

VINCENT ELTSCHINGER, ISABELLE RATIÉ

SELF, NO-SELF, AND SALVATION

DHARMAKĪRTI'S CRITIQUE OF THE NOTIONS OF SELF AND PERSON

ÖSTERREICHISCHE AKADEMIE DER WISSENSCHAFTEN  
PHILOSOPHISCH-HISTORISCHE KLASSE  
SITZUNGSBERICHTE, 837. BAND

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ÖSTERREICHISCHE AKADEMIE DER WISSENSCHAFTEN  
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# Self, No-Self, and Salvation

## Dharmakīrti's Critique of the Notions of Self and Person

Vincent Eltschinger and Isabelle Ratié

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## Foreword

Dharmakīrti (550–650 CE?)<sup>1</sup> is arguably, of all Indian Buddhist thinkers, the one who has exerted the most decisive impact on Indian philosophy as a whole. Strangely enough, his contribution to the Buddhist intellectuals' heated polemics against both their coreligionists' personalism (*pudgalavāda*) and the non-Buddhists' (but also certain Buddhists') self (*ātman*) has never been made the object of the systematic study it deserves. The Buddhist doctors' polemic against the Vātsīputrīyas' and Sāṃmitīyas' *pudgala* is now fairly well documented: the arguments put forward in the VK, the KV, MSA(Bh), the TSi, the AKBh, the MHK, the MAV and the TS(P) have been studied or at least translated and/or summarized by La Vallée Poussin, Stcherbatsky, Schayer, Sastri, Iida, Oetke, Duerlinger, Huntington, Eltschinger and Kishi.<sup>2</sup> As for Dharmakīrti's polemic against the *pudgalavāda*, it has only recently received scholarly attention.<sup>3</sup> The situation is quite pitiable when it comes to the Buddhist intellectuals' polemics against the outsiders' *ātman*: whereas the arguments put forward by early Mādhyamikas (Nāgārjuna, Āryadeva) and Yogācāras (YBhū, Vasubandhu's KSP and AKBh) have already been investigated to a certain extent,<sup>4</sup> the same cannot be said of the controversy as it is reflected in the works of Dignāga, Dharmapāla, Dharmakīrti, Bhāviveka, Śāntarakṣita/Kamalaśīla, Karṇakagomin and Śāṅkaranandana. Dignāga's *Nyāya-*, *Vaiśeṣika-* and *Sāṅkhya-parīkṣās* (which are likely to have contained arguments

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<sup>1</sup> On the dates of Dharmakīrti, see Krasser 2011; for the state of the art before Krasser's new chronology, see, e.g., Eltschinger 2007: 25–28.

<sup>2</sup> See below, Chapter 1, §1.1.3.7.

<sup>3</sup> See Eltschinger/Ratié 2010, and below, Chapter 1, §1.2.

<sup>4</sup> On Nāgārjuna's MMK, see Vetter 1982; on Āryadeva's CŚ, Chapter 10, see Lang 1986: 95–103; on (the pseudo-)Āryadeva's ŚŚ, Chapter 2, see Tucci 1929: 19–37; on YBhū 129,6–137,8, see Shukla 1967; on Vasubandhu's arguments in the KSP, see Yoshimizu 1999; on Vasubandhu's arguments against Sāṅkhya and Vaiśeṣika in AKBh 9, see, e.g., Sanderson 1995, Duerlinger 2003a: 96–111 and 238–298, and Mejer 1999.

against these schools' views on the *ātman/puruṣa*) as well as Karṇakagomin's *Nairātmyasiddhi* are lost;<sup>5</sup> the Chinese of Dharmapāla's commentary on CŚ 10 is still awaiting a translator; Śāntarakṣita's and Kamalaśīla's extensive *Ātmaparīkṣā* in the TS(P) has hardly been studied in the West so far;<sup>6</sup> Śāṅkaranandana's *Dharmālaṅkāra*, the second Chapter of which is entitled "A Proof of Selflessness" (*Nairātmyasiddhi*), has only recently resurfaced in the Tibetan Autonomous Region and remains unedited.<sup>7</sup> And while Dharmakīrti's identification of the false view of a self or "personalistic" false view with ignorance/nescience has been made the object of several studies,<sup>8</sup> nothing similar can be said regarding his many arguments against the self. To be sure, Iwata, Tillemans and Watanabe have analyzed some occurrences of his critique of the Sāṅkhyas' teleological argument; Iwata and Ono have dedicated important studies to his critique of the Naiyāyikas' *vyatirekin* argument; Vetter's translation of PV 2.131cd–285 includes PV 2.220–256 as well as PV 2.267–269, where Dharmakīrti criticises the Naiyāyika soteriology and polemicizes against the Ātmavādins' view of recollection as providing a strong argument in favour of the self. However, Dharmakīrti's writings include many more arguments and critical allusions to the self. Maybe due to most specialists' understanding of Dharmakīrti as a disembodied and axiomatically neutral logician, this philosopher's overall attitude and arguments regarding the *puḍgala* and the self have never been presented in a systematic, historically as well as religio-philosophically contextualized study. The present book aspires to fill this important need and is meant as a humble continuation of Oetke's *'Ich' und das Ich* (1988), to which many pages of this study are indebted.

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<sup>5</sup> On Dignāga's *Parīkṣās*, see Hattori 1968: 9. Karṇakagomin refers his audience back to his own *Nairātmyasiddhi* in PVSVT 32,21, 81,16, 82,8, 92,6, 95,26.

<sup>6</sup> For a systematic treatment of the *Ātmaparīkṣā* Chapter of the TS(P) in Japanese, see the references to Naito's numerous publications in Steinkellner/Much 1995: 61–62. For partial Western translations, see Schayer 1931–1932, Sferra 2004 and Kapstein 2009.

<sup>7</sup> The authors have undertaken a diplomatic and critical edition of Śāṅkaranandana's *Dharmālaṅkāra*, Chapter 2, and are planning to publish it, together with an English translation and study, in the not too distant future.

<sup>8</sup> See below, Introduction, §§0.1.1–2 and fn. 7, p. 4.

