire for generality . . . a sound comparative study somehow negotiates this contest and accommodates both the particular and the general.

<sup>39</sup> William E. Paden, “Elements of a New Comparativism,” *M TSR* 8 (1996): 5–14. See also Shemaryahu Talmon, “The ‘Comparative Method,’” in *Congress Volume, Göttingen 1977* (VT Sup 29; Leiden: Brill, 1978); *Scripture in Context: Essays on the Comparative Method* (eds. C. D. Evans, W. W. Hallo and J. B. White; PT 34; Pittsburgh: Pickwick, 1980).

<sup>40</sup> Smith, *Drudgery Divine*, 42.

<sup>41</sup> Carter, “Comparison in the History of Religions,” 6.

<sup>42</sup> Smith, *Drudgery Divine*.

<sup>43</sup> Smith, *Drudgery Divine*, 51–52. Smith argues that comparison “brings differences together within the space of the scholar’s mind . . . It is the scholar who makes their cohabitation – their ‘sameness’ – possible . . . (Comparison) “lifts out and strongly marks certain features within difference as being of possible intellectual significance.”

<sup>44</sup> Smith identifies four “classes” of comparison: (1) cultural; (2) historical; (3) assimilation (diffusion, or borrowing); and (4) comparison as a hermeneutic device. According to Smith, these four classes of comparison correspond to four modes or styles of comparison: ethnographic, encyclopedic, morphological and evolutionary. The first class, cultural comparison, tends to simply describe cultural features, and is often “idiosyncratic, depending on intuition, a chance association” or limited knowledge. The second, historical (corresponding to encyclopedic) comparison, is often characterized by “contextless lists” held together by surface associations rather than careful, specific and meaningful comparisons. The third approach is characterized by “the noting of similarity . . . and the accounting for this similarity in terms of a process of borrowing.” Often utilizing “diffusionist” theories, this approach tends to introduce historical frameworks into the comparative enterprise, usually by trying to get back to the earliest expression of a particular motif, idea or symbol. Hence high value is placed on pedigree. Naturally, this approach can be seen as threatening to those whose traditions proceed from earlier ones with “a clear sense of higher value and authenticity attached to the source and a sense of second handedness, of imitation, and even of fraud attached to the alleged borrower.” Furthermore, “there is frequently a strong sense of in- and out-groups, of peoples from whom it is alright to have borrowed and peoples from whom one ought not (70).” The fourth class, comparison as a hermeneutical device, holds that a motif, symbol or custom found in one culture can be used as a key to interpret a similar one in another culture.

nities is as old as our earliest literary documents,<sup>45</sup> too much prior discussion on method neglects “methodological rigor in answering the fundamental question: ‘when is a parallel a true parallel?’”<sup>46</sup> The majority of cases in the history of comparison involve a “subjective experience . . . projected as an objective connection through some theory of influence, diffusion, borrowing, or the like.”<sup>47</sup> For Smith, this is “a process of working from a psychological association to an historical one; it is to assert that similarity and contiguity have causal effect.” This is not science, but “magic.”<sup>48</sup> Too much comparative study is “impressionistic” and lacks the methodological rigor attained in such fields as comparative law, literature, and philology.<sup>49</sup>

Smith’s critical study of comparative method is especially helpful in the study of Christian origins for he has shown that genealogical comparisons are often dismissed or ignored in order to preserve a privileged position for early Christianity, i.e., to make Christianity *incomparable*.<sup>50</sup> The “unique” does not allow for comparison.<sup>51</sup> Smith suggests that instead of attempting to establish Christianity’s “uniqueness,” comparative studies should develop “a discourse of ‘difference,’” which would also avoid discourses of the “‘same.’”<sup>52</sup> Smith highlights one of the most difficult problems facing New Testament scholars:

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Such comparisons are used to argue for either a common archetype or to justify comparing similar stages of human development.

<sup>45</sup> Jonathan Z. Smith, *Map Is Not Territory: Studies in the History of Religions* (SJLA 23; Leiden: Brill, 1978), 240.

<sup>46</sup> Smith, *Map Is Not Territory*, 241, n. 3. On parallels, see Herbert J. Rose, *Concerning Parallels* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1934); Henri Frankfort, *The Problem of Similarity in Ancient Near Eastern Religions* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1951); Bruce M. Metzger, “Considerations of Method in the Study of Mystery Religions,” *HTR* 48 (1955): 1–20; Morton Smith, *Tannaitic Parallels to the Gospels* (SBLMS 6; Philadelphia: Society of Biblical Literature, 1951).

<sup>47</sup> Jonathan Z. Smith, “In Comparison a Magic Dwells,” in *Imagining Religion: From Babylon to Jonestown* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), 22.

<sup>48</sup> Smith, “In Comparison a Magic Dwells,” 22.

<sup>49</sup> In historical and comparative linguistics, the comparative method is used for studying the development of languages, to reconstruct prehistoric phases of languages and to explore hypothetical relationships between languages. Developed over the course of the nineteenth century, the comparative method was (and is) used as a means of establishing genetic and genealogical relationships between language systems. There are a series of methodological steps required for demonstrating genetic relationship, which include the identification of cognates, determining their sound correspondences, reconstructing proto-phonemes and examining the systems typologically.

<sup>50</sup> Smith, *Drudgery Divine*, 48: “from a standpoint of protecting the privileged position of early Christianity, it is only genealogical comparisons that are worthy of note, typically, insistently to be denied.” See also John Hick and Paul F. Knitter, *The Myth of Christian Uniqueness: Toward a Pluralistic Theology of Religions* (Maryknoll: Orbis, 1987).

<sup>51</sup> Smith, *Drudgery Divine*, 116.

<sup>52</sup> Smith, *Drudgery Divine*, 42.

the challenge of (re)describing early Christianity's emergence as *a distinct entity (entities) within the genetic matrix of Judaism*.

Smith criticizes both the indiscriminate pursuit of identifying instances of "borrowing," with its implications of "prestigious origins (pedigree),"<sup>53</sup> as well as the construction of a static picture of Judaism as a cultural "background" against which to contrast the "uniqueness" of Christianity. For Smith, such portraits depict early Christian materials as dynamic, while Jewish, Gnostic, or pagan texts are regarded as somehow "frozen" in time.<sup>54</sup> James M. Robinson has also criticized studying the New Testament in terms of its Jewish "background" since (re)constructions dependent on such "background" studies tend to relegate Judaism to "a static backdrop or stage setting."<sup>55</sup> He suggests categorizing the concept of "background" as *trajectories* since this method can be used to apply "both to the most embracing movement in which a whole culture is caught up . . . or the trajectory of one specific religious tradition within the wider streams of movement."<sup>56</sup> The term itself signifies the sense of *movement* inherent to developing traditions far more than the *static* term "background." Such a re-orientation might allow for more nuanced reconstructions and models of historical development.<sup>57</sup>

Comparative study is never disinterested; it is always a "technique of persuasion," a rhetorical device or discursive strategy intended to move an audience in a particular direction. Comparison is a political act informed by ideological interests.<sup>58</sup> Alleged "influences" between texts or literary traditions

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<sup>53</sup> Smith, *Drudgery Divine*, 47.

<sup>54</sup> James M. Robinson and Helmut Koester, *Trajectories through Early Christianity* (eds. J. M. Robinson and H. Koester; Philadelphia: Fortress, 1971), 108.

<sup>55</sup> James M. Robinson, "Introduction: The Dismantling and Reassembling of the Categories of New Testament Scholarship," in *Trajectories*, 12. This was especially the case in older "history of religions" research which tended to view the ancient world as a monolithic unity: "the religious world through which early Christianity moved has been conceptualized as strangely immobile . . . Research had not advanced to the point where layers of tradition could be distinguished. The fragmentary state of the documentation did not permit tracing step by step a series of developments but required the amalgamation of references scattered over half a millennium into one coherent and harmonized picture."