It includes three chapters: 1. Dharmakīrti's polemics against his coreligionists' *pudgalavāda*; 2. Dharmakīrti's critique of the non-Buddhists' arguments in favour of a self or in disfavour of the Buddhists' (then mainly Vasubandhu's) accounts of selflessness; 3. Dharmakīrti's arguments (mainly) against the Nyāya's crypto-Buddhist but *ātman*-centered soteriology. About one half of the arguments composing Chapter 2 recur in several works of Dharmakīrti (PVSV, PVin 2 and 3, NB) and have already received sustained scholarly attention: in this case, we have tried our best to present the doctrinal background of these arguments and to sum up Dharmakīrti's critique as expounded in the available secondary literature. Although Vetter's notes on PV 2.220–256 already contain many insightful remarks, we thought it might be worth providing these stanzas with an English translation, a doctrinal introduction, a running commentary and numerous footnotes taking into consideration Devendrabuddhi's and Śākyabuddhi's commentaries as well as the religio-philosophical ideas of his Brahmanical opponents. As for Dharmakīrti's critique of Buddhist personalism, we have allowed ourselves to reproduce, with a new introduction and a few adaptations, a previously published joint contribution of ours.<sup>9</sup> These three chapters are preceded by an introduction attempting to capture Dharmakīrti's general attitude regarding the self, to provide his critique of the self with a religio-philosophical meaning, and to deal with all those remarks by Dharmakīrti – critical or not – that found no place in either of the three parts.

An additional remark is called for concerning Chapter 1. Before dealing with Pudgalavāda Buddhism and Dharmakīrti's critique of his coreligionists' "person," we have devoted considerable attention to the *tathāgatagarbha* or *buddha*-nature strand of Indian Mahāyāna. And this we have done in spite of the fact that the (at least *prima facie*) substantialist leaning of this tradition has never been made the explicit target of "mainstream" philosophers, and even less so by Dharmakīrti. This addition has no other justification than our wish to call attention to the fact – or let us say the strong hypothesis – that Dharmakīrti, like Vasubandhu before him, elaborated his ideas on self and selflessness in an environment in which Buddhist attempts to relativize selflessness

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<sup>9</sup> See Eltschinger/Ratié 2010.

and resort to an enduring personality principle are likely to have been in far greater number than is generally recognized.

Neither of us knows enough Chinese to investigate the important materials supplied by the the ŚŚ, VK, the Mahāyānist MPSū, the TSi, the TDK, the SNŚ and the DPŚ. We have relied on English and French translations in La Vallée Poussin 1925, Tucci 1929, Venkataramanan 1953, Yamamoto 1973, Sastri 1978, Liu 1982 Fujii 1991 and 1993, Priestley 1999, Walser 2005, Miyamoto 2007, Lusthaus 2009, contenting ourselves with providing references to the Taisho edition and quoting the Sanskrit text of the TSi as reconstructed by Sastri (1975).

Needless to say, writing a book *à quatre mains* is a major challenge. Two authors who pursue different scientific interests and have different scholarly backgrounds might translate and interpret somewhat differently the same source materials, and this is bound to happen when two alleged specialists of distinct (albeit related) fields – i.e., on the one hand, Dharmakīrti and Buddhist studies, and on the other hand, Śaiva nondualism and Brahmanical conceptions of the self – come to work together. Moreover, we have different styles and writing habits (although both of us obviously have a certain leaning toward endless footnotes!). But in spite (or maybe because) of our different backgrounds and perspectives (and also in spite of the tendency to work in solitude that usually affects both of us), we took immense pleasure in working together and intend to pursue this collaboration in the future.

Vincent Eltschinger has supplied the first draft translation of almost all the Dharmakīrti materials mentioned in this book and is responsible for all translations from the Tibetan. For her part, Isabelle Ratié has provided the first draft translation of nearly all the non-Buddhist materials mentioned in the footnotes, introductory sections and running commentaries. Not only have we shared the task of interpreting the gathered materials; we have also discussed together all the aspects of this work (including all translations and interpretations, as well as the overall structure to be given to this study), so that we assume equal responsibility for the entire book.

It is our pleasant duty to thank Shoryu Katsura and Toshikazu Watanabe for putting at our disposal their provisional reconstruction of Dignāga's PS 3 as well as their edition of the PST thereon; Kyo Kano, for sending us an article on Dharmakīrti's critique of the self that was

still unpublished at that time; Robert Kritzer, for sending us unpublished teaching materials; Helmut Krasser, for the many materials he has made available to us and for his help in technical matters; Johannes Bronkhorst, who provided insightful remarks on several of the materials alluded to here; Tina Draszcyk, Berthe Jansen and Birgit Kellner, for their help in interpreting two difficult passages; Masamichi Sakai and Jonathan Silk, for providing many quotations with their exact references in the Taisho *Tripitaka*; the editors of the *Indogaku Chibettogaku Kenkyu*, for allowing us to reproduce significant parts of a previous publication. Michael Ravenscroft deserves heartfelt thanks for carefully reading the manuscript and improving our English; and our debt to him and Pamela Ravenscroft goes far beyond what language and science will ever be able to reach. Last but not least, the authors wish to express their deepest gratitude to those who took the trouble to read and thus significantly improve (parts of) an earlier draft of our manuscript: Hugo David, Harunaga Isaacson, Ernst Steinkellner, John Taber, Toshikazu Watanabe.

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# Introduction

## Dharmakīrti's Attitude toward the Self

More systematically and radically than Dignāga, Dharmakīrti embodies the early medieval Buddhist intellectuals' turn toward apologetics on behalf of Buddhism as a whole and against the growing hostility of the brahmanical *élites*.<sup>1</sup> And as his provocative identification of the false view of a self<sup>2</sup> (*ātma-dṛṣṭi*) with nescience<sup>3</sup> (*avidyā*) most clearly testifies, Dharmakīrti was a staunch adversary of the self. Indeed, the word *ātman* occurs with relative frequency in his works. However, most of these occurrences pertain to statements regarding selflessness (*nair-ātmya*) as the only possible way to liberation, or, equivalently, to the belief in a self as the root-cause of defilements, rebirth and suffering. In other words, *arguments* against the self or the person are surprisingly rare in the works of such an uncompromising proponent of selflessness – at least in comparison with works of other noted Buddhist scholars such as Vasubandhu, Candrakīrti, Śāntarakṣita, Kamalaśīla and Śāṅkaranandana, whose writings generally include at least one independent section dedicated to the refutation of the *ātman* and/or the

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<sup>1</sup> The present introduction aims at depicting Dharmakīrti's general attitude toward the self (especially the belief in a self as the hallmark of nescience) and providing his critique with a religio-philosophical meaning. It mainly deals with those of Dharmakīrti's allusions to the self that have not found their place in the body of this study due to their lack of argumentative value or isolated character.

<sup>2</sup> When *ātman* occurs in such compounds as *ātma-dṛṣṭi* we have generally translated it as "a self" rather than "the self" since the latter translation might misleadingly induce the reader to think that *ātma-dṛṣṭi* is a misconception of the self understood as a real entity, instead of conveying the idea that *ātma-dṛṣṭi* is precisely the false view that there *is* such a thing as a self. Unfortunately we could not achieve complete consistency in this respect, as the context in which such compounds appear sometimes calls for a definite article that sounds more natural in English.

<sup>3</sup> See below, §§0.1.1–2.

*pudgala*. Moreover, several among his arguments *apparently* exhaust themselves in merely presenting as paradigmatic instances of logical fallacies the proofs of the self put forward by Naiyāyika, Vaiśeṣika and Sāṅkhya opponents.

The reason(s) why Dharmakīrti did not, contrary to Vasubandhu or Śāntarakṣita, criticise these proofs in a systematic manner, remain(s) shrouded in mystery. Did he hold Vasubandhu to have provided a sufficiently extensive and convincing treatment of the issue? But why, then, did Dharmakīrti not answer Uddyotakara's counterarguments, as he did on the issues of language and universals? Why did Dharmakīrti overlook the flagship among the Buddhist as well as non-Buddhist Ātmavādins' arguments, viz. that of the self as the only possible way to account for the synthesis or coordination (*pratisandhāna*) of cognitions? Whatever the answers to these questions,<sup>4</sup> a systematic study of Dharmakīrti's arguments reveals that his critique nearly covers the entire range of his opponents' proof strategies. But it also reveals that Dharmakīrti's polemics against the self does by no means reflect a disinterested and religiously uncommitted search for truth.

First, his critique must be located in the context of the Buddhist epistemologists' self-representation (and, probably, self-legitimation) as those Buddhists who, by defeating the non-Buddhists' misleading and soteriologically harmful epistemological views, make the path to liberation *possible*.<sup>5</sup> Second, Dharmakīrti's arguments must be read against the background of his anthropological and epistemological elaborations on scriptural authority: should a given treatise present as inferable things that are *not*, as the Veda and Brahmanical religio-philosophical *śāstras* do, this treatise ought to be rejected as unreliable and hence not eligible as a scriptural basis for the religious endeavours

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<sup>4</sup> Dharmakīrti was certainly well aware of the fact that claiming the notion of a self to be the most congenial sign of nescience, i.e., a wrong notion (*viparyāsa*), was not enough to *refute* it. That, contrary to Vasubandhu before him or Śāntarakṣita after him, he did not deem useful to refute all the Buddhist and non-Buddhist attempts to prove the existence of a self, might be due to his conviction that the proof of momentariness (*kṣaṇikatva*), and especially what would become the *sattvānumāna* from PVin 2 onward, was a sufficient argument against a permanent self. See below, §0.2.2.

<sup>5</sup> See Krasser 2005, Eltschinger 2005: 154–162, Eltschinger forthc. b (§2.2).

of practically rational persons (*prekṣāvātpuruṣa*). Third, one should not lose sight of the fact that numerous Buddhist sources, including epistemological ones, can be interpreted as holding the critique of the self to be instrumental in the eradication of at least one – admittedly benign – form of the personalistic false view (*satkāyadrṣṭi*), which Dharmakīrti equates with nescience and therefore with the cause of suffering. Fourth, Dharmakīrti's arguments culminate in a long section of PV 2 aimed at demonstrating that any variant of *ātmavāda* makes liberation impossible. In other words, the Buddhist critique of the self is religiously and soteriologically committed in that it is instrumental in a rational person's choice of a reliable religio-philosophical system capable of fulfilling his/her expectations as to elevation (*abhyudaya*) and *summum bonum* (*niḥśreyasa*). And since the only soteriologically reliable path is Buddhism – which alone prescribes selflessness as the means toward liberation –,<sup>6</sup> the critique of the self is apologetically committed too.

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<sup>6</sup> Cf. AKBh<sub>Pr</sub> 461,1–4/AKBh<sub>LE</sub> 34,1–8: *kiṃ khalv ato 'nyatra mokṣo nāsti / nāsti / kiṃ kāraṇam / vitathātma-drṣṭiniviṣṭatvāt / na hi te skandhasantāna evātmaprajñaptiṃ vyavasyanti / kiṃ tarhi / dravyāntaram evātmānaṃ parikalpayanti / ātmagrāhaprabhavās ca sarvakleśā iti /*. “[Objection:] But isn't there any liberation outside the<sup>a</sup> [teaching of the Buddha]? [Answer:] There isn't. – Why? – Because the [outsiders] stick to the erroneous view of a self, for [contrary to us,] they do not consider the designation 'self' [to refer] merely to the series of the constituents; rather, they conceive the self as an independent substance. Now, all [the] defilements [which are responsible for bondage] originate from the belief in a self[, and this is the reason why there is no means of liberation outside selflessness as prescribed by the Buddha].” [a *ataḥ* is to be understood against the background of AK 8.43, especially *śāsanaṃ muneḥ*.] Cf. also AK, antepenultimate and ultimate stanzas (AKBh<sub>Pr</sub> 478,14–21/AKBh<sub>LE</sub> 168,1–8): *ity etāṃ suvihitahetumārgaśuddhāṃ buddhānāṃ pravacanadharmatāṃ niśāmya / andhānāṃ vividhakudṛṣṭiceṣṭitānāṃ tīrthyānāṃ matam apavidhya yānti anandhāḥ // imāṃ hi nirvāṇapuraikavartinīṃ tathāgatādityavaco'mśubhāsvatīm / nirātmāṃ āryasahasravāhitāṃ na mandacakṣur vivṛtām apīkṣate //*. “Those who are not blind proceed by observing that the [fundamental] law [inherent] in the teaching of the *buddhas* is unobjectionable (*śuddha*) thanks to a well ordained path of [argumentative] reasons and by rejecting the doctrine of blind outsiders [such as Kapila and Ulūka] who were prompted by various evil false views. For the weak-eyed [outsider or personalist] fails to see, even [though it is] manifest, this selflessness which is the only path to the city of *nirvāṇa*, which is radiant due to the rays which are the words of the sun[-like] Tathāgata [and] which is conveyed by thousands of noble ones.” On the city of *nirvāṇa*, see below, fn. 374, p. 282.