<sup>56</sup> Robinson, "Introduction: The Dismantling," 13–14.

<sup>57</sup> Robinson, "Introduction: The Dismantling," 16: "Not only are specific trajectories to be understood and evaluated with reference to their interplay with overarching trajectories; also specific events, individuals, documents, and positions become intelligible only in terms of the trajectories in which they are caught up. At one stage of a movement a document may function in a specific way, have a certain meaning or influence on the movement; at a subsequent stage on the trajectory that document, unaltered, may function or cut in a different way, may mean in effect something different, may influence the movement differently."

<sup>58</sup> See Bruce Lincoln, *Death, War and Sacrifice: Studies in Ideology and Practice* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 244. Terry Eagleton, *Ideology: An Introduction* (London: Verso, 1991), 3, points out that ideology can refer to how signs and meaning are produced; to a body of ideas held by a social group or class; ideas which legitimate dominant

can betray nationalistic motivations.<sup>59</sup> Comparative constructions can be “and often are ‘fabrications.’”<sup>60</sup> Fortunately, scholars are increasingly cognizant of the fact that ideology, location, interest and politics inform every interpretation (and/or comparison) of text and/or history.<sup>61</sup> But if it is true that we (re)construct, i.e., (re)invent the past for contemporary interests, one might well ask: how can we (re)construct an ancient past that we have no non-mediated access to? How can we responsibly conduct research into Christian origins when we know that all readings are “ideological” readings? These are important questions, especially when we consider that we always run the risk of exchanging one ideologically mythic narrative for another.<sup>62</sup>

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political power; distorted communication; ideas motivated by social interests; the medium in and through which people live in relation to social structure(s); or most commonly, preconceived ideas which distort understanding. Eagleton defines ideologies as “belief systems characteristic of certain social groups or classes, comprised of both discursive and non-discursive elements.” In a more negative sense, ideologies can be understood as flawed, false belief systems that legitimize social oppression. Vernon Robbins, *The Tapestry of Early Christian Discourse: Rhetoric, Society, and Ideology* (London: Routledge, 1996), 96, follows David Davis’ definition of ideology as “an integrated system of beliefs, assumptions and values, not necessarily true or false, that reflect the needs and interests of a group or class at a particular time in history.” See David Brion Davis, *The Problem of Slavery in the Age of Revolution, 1770-1823* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1975), 14. According to Robbins, ideologies are present in the production and framing of texts and in the history of interpretation of texts. Ideological criticism is a relatively new approach in New Testament studies. See John S. Kloppenborg, “Ideological Texture in the Parable of the Tenants,” in *Fabrics of Discourse: Essays in Honor of Vernon K. Robbins* (Harrisburg: Trinity Press International, 2003), 64–88.

<sup>59</sup> Arturo Farinelli, “Literary Influences and the Pride of Nations,” *YCGL* 36 (1987): 69–74.

<sup>60</sup> Morten H. Jensen, “On How Making Differences Makes a Difference,” in *Introducing Religion: Essays in Honour of Jonathan Z. Smith* (eds. W. Braun and R. T. McCutcheon; London: Equinox, 2008), 147.

<sup>61</sup> Hayden White, “Afterword” in Victoria E. Bonnell and Lynn Hunt, eds., *Beyond the Cultural Turn: New Directions in the Study of Society and Culture* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), 315–324, 324, criticizes “a certain ideology of social science that pretends to be free of ideology and capable of perceiving social reality in a ‘disinterested’ manner.” Western academic social science itself is “shot through with ideological preconceptions about the nature of social reality and the proper way to study it.” See also Hans-Georg Gadamer, “On the Scope and Function of Hermeneutical Reflection,” in *Philosophical Hermeneutics* (ed. D. E. Linge; Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976), 28, argued that historical understanding always develops within particular traditions of knowledge that involve presuppositions on the part of the interpreter. Melanie Johnson-Debaufre, *Jesus among Her Children: Q, Eschatology, and the Construction of Christian Origins* (HTS 55; Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005), 9–10, reminds us that there is no such thing as “objective” scholarship, as all scholars are to some extent “interested” and socially located.