## 0.1. DHARMAKĪRTI'S ACCOUNT OF THE BELIEF IN A SELF AS NESCIENCE

0.1.1. According to Dharmakīrti, nescience/ignorance/delusion (*avidyā*, *ajñāna*, *moha*) basically consists in erroneous perception (*mithyo-palabdhi*), pseudo-perception (*pratyakṣābhāsa*), concealment (*saṃvṛti*) and conceptuality (*vikalpa*), which all superimpose unreal aspects (*abhūtākāra*) onto the real.<sup>7</sup> And Dharmakīrti calls “personalistic false view” that part of nescience which, superimposing a fictitious self and that which is believed to belong to this self (*ātmīya*), gives rise to all defilements (*kleśa*) and commits living beings to action and rebirth.<sup>8</sup> Dharmakīrti equates the personalistic false view with nescience in several sections of his PV.<sup>9</sup> The identification of *satkāyadarśana* with nescience occurs first in PV 1.222:

The birth of all kinds of defects<sup>10</sup> is due to the personalistic false view [i.e., to the clinging to the self and what belongs to the self, and] this [false view of a self] is [nothing but] nescience.<sup>11</sup>

Its identity with ignorance is stressed in Dharmakīrti's commentary on the same stanza:

All defects are born of the personalistic false view, and it is this [false view] that is called “ignorance” [in our doctrinal system].<sup>12</sup>

As for equating the personalistic belief with delusion, it is done at least twice in PV 2:

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<sup>7</sup> On Dharmakīrti's views regarding *avidyā*, see Vetter 1990: 22–26, Franco 2001: 289–300, Eltschinger 2009b and 2010c. The present section is but an adaptation of §§1.3 and 2.1 of the latter two essays. On Dharmakīrti's identification of nescience to conceptuality, see especially Eltschinger 2009b: 41–62.

<sup>8</sup> On the *satkāyadarśi*, see Rahder 1932, *Kośa* IV.15–17, fn. 3, and *Traité* II.737, fn. 3. See also below, fn. 26, p. 7.

<sup>9</sup> For a hypothesis and detailed references regarding Dharmakīrti's likely sources for these identifications, see Eltschinger 2009b: 70–76.

<sup>10</sup> On the nature of these *doṣas* see below, fn. 67, p. 203.

<sup>11</sup> PV 1.222ac<sub>1</sub>: *sarvāsāṃ doṣajātīnāṃ jātiḥ satkāyadarśanāt / sāvidyā [...] //*.

<sup>12</sup> PVSV 111,19–20: *satkāyadarśanaajāḥ sarvadoṣāḥ / tad eva cājñānam ity ucyate /*.

Delusion is the root[-cause] of defects, and this [delusion] consists in the belief in a [personal] being.<sup>13</sup>

All the impurities have this [delusion] as [their] root[-cause], and this [delusion] is the personalistic false view.<sup>14</sup>

0.1.2. Dharmakīrti was well aware of the fact that his interpretation of nescience as the false view of a self could incur criticism from many of his coreligionists, even though he was by no means the first Buddhist scholar to interpret it in this manner. Whereas his general understanding of nescience in terms of erroneous cognition was closely in line with Vasubandhu's position, his identification of a false view (*dṛṣṭi*) with nescience could be rejected on the grounds that Vasubandhu held the false view to be *associated* (*samprayukta*) with nescience and not *identical* with nescience;<sup>15</sup> consequently, this identification could easily be found guilty of contradicting Buddhist scriptures (*āgamavirodha*). Dharmakīrti was thus compelled both to explain how something can be said to be associated with itself and to account for such a loss of the meaning of "associated" (*samprayuktārtha*). He seems to have entrusted (hypothetical) followers and/or commentators with the task of answering these questions of a more dogmatic character. His exegetical justification for this identification occurs in the following stanza:

Delusion is presented as the [principal] cause of defects [in one *sūtra*, and] in another one, it is the personalistic false view, because [defects] are eliminated when the [personalistic false view] is eliminated.<sup>16</sup>

In his commentary,<sup>17</sup> Dharmakīrti argues that if the Buddha has taught delusion to be the cause of defilements in one *sūtra*, and the persona-

<sup>13</sup> PV 2.196ab<sub>1</sub>: *mohaś ca mūlaṃ doṣāṇāṃ sa ca sattvagrahaḥ* [...] /.

<sup>14</sup> PV 2.212cd: *tanmūlās ca malāḥ sarve sa ca satkāyadarśanam* //.

<sup>15</sup> See AK 3.29c.

<sup>16</sup> PV 1.223 (leaving *ata eva* untranslated): *moho nidānaṃ doṣāṇāṃ ata evābhidhīyate / satkāyadr̥ṣṭir anyatra tatprahāṇe prahāṇataḥ* // . Note also PV 2.214: *vyākhye-yo 'tra virodho yas tadvirodhāc ca tanmayaiḥ / virodhaḥ śūnyatādr̥ṣṭeḥ sarvadoṣaiḥ prasidhyati* // . "The contradiction [with scripture] which [seems to ensue] on this point has to be explained. However, since [the perception of emptiness] is contradictory to this [personalistic false view], it is established that the perception of emptiness contradicts all the defects [too], which are born of this [personalistic false view]." On °*māya*, see below, fn. 41, p. 10.