<sup>62</sup> Bruce Lincoln, *Theorizing Myth: Narrative, Ideology, and Scholarship* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999), 209, recognizes this dilemma and characterizes scholarship as “myth with footnotes.”

The problem is that if biblical scholars do *not* provide the models for contemporary reflection on Christian origins, others most certainly will.<sup>63</sup> We cannot, therefore, *not* do readings in Christian origins, as assumptions and presuppositions always inform our scholarship, but we can aspire to perform “thicker” readings that reflect informed research and training in the field.<sup>64</sup> So while ideological investments can be identified in virtually all critical scholarship, this does not mean that critical scholarship is illegitimate. On the contrary, it is precisely the ideological interests inherent in critical scholarship that makes (and keeps!) things interesting.<sup>65</sup> The study of Christian origins need not be a naive, pre-critical, apologetic, pseudo-scientific re-inscription of (canonical) scripture, but can (and should) be an incisive, critical, investigative, and self-reflexive willingness to challenge paradigms, question assumptions and come to new conclusions by holding problematic categories and issues in creative tension for further study and reflection.

The study of early Christian social formation should evoke a sense of movement, not stasis.<sup>66</sup> Human behavior is ever evolving, constantly shifting and changing as new practices emerge.<sup>67</sup> Early Christianity arose at a time when different groups were undergoing rapid social change. It might be preferable to think in terms of *polygenesis*,<sup>68</sup> practice,<sup>69</sup> and “*continuity in difference*,” perspectives that assume that there is no such thing as “pure beginnings.”<sup>70</sup> It is hybridity, “not purity, [that] characterizes historical prac-

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<sup>63</sup> Jacques Berlinerbrau, *The Secular Bible: Why Nonbelievers Must Take Religion Seriously* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), referring to less critical interpreters of the tradition.

<sup>64</sup> Clifford Geertz, *The Interpretation of Cultures* (New York: Basic, 1973), 3–30.

<sup>65</sup> Kloppenborg Verbin, *Excavating Q*, 443: “many of the historiographic endeavors in the field of Christian origins will show, I think, that ideological (theological as well as antitheological) subtexts lurk beneath the often pretended objectivity of criticism. That is not a defect of criticism. It is what makes historical criticism of interest in the first place.”

<sup>66</sup> A number of social theorists use theories of practice, which posit that individual action exists only within a context, site or background of practices that assume human agency and constitute social formations. See, for example, Theodore R. Schatzki, *The Site of the Social: A Philosophical Account of the Constitution of Social Life and Change* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2002).

<sup>67</sup> Smith, *Drudgery Divine*, 106, insists on “the recognition and role of historical development and change.”

<sup>68</sup> William E. Arnal and Willi Braun, “Social Formation and Mythmaking: Theses on Key Terms,” in *Redescribing Christian Origins* (eds. R. Cameron and M. P. Miller; Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2004), 459–67, esp. 463, n. 6.

<sup>69</sup> Karen L. King, *What is Gnosticism?* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003), 228–33.

<sup>70</sup> King, *What is Gnosticism?*, 229. Since religious traditions are constantly in the process of formation, deformation and reformation, they are “constructions that require assiduous, ongoing labor to maintain in the face of both contested power relations within, and porous, overlapping boundaries with traditions without (230).” The task of history, therefore, is to



esses.”<sup>71</sup> Religious traditions are subject to processes of “amalgamation, of blending heterogeneous beliefs and practices.”<sup>72</sup> Traditions borrow from each other; community borders are often undefined. The communities comprising ancient Judaism and early Christianity represent a *spectrum* within which there were “many gradations which provided social and cultural progression across this spectrum.”<sup>73</sup> There were “much more fluid and not strictly defined borders,” with “contact zones” and spaces of “transculturation” between communities. This model provides us with a more realistic description of the shared forms of worship, ethics, and textual interpretation between Jews and Christians,<sup>74</sup> as well as an opportunity to reconsider how difference is constructed within and between religious communities.<sup>75</sup>