listic false view in another one, he could only have the same primary cause (*pradhāna[hetu]*) in mind, because in both cases he is pointing out the factor that, when eliminated, leads to the elimination of the defilements, i.e., the “material” cause (*upādāna*). In other words, “delusion” and “personalistic false view” are synonymous. How do the commentators with this type of doctrinal background explain away the contradiction with the scripture that seems to ensue from this identification? What does “associated” mean in the Abhidharmic statement “nescience is associated with the false view(s)” if nescience and the personalistic false view are one and the same thing?<sup>18</sup> According to Devendrabuddhi, “associated” points here to a relationship between the parts and the whole (*ekadeśaikadeśibhāva*); Śākyabuddhi explains it as being like the relationship between the body and its limbs (*aṅgāṅgibhāva*).<sup>19</sup> According to Prajñākaragupta, “associated” refers to a relationship between universal and specific instance (*sāmānyaviśeṣabhāva*).<sup>20</sup> Nescience and the personalistic false view stand in the same kind of relationship as a forest and *palāśa*-trees (*Butea frondosa*) in the expression: “The forest has *palāśa*-trees” (*palāśayuktaṃ vanam iti*), or the body and limbs such as hands in the expression: “The body has [limbs] such as hands” (*pāṇyādiyuktaṃ śarīram iti*).<sup>21</sup> The apparent contradiction with scripture can then be explained away easily: the statement that nescience is associated with the personalistic false view means that nescience, considered as a whole, a body or a universal, possesses the personalistic false view considered as a part, a member/limb, or a specific instance.<sup>22</sup> As Prajñākaragupta concludes, “by mentioning [that the personalistic false view is] a specific instance,

<sup>17</sup> See PVSV 111,23–112,5, Dunne 2004: 372–373, Eltschinger 2007: 236–239.

<sup>18</sup> See PVP D92b7–93a1/P107a7–8, PVA 146,14–16 and PVV 85,15–17.

<sup>19</sup> See PVP D93a1/P107a8–b1 and PVṬ Ñe D137a5/P169a6; see also PVA 146,14 and PVV 85,16–17.

<sup>20</sup> See PVA 146,20; see also PVV 85,20.

<sup>21</sup> For *palāśayuktaṃ vanam iti*, see PVP D93a1–2/P107b1, PVA 146,20, PVV 85,20, Vibh. 85, fn. 10. For *pāṇyādiyuktaṃ śarīram iti*, see PVP D93a2/P107b1 and Vibh. 85, fn. 10. The second example obviously does not fit together with the explanation of “associated” as *sāmānyaviśeṣabhāva*, hence its disappearance in the PVA and PVV.

<sup>22</sup> See PVP D93a3/P107b2–3, PVṬ Ñe D137a5–7/P169a6–b1, PVA 146,21.

nescience consisting in this [i.e., a false view,] is pointed out as being primarily the cause [of defilements].”<sup>23</sup> Or, according to Manorathanandin, “[Dharmakīrti’s] aim [in defining nescience as the personalistic false view] is to show that nescience consisting in a false view is primarily the cause of defilements.”<sup>24</sup> As we can see, although Dharmakīrti was by no means the first Buddhist intellectual to connect *avidyā* with *ātmadr̥ṣṭi* and the like or to define the former by means of the latter, he may have been the first to develop an exegetical strategy to justify an equation that could easily be taken, at least among the Ābhidharmikas, as unorthodox.

0.1.3. Various terms refer to this kind of nescience in Dharmakīrti’s writings: “personalistic false view” (*satkāyadr̥ṣṭi*, °*darśana*), “false view of a self” (*ātmadarśana*), “belief in/adhesion to a self” (*ātmagraha*, *ātmābhiniveśa*), and “false view of/belief in a [substantial] living being” (*sattvadr̥ṣṭi*, *sattvadarśana*, *sattvagraha*).<sup>25</sup> According to Yogācāra and Sautrāntika definitions, the personalistic belief consists in regarding the five constituents to which one clings (*upādānaskandha*) either as a self (*ātmataḥ*) or as one’s own (*ātmīyataḥ*, i.e., as belonging to the self).<sup>26</sup> People who are deluded by this false view hold a basically transient (*sat < sīdati*) collection or cluster to be both permanent (*nityasañjñā*) and unitary (*piṇḍasañjñā*). In his account of the future Buddha’s philosophical reflections on the eve of his career, Dharmakīrti presents the cause of suffering (*duḥkhaḥetu*) in the following way:

<sup>23</sup> PVA 146,21–22: *evaṃ viśeṣābhidhānena tatsvabhāvāvidyā nidānabhūtā prādhānyena nirdiṣṭā /*.

<sup>24</sup> PVV 85,20–21: *dr̥ṣṭisvabhāvāvidyā prādhānyena kleśahetur ity upadarśanam [...] prayojanam /*.

<sup>25</sup> For the various designations of nescience in Dharmakīrti’s works (especially in PV 2), see Vetter 1990: 23.

<sup>26</sup> That *satkāya* should be interpreted as the five *upādānaskandhas* is obvious from the definitions adduced in the *Maulī Bhūmiḥ* of the *Yogācārabhūmi* (see Ahn 2003: 62, and for a German translation, Ahn 2003: 169–172), AS 7,8 (see Ahn 2003: 170, fn. 27, and for a German translation, Ahn *ibid.*), PSk 9,12–13 (for a French translation, see Dantinne 1980: 15), TrBh<sub>B</sub> \*14,14–16/TrBh<sub>L</sub> 23,12–14, AKBh<sub>Pr</sub> 281,20–21 on AK 5.7.

The cause [of suffering, i.e., of rebirth,] is attachment bearing upon the conditioning factors, [an attachment that is] due to the belief in the self and what [supposedly] belongs to the self.<sup>27</sup>

According to Devendrabuddhi, craving proceeds from one's adhering to the painful conditioned factors that are intrinsically free from the self and one's own, under the aspects of the self and one's own.<sup>28</sup> This is tantamount to saying that defilements such as craving only occur once unreal aspects have been superimposed on *dharmas*, specifically on the five constituents to which one clings, which lack these aspects entirely. While commenting on another passage, Devendrabuddhi claims that defilements such as desire (another equivalent for attachment and craving) proceed from one's superimposing aspects such as "permanent," "pleasurable," "self" and "one's own" on the impermanent, painful, selfless and empty constituents.<sup>29</sup> A huge number of passages presenting the same idea could be adduced here: the personalistic belief is responsible for one's superimposing contrary aspects such as self and one's own on the selfless and empty constituents.<sup>30</sup> As Dharmakīrti himself has it, "desire [arises] from the superimposition of another [i.e., unreal] nature onto something (*dharma*) that does not have this nature."<sup>31</sup> PV 2.270 provides us with Dharmakīrti's most significant statement as to how craving takes place once unreal aspects have been ascribed to reality:

Having[, due to ignorance,<sup>32</sup> superimposed sixteen unreal aspects, viz. "lasting," "pleasant," "mine," "I," etc., onto the four [nobles'] truths,<sup>33</sup> one craves [for what is pleasurable to the self].<sup>34</sup>

<sup>27</sup> PV 2.135ac<sub>1</sub>: *ātmātmīyagrahakṛtaḥ snehaḥ saṃskāragocaraḥ / hetuḥ [...] // . sneha = trṣṇā* according to PVP D56a7/P64a4 and PVṬ *Ñe* D117b3-4/P143b7; Śākyabuddhi (PVṬ *Ñe* D117b4/P143b7-8) explains *gocara* as *\*viṣaya*.

<sup>28</sup> See PVP D56b1/P64a5-6.

<sup>29</sup> See PVP D60b2-3/P69a4-5.

<sup>30</sup> See, e.g., PVP D88a4-5/P101b4 and PVP D88a6/P101b5-6.

<sup>31</sup> PV 2.196ab: *ātmāntarasamāropād rāgo dharme 'tadātmake /*.

<sup>32</sup> According to PVP D116a1/P134b2 (*sgro btags nas ni mi śes pa'i phyir*).

<sup>33</sup> At least according to the Vaibhāṣikas, each of the four nobles' truths is to be successively contemplated under four different aspects: the truth of suffering, under the aspects "impermanent," "painful," "empty" and "selfless"; the truth of origin, under

According to Devendrabuddhi and Śākyabuddhi, nescience, i.e., the false view of a self, has one grasp aspects that are contrary to the real ones, i.e., it makes one superimpose an "I" onto what is selfless and a "mine" onto what is empty.<sup>35</sup> But nescience is also responsible for deluded persons taking momentary things to be lasting (*sthira*) or even unchangeably permanent (*kūṭasthanitya*),<sup>36</sup> or holding intrinsically painful things to be pleasurable, i.e., not to be under the sway of cankers

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the aspects of "(distant/material) cause" (as a seed), "arising," "(serial) causation" and "(joint) condition"; the truth of cessation, under the aspects of "cessation," "calm," "excellent" and "salvation"; the truth of the path, under the aspects of "path," "fitness," "access" and "conducive to release." See AKBh<sub>Pr</sub> 343,16–19 on AK 6.17c<sub>i</sub>, PVP D62a3–7/P71a1–6 and Wayman 1980. The AKBh records a lengthy discussion pertaining to four different ways of interpreting these sixteen aspects (see AKBh<sub>Pr</sub> 400,1–401,17 on AK 7.13a, *Kośa* V.30–39, Pruden 1988–1990: IV.1110–1116). According to the fourth exegetical pattern, each of these aspects aims at counteracting (*pratipakṣa*) a particular false view. The aspects *anitya*, *duḥkha*, *śūnyā* and *anātman* counteract the false views of permanence, pleasurable, one's own, and self; the aspects of *hetu*, *samudaya*, *prabhava* and *pratyaya* contradict the false views of the absence of a cause, of a unique cause such as God or primordial matter (according to AKVy 628,30–31), of an evolution of being, and of an intelligent creation; the aspects *nirodha*, *śānta*, *prañīta* and *niḥsaraṇa* oppose the false views that release does not exist, that release is painful, that the bliss of *dhyāna*s is the most excellent, and that liberation, because it is subject to falling again and again, is not definitive; as for the aspects *mārga*, *nyāya*, *pratipad* and *nairyāṇika*, they respectively counteract the false views that there is no path, that this is a wrong path, that there is another path, and that the path is subject to retrogression (see AKBh<sub>Pr</sub> 401,11–17, *Kośa* V.38–39, Pruden 1988–1990: IV.1115–1116). The explanations provided by Dharmakīrti's commentators are too scarce to allow us to determine which interpretation, if any, they favoured. Devendrabuddhi and Śākyabuddhi content themselves with listing the four aspects superimposed on each of the last three truths (see PVP D115b6–7/P134a8–b2 and PVṬ *Ñe* D147b3–5/P182a8–b2).

<sup>34</sup> PV 2.270: *sthiraṃ sukhaṃ mamāhaṃ cetyādi satyacatuṣṭaye / abhūtān ṣoḍaśākārān āropya paritrṣyati //*.

<sup>35</sup> See PVP D115b3–4/P134a4, PVP D115b6/P134a7–8 and PVṬ *Ñe* D147a1–2/P181b3–5.

<sup>36</sup> See PVP D115b4/P134a5–6 (to be compared with Vibh. 102, fn. 1) and PVṬ *Ñe* D147a6–7/P182a2–3.

(*sāsrava*) or dependent on causes (*hetuparatantra*) in each of their successive moments (*pratikṣaṇam*).<sup>37</sup>

0.1.4. According to Dharmakīrti and his commentators, the personalistic false view is the (principal) cause (*nidāna*), the origin (*yoni*, *prabhava*), or the root (*mūla*) of all (kinds of) defects (*doṣa*), defilements (*kleśa*, *upakleśa*) or moral impurities (*mala*).<sup>38</sup> Among the expressions denoting the fact that defilements such as desire originate from the false view of a self, one also encounters “cause” (*kāraṇa*, alone or with preceding *utpatti*<sup>o</sup>, *pradhāna*<sup>o</sup>; *hetu*<sup>39</sup>), “arising” (*jāti*, *utpatti*<sup>40</sup>) and suffixal elements such as <sup>o</sup>*pūrvaka*, <sup>o</sup>*maya*,<sup>41</sup> <sup>o</sup>*hetuka*, *ja*, <sup>o</sup>*mūla*, or <sup>o</sup>*kṛta*. Defilements originate from the personalistic false view (*satkāyadarśanaja*, *jig tshogs su lta ba'i rañ bžin*), (causally) presuppose the false view of a self or the adherence to the self and one's own (*bdag tu lta ba sñon du soñ ba can*, *ātmātmīyābhīniveśapūrvaka*), arise from the false view of a self (*bdag tu lta ba las byuñ ba*), or have nescience for their cause (*avidyāhetuka*).<sup>42</sup> They are all based on the beliefs in “I” and “mine” (*ñar 'dzin pa dañ ña yir 'dzin pa dag la gnas pa*) and arise in dependence on a mind that complies with the false view of a self and one's own (*bdag dañ bdag gir lta ba'i rjes su 'brel ba'i sems la ltos nas [...] 'gyur ba*).<sup>43</sup>

0.1.5. As we have seen, the belief in a self and what belongs to the self is the cause of suffering, i.e., attachment bearing on the conditioning factors. In other words, nescience is the cause of craving (*tṛṣṇā*), which is

<sup>37</sup> See PVP D115b5/P134a6. *duḥkha*(*bhūta*) is regularly explained as *sāsrava* in the PVP; see, e.g., PVP D57b7/P66a1 and PVP D58a3/P66a5.