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analyze the processes and practices “by which people make sense of their lives in contexts of ancient pluralism, the governing regimes and institutions that further and constrain such practices, and the power relations that are at stake,” not simply identify the “true” provenance of particular ideas, stories, and practices (230–31).”

<sup>71</sup> Homi K. Bhabha, *The Location of Culture* (London: Routledge, 1994), 19, argues that creative forms of identity are produced on the boundaries in *between* forms of difference, in the intersections and overlaps across the spheres of class, gender, race, nation and location.

<sup>72</sup> See Peter Van der Veer, “Syncretism, Multiculturalism and the Discourse of Tolerance,” in *Syncretism/Anti-Syncretism: The Politics of Religious Synthesis* (eds. C. Stewart and R. Shaw; London: Routledge, 1994), 196–211, 208. Rather than implying genetic impurity, “syncretism” can be understood as “an aspect of religious interaction over time” that allows us to understand how religious beliefs and practices change over time and across “geographical and cultural space (King, *What is Gnosticism?*, 223).” The term itself illustrates the “politics of difference and identity” that have characterized the study of early Christianity, since it has often been used as “a rhetorical tool” in inter-sectarian Christian conflict. King, *What is Gnosticism?*, 223, notes that the term came “into parlance during the Reformation, almost solely in the context of intra-Christian controversy. It was deployed largely by Protestants as a rhetorical tool to discredit Catholicism.” See also Robert Young, *Colonial Desire: Hybridity in Theory, Culture, and Race* (London: Routledge, 1995), 6–26.

<sup>73</sup> Boyarin, *Border Lines: The Partition of Judaeo-Christianity*, 18, suggests that second/third century Christianity and Judaism existed as “points on a continuum” between Marcionites and Jews.” He envisions early Christianity as “the entire multiform cultural system . . . the original cauldron of contentious, dissonant, sometimes friendly, more frequently hostile, fecund religious productivity out of which ultimately precipitated two institutions at the end of late antiquity: orthodox Christianity and rabbinic Judaism (44).”

<sup>74</sup> Judith Lieu, *Neither Jew Nor Greek?: Constructing Early Christianity* (London: T & T Clark, 2002), 206; Boyarin, *Dying for God*, 10.

<sup>75</sup> Boyarin, *Border Lines*, 18. Boyarin’s “wave-theory account” seeks “to replace the older *Stammbaum* (family tree) model. Wave theory posits that linguistic similarity is not necessarily the product of a common origin but may be the product of convergence of different dialects spoken in contiguous areas, dialects that are, moreover, not strictly bounded and differentiated from each other but instead shade one into the other. Innovations at any one point spread like the waves created when a stone is thrown into a pond, intersecting with other such waves produced in other places and leading to the currently observed patterns of differentiation and similarity. The older theory, the *Stammbaum* model, presumed that all similarity between languages and dialects is the product of a shared origin, while differentiation is pro-

It is one thing to compare texts; it is quite another to compare *texts* and *communities*.<sup>76</sup> And yet texts are written by individuals and individuals tend to be members of communities. Traces of such allegiances, identities, and social memberships may be embedded in texts, allowing the critic to excavate texts and retrieve this data.<sup>77</sup> Individual cases of historical influence may be difficult to prove, but we may proceed with the following general methodological principles: (1) if the case for socio-historical influence is stronger than the case for isolation, then socio-historical contact between the individual author of a text and the comparative text, individual, or community can be posited; (2) although any two texts, ideas, or rituals can be compared, the closer that such texts, ideas, or rituals become in historical time and space, the more likely the possibility (and probability) of socio-historical contact becomes; and (3) if close socio-historical, geographical and chronological proximities, social structures, sectarian orientations, approaches to religious institutions, and literary forms cumulatively point towards a spectrum or continuum of socio-historical and ideological affinities, then comparative analysis may require a working model of historical contact and influence.

The challenges involved in comparative research can be illustrated by a brief history of comparative work on Qumran and the New Testament. Since the discovery of the Scrolls, scholars have been finding “parallels” between the New Testament and Qumran,<sup>78</sup> between the Gospel of John,<sup>79</sup> Paul’s let-

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duced after the languages no longer have contact with each other.” The older model corresponds to a distinct “parting of the ways” and assumes “that all that is shared between the two is a product of their common origins, while the wave theory model leads us to think of much more fluid and not strictly defined borders on the ground.”

<sup>76</sup> Stanley Stowers, “Towards a Social Explanation for the Formation of Christian Anti-Judaism,” (unpublished paper), 5, criticizes the “community of the text” fallacy, a notion that reinscribes a Christian myth of origins: “I agree that every writing has a context that is some form of sociality, but not every form of sociality is a community.”

<sup>77</sup> Jeff S. Anderson, “From ‘Communities of Texts’ to Religious Communities: Problems and Pitfalls,” in *Enoch and Qumran Origins: New Light on a Forgotten Connection* (ed. G. Boccaccini; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2005), 351–55, 353: “the search for evidence of communities behind texts is a legitimate enterprise.” George W. E. Nickelsburg, *1 Enoch 1: A Commentary on the Book of 1 Enoch, Chapters 1–36; 81–108* (Hermeneia; Minneapolis: Fortress, 2001), 2: “texts are historical artifacts, created in time and space, by real human beings.” Consequently, “the book as text calls for literary analysis, and its genesis in time and place invites historical investigation (1).” See also *Ancient Judaism and Christian Origins: Diversity, Continuity, and Transformation* (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2003), 147: “Both the development of archaeological science and the use of new historical and social scientific methods have emphasized the need to read the ancient religious texts historically and not simply to treat them as pieces of literature or theological compendia. They are artifacts that were created in time and place . . . these texts arose in response to concrete historical circumstances and functioned in particular geographic and social locations. To be fair to the texts and their authors, we must try to identify these times, circumstances, and locations.”

<sup>78</sup> Pierre Benoit, “Qumran and the New Testament,” in *Paul and Qumran: Studies in New*

ters,<sup>80</sup> John the Baptist, Jesus, and the Qumran texts.<sup>81</sup> The early phases of research were marked by excitement about the discovery of ancient Jewish

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*Testament Exegesis* (ed. J. Murphy-O'Connor; Chicago: Priory, 1968), 1–30; Matthew Black, *The Scrolls and Christian Origins: Studies in the Jewish Background of the New Testament* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1961); "The Dead Sea Scrolls and Christian Origins," in *The Scrolls and Christianity: Historical and Theological Significance* (ed. M. Black; London: SPCK, 1969), 97–106; Raymond E. Brown, "The Dead Sea Scrolls and the New Testament," in *John and the Dead Sea Scrolls* (ed. J. H. Charlesworth; New York: Crossroad, 1990), 1–8; Oscar Cullmann, "The Significance of the Qumran Texts for Research into the Beginnings of Christianity," *JBL* (1955): 213–26; Jean Daniélou, *The Dead Sea Scrolls and Primitive Christianity* (trans. Salvator Attanasio; Baltimore: Helicon, 1958); Joseph A. Fitzmyer, *The Dead Sea Scrolls and Christian Origins* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2000); David Flusser, *Judaism and the Origins of Christianity* (Jerusalem: Magnes, 1988); David N. Freedman, "Early Christianity and the Scrolls: An Inquiry," in *Jesus in History and Myth* (ed. R. J. Hoffman and G. A. Larue; Buffalo: Prometheus, 1986), 97–102; William S. Lasor, *The Dead Sea Scrolls and the New Testament* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1972); Lucetta Mowry, *The Dead Sea Scrolls and the Early Church* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962); Krister Stendahl, ed., *The Scrolls and the New Testament* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1957).

<sup>79</sup> Karl Georg Kuhn, "Die in Palästina gefundenen hebräischen Texte und das neue Testament," *ZTK* 47 (1950): 192–211; Howard M. Teeple, "Qumran and the Origin of the Fourth Gospel," *NovT* 4 (1960): 6–25; Raymond E. Brown, "The Qumran Scrolls and the Johannine Gospel and Epistles," *CBQ* 17 (1955): 403–19, 559–74; James H. Charlesworth, ed., *John and the Dead Sea Scrolls* (New York: Crossroad, 1990); Richard Bauckham, "Qumran and the Fourth Gospel: Is there a Connection?" in *The Scrolls and the Scriptures: Qumran Fifty Years After* (eds. S. E. Porter and C. A. Evans; JSPSup 26; Sheffield University Press, 1997), 267–79; Harold W. Attridge, "The Gospel of John and the Dead Sea Scrolls," in *Text, Thought, and Practice in Qumran and Early Christianity: Proceedings of the Ninth International Symposium of the Orion Center for the Study of the Dead Sea Scrolls and Associated Literature, Jointly Sponsored by the Hebrew University Center for the Study of Christianity, 11–12 January, 2004* (eds. R. A. Clements and D. R. Schwartz; STDJ 84; Leiden: Brill, 2009), 109–26.

<sup>80</sup> Jerome Murphy-O'Connor, ed., *Paul and Qumran: Studies in New Testament Exegesis* (Chicago: Priory, 1968). Fitzmyer, *The Semitic Background of the New Testament*, 213–17. See also Henry J. Cadbury, "A Qumran Parallel to Paul," *HTR* 51 (1958): 1–2.

<sup>81</sup> Herbert Braun, "The Significance of Qumran for the Problem of the Historical Jesus," in *The Historical Jesus and the Kerygmatic Christ: Essays on the New Quest of the Historical Jesus* (eds. C. E. Braaten and R. A. Harrisville, Nashville: Abingdon, 1964), 69–78; William H. Brownlee, "Jesus and Qumran," in *Jesus and the Historian* (ed. F. T. Trotter; E. C. Colwell Festschrift; Philadelphia: Westminster, 1968), 52–81; Howard C. Kee, "The Bearing of the Dead Sea Scrolls on Understanding Jesus," in *Jesus in History and Myth* (eds. R. J. Hoffman and G. A. Larue; Buffalo: Prometheus, 1986), 54–75; Otto Betz, *What Do We Know About Jesus: The Bedrock of Fact Illuminated by the Dead Sea Scrolls* (trans. M. Kohl; London: Philadelphia, 1968); James H. Charlesworth, "The Dead Sea Scrolls and the Historical Jesus," in *Jesus and the Dead Sea Scrolls* (ed. J. H. Charlesworth; New York: Doubleday, 1992), 1–74; Craig A. Evans, "Jesus and the Dead Sea Scrolls," in *The Dead Sea Scrolls After Fifty Years: A Comprehensive Assessment* (eds. P. W. Flint and J. C. VanderKam; Leiden: Brill, 1999), 573–98; B. Herjel-Hansen, "Did Christ Know the Qumran Sect?: Jesus and the Messiah of the Desert, An Observation based on Matthew 24, 26–28," *RevQ* 1 (1959): 495–

manuscripts contemporary with early Christianity. In this initial enthusiasm, various claims were made regarding the nature, degree, and extent of relationship. After all, it appeared that the Jesus movement and the Qumran community seemed to have shared a number of technical terms, such as “the Poor,”<sup>82</sup> the “Sons of Light,”<sup>83</sup> “the Way,”<sup>84</sup> and “the Holy Spirit.”<sup>85</sup>

Similarities were also noticed between the organizational structures at Qumran and those described in the Book of Acts. For example, both groups had a full assembly of “the Many.”<sup>86</sup> The Qumran community was composed of priests, Levites, laymen and proselytes, and represented all of Israel.<sup>87</sup> This was a full assembly (“the Many”) of Aaron and Israel. In Acts, the “assembly” or “congregation” was also the full body of Jewish Christian followers and disciples.<sup>88</sup> Both groups also had respected “elders” in their communities.<sup>89</sup> Both communities seem to have had a “council of twelve” that probably represented the eschatological twelve tribes of Israel.<sup>90</sup> Both had “overse-

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508; Kurt Schubert, “The Sermon on the Mount and the Qumran Texts,” in *The Scrolls and the New Testament* (ed. K. Stendahl; New York: Harper, 1957), 118–28.

<sup>82</sup> Q 6:20; Mt 10:21, 19:21; Lk 18:22; Gal 2:10; 1QpHab 12.3, 12.6, 12.10; 1QH 2.32-34, 5.13, 18, 20-22.

<sup>83</sup> Lk 16:8; Jn 12:35-36; 1 Thess 5:5. In John 12:35-36.

<sup>84</sup> In Acts 24:5 “the Way” is the technical term referring to “the sect of the Nazoreans” that Paul is accused of belonging to (Acts 24:5, 22:4, 9:2, 19:9, 24:14, 22). The Qumran community used this term to describe their own way of life. See Fitzmyer, *The Semitic Background of the New Testament*, 282–83; S. Vernon McCasland, “The Way,” *JBL* 77 (1958): 222–30. The community “have chosen the Way” (1QS 9.17-18) while those who leave the community are “they who turn aside from the Way” (CD 1.13). The term “the Way” may allude to “the Way of the Lord” of Isaiah 40:3, which is to be prepared by his messengers in the wilderness. Although “the Way” refers to the study and observance of the law at Qumran, this study was believed to be divinely-inspired (see 1QS 4.22, 8.10, 18, 21, 9.5, 9, 11.11, 1QM 14.7, 1QSa 1.28). According to 1QS, the Qumran community was “the perfect Way” and taught the “perfection of Way (1QS 8.18, 21, 9.5, 6, 8, 9).”

<sup>85</sup> Magen Broshi, “What Jesus Learned From the Essenes,” *BAR* 30 (2004): 32–37, 64. Charlesworth, “The Dead Sea Scrolls and the Historical Jesus,” 22. See also Frederick F. Bruce, “Holy Spirit in the Qumran Texts,” *The Annual of Leeds University Oriental Society* 6 (1969): 49–55. John’s Gospel frequently uses the phrase “Spirit of Truth” (14:17, 15:26, 16:13), a phrase found in the scrolls (1QS 3.19, 4.21, 23, 4Q177 4.10). James H. Charlesworth, “Qumran, John and the Odes of Solomon,” in *John and the Dead Sea Scrolls* (ed. J. H. Charlesworth; New York: Crossroad, 1990), 126, suggests that the author of “John probably borrowed some of his dualistic terminology and mythology from 1QS 3:13–4:26.”

<sup>86</sup> Acts 4:32, 6:2, 6:5; 1QS 6.1, 7.16, 8.19.

<sup>87</sup> 1QS 2.1, 2.19-21, 1.18, 21, CD 14.3; 1QS 6.1, 7.16, 7–9, 8.19, 11-18, 21, 25, 26.

<sup>88</sup> Acts 4:32, 6:2, 6:5.

<sup>89</sup> 1QS 6.18; CD 5.4; Acts 11:30, 15:2, 4, 6, 16:4, 21:18.

<sup>90</sup> 1QS 8.1; Acts 6:2, 1:15, 2:14. The correspondence is not exact, as there may have been fifteen men in the Qumran inner circle; however, both groups employed the number twelve, which clearly has eschatological significance.