<sup>38</sup> E.g., PV 2.197a (*doṣa*), PV 1.222a (*sarvāsāṃ doṣajātīnām*), PV 2.214d (*sarvadoṣa*), PVSVT 401,24–25 and PVP D91a2/P105a5 (*sarvakleśa*), PVP D60a2–3/P68b4 (*ñon moñs pa dañ ñe ba'i ñon moñs*, *\*kleśopakleśāḥ*), PV 2.212c (*malāḥ sarve*).

<sup>39</sup> E.g., PVSVT 50,28 (*kāraṇa*), PVSVT 401,29 and PVP D91a2/P105a5 (*utpattikāraṇa*), PVSVT 402,23–24 (*pradhānakāraṇa*), PVSVT 401,21 (*hetu*).

<sup>40</sup> E.g., PV 1.222b (*jāti*), PVSVT 401,22 and 26 (*utpatti*).

<sup>41</sup> Rendered in Tib. as *rañ bžin* (*can*). Note PVT Ñe D137b3/P169b6: *rañ bžin ni ño bo ñid dam rgyu yin no //*. “\**maya* [points] either [to] the nature (\**rūpa*) or [to] the cause (\**hetu*).”

<sup>42</sup> Respectively PVS 111,19, PVP D93b1/P108a1 (on *rañ bžin*, see above, fn. 41), PVP D60a2–3/P68b4, PVS 8,20, PVP D93a5/P107b5, PVSVT 401,24 and 25.

<sup>43</sup> Respectively PVP D93b1–2/P108a1–2 and PVP D67b4/P77a6–7.

nothing but the traditional sequence of dependent origination, where both nescience and craving function as the cause of suffering: as defilements, they both give rise to other defilements (e.g., *trṣṇā*→*upādāna*) and to actions (*kriyā*, e.g., *avidyā*→*saṃskāra*, or *upādāna*→*bhava*), the latter being in turn responsible for new foundations (*vastu*) of existence (e.g., *saṃskāra*→*vijñāna*, or *bhava*→*jāti*).<sup>44</sup> Insofar as they give rise to actions leading to new existential foundations, nescience and craving<sup>45</sup> are the two causes of (re)birth (*[punar]janman*) and transmigration (*saṃsāra*),<sup>46</sup> which are the hallmarks of suffering.<sup>47</sup> Whereas Devendrabuddhi simply defines suffering as (re)birth (*skye ba'i mtshan ñid can gyi sdug bsñal*), Dharmakīrti characterizes it as the constituents undergoing transmigration (*duḥkhaṃ saṃsāriṇaḥ skandhāḥ*).<sup>48</sup> It is hardly surprising, then, that according to Dharmakīrti, “as long as (s)he adheres to a self, the [person who experiences craving remains] in *saṃsāra*.”<sup>49</sup> According to Devendrabuddhi, for whom “the personalistic false view is the cause of the connection (*\*pratisandhi*) to a new existence (*\*punarbhava*),”<sup>50</sup> “the [person] who is under the sway of the false view of a self has the notion of pleasure (*\*sukhasañjñā*) with regard to suffering [and] will be connected to a new existence.”<sup>51</sup> The link between the false view of a self, attachment and rebirth can be summarized as follows:

<sup>44</sup> See AK 3.27 and AKBh<sub>Pr</sub> 134,26–135,3, *Kośa* II.69, Pruden 1988–1990: II.407.

<sup>45</sup> See PVP D56a6/P64a3, PVP D57b3/P65b4, PVP D115b6/P134a8, PVP D116a1/P134b3, PVP D115b2/P134a2–3, PVP D58b1/P66b4.

<sup>46</sup> For definitions of *saṃsāra*, see PVP D62b3–4/P71b2–3 (to be compared with PVV 62,11–12), PVP D95b6/P110b3 (together with PVT Ñe D138b6–7/P171a7–8), TSP<sub>K</sub> 184,21–22/TSP<sub>S</sub> 230,8–9 (unidentified quotation).

<sup>47</sup> See PVT Ñe D148a1/P182b6. Suffering is also defined in terms of *duḥkhatātraya* in PVP D62b4/P71b3–4 (together with PVT Ñe D120b5–7/P147b5–7). On the three types of painfulness, see below, Chapter 3, §3.3.7.

<sup>48</sup> Respectively PVP D56a6/P64a3 and PV 2.146c.

<sup>49</sup> PV 2.218cd (leaving *tena* untranslated): *tenātmābhīniveśo yāvat tāvat sa saṃsāre //*.

<sup>50</sup> PVP D85a6–7/P98a3–4: *'jig tshogs lta ba yañ srid par ñiñ mtshams sbyor ba'i rgyur gyur pa*. See also PVP D85b5/P98b2–3.

<sup>51</sup> PVP D85a6/P98a3: *gañ la bdag tu lta ba yod pa de ni sdug bsñal la bde ba'i 'du śes can yin te / yañ srid par mtshams sbyor bar 'gyur ro //*.

Thus when there is adherence to a self, a multitude of defects such as attachment to one's own (*\*ātmīyasnehādidoṣa*) arise, and attachment to a self causes [one] to take a [new existential] place (*\*sthāna*).<sup>52</sup>

0.1.6. Let us now consider the genealogy of defilements from the personalistic false view. As we shall see, Dharmakīrti provides a coherent picture of the sequence *avidyā–(śaḍāyatana–sparśa–vedanā–)trṣṇā–upādāna–bhava–jāti*, although some items in his account have no explicit equivalent in the traditional twelve-membered chain of dependent origination. In Dharmakīrti's opinion, the false view of a self may be held directly responsible for the rise of at least three factors: the notion of otherness, the belief in one's own, and attachment/craving. In an interesting statement, Dharmakīrti points out:

Once [the notion of] the self exists, the notion of the other (*parasañjñā*) [arises, and] from this distinction between the self and the other [are born] grasping and aversion; bound to these two, all the defects arise.<sup>53</sup>

Devendrabuddhi accounts as follows for the genealogy of otherness:

As long as the thought adheres to a self (*\*ātmēti*), [it has] the notion of a self (*\*ātmasañjñā*), and once this [notion] exists, all that [the thought] does not grasp in this way is [held to be] other.<sup>54</sup>

In another statement, Dharmakīrti declares that “the [false] view of a self generates the belief in one's own (*ātmīyagraha*).”<sup>55</sup> Persons deluded by the false view of a self regard the constituents of being both as a self and as belonging to the self, but this feeling of property may well be extended beyond the constituents and range over parts of the world that have been posited as other than the self. The personalistic belief is responsible for yet another factor, which is variously termed “desire” (*rāga*), “craving” (*trṣṇā*), “grasping” (*parigraha*) or “attachment” (*sne-*

<sup>52</sup> PVP D58a7–b1/P66b3–4: *de ltar na bdag tu mñon par žen pa yod na bdag gir chags pa la sogs pa'i skyon gyi tshogs 'jug par 'gyur žiñ / bdag tu chags pas kyañ gnas yoñs su len par byed do //*.

<sup>53</sup> PV 2.219 (*āryā* metre): *ātmani sati parasañjñā svaparavibhāgāt parigrahadveṣa u / anayoḥ sampratibaddhāḥ sarve doṣāḥ prajāyante //*.

<sup>54</sup> PVP D95b7/P110b4–5: *ji srid du blo bdag ces mñon par žen pa de srid du bdag tu 'du šes pa dañ de yod na de ltar mi 'dzin pa gañ yin pa de thams cad gžan yin no //*.

<sup>55</sup> PVS 111,18: *ātmadarśanam ātmīyagrahaṃ prasūte /*.

ha), and clearly corresponds to the eighth link of dependent origination, i.e., craving. In spite of this functional equivalence, these terms seem not to be necessarily synonymous, for Dharmakīrti is likely to have introduced a causal sequence between them, thus splitting the traditional eighth link into two. If this is correct, from the false view of a self arises first attachment or love for the self and one's own, and then craving for the things that are regarded as beneficial or pleasurable to the self. This can be seen in the following stanza:

He who sees a self has a constant attachment for this [self, thinking of it as] "I." Because of [this] attachment [for the self,] he craves for the pleasures [of this self, and his] thirst conceals [from him] the defects [of the things he deems conducive to these pleasures].<sup>56</sup>

Here, both Devendrabuddhi and Manorathanandin interpret "attachment" as "attachment for the self."<sup>57</sup> Whereas attachment regards the self (but bears upon the conditioning factors), craving regards the pleasures (*sukha*) of the self,<sup>58</sup> i.e., the things that are deemed conducive to these pleasures,<sup>59</sup> or impure (*sāsrava*) things that are (deemed) favourable (*anugrahaka*) in that they are conducive to the pleasures (of the self).<sup>60</sup> Besides the frequent occurrence of expressions such as *ātmasneha*,<sup>61</sup> *ātmātmīyasneha*<sup>62</sup> or even *\*satkāyasneha*,<sup>63</sup> Devendrabuddhi's definition of *sneha* is worth noticing:

<sup>56</sup> PV 2.217 (*āryā* metre): *yaḥ paśyaty ātmānaṃ tatrāsyaḥam iti śāśvataḥ snehaḥ / snehāt sukheṣu tṛṣṇati tṛṣṇā doṣāṃs tiraskurute //*. Śākyabuddhi interprets *doṣa* as "birth, ageing and death" (*\*jātijarāmaraṇa*, PVṬ *Ñe* D138b1/P170b8).

<sup>57</sup> See PVP D95a6/P110a2 and PVV 87,3.

<sup>58</sup> PVP D95a6/P111a2: *bdag gi bde la sred 'gyur*.

<sup>59</sup> PVV 87,3–4: *sukhasādhanatvenādhyavasitānām vastūnām*.

<sup>60</sup> See PVP D95b1/P111a4–5 and PVSṬ 402,8.

<sup>61</sup> See, e.g., PVP D58a1–2/P66a3.

<sup>62</sup> See PVP D57b3/P65b4. Attachment for the self and what belongs to the self is said to regard the object that is clung to as the self and one's own (*ātmātmīyatvābhiniṣṭe viṣaya ātmātmīyasnehaḥ*, PVSṬ 401,26–27).

<sup>63</sup> See, e.g., PVP D90b5/P104b7.

[We call] “attachment” an inclination for the self and one’s own which presupposes the [afore-mentioned delusion].<sup>64</sup>

According to Dharmakīrti, attachment for the self and what belongs (or ought to belong) to the self is in turn the cause of hostility (*pratigha*) and aversion (*dveṣa*):

Indeed, he who, without grasping (*parigraha*), sees that there is neither I nor mine, is not attached to anything and, [being so] devoid of attachment, is not averse to anything [either], for there is no [aversion] regarding that which does not hinder the self or one’s own, nor regarding that which opposes the [said] hindrance.<sup>65</sup>

One can show hostility or aversion only for that which hinders (*uparodha*) or harms (*pīḍā*) what has been taken as the self and one’s own:<sup>66</sup>

Aversion [arises] with regard to that alone which offers opposition (*pratikūlavartin*) by its hostility to that upon which the attachment for the self and one’s own bears (*viṣayabhūta*). Therefore, there is no aversion without attachment for the self and one’s own.<sup>67</sup>

And in Dharmakīrti’s eyes, that which is other than the self gives rise to aversion only insofar as it opposes love for the self and one’s own, but arouses craving as soon as it is regarded as pleasurable to the self. Craving for the pleasures of the self and that which is conducive to them generally implies one’s running around in search of pleasure. This is indeed the Vaibhāṣika definition of the ninth link of dependent origination, appropriation or clinging (*upādāna*),<sup>68</sup> which Dharmakīrti obviously has in mind in PV 2.218ab:

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<sup>64</sup> PVP D60a2/P68b2–3: *de sñon du soñ ba can gyi bdag dan bdag gir zen pa ni chags pa’o //*. See also PVP D94b7/P109b4–5.

<sup>65</sup> PVSṬ 111,15–17: *na hi nāhaṃ na mameti paśyataḥ parigraham antareṇa kvacit snehaḥ / na cānanurāgiṇaḥ kvacid dveṣaḥ / ātmātmīyānuparodhiny uparodhapratighā-tini ca tadabhāvāt /*.

<sup>66</sup> See PVSṬ 402,12 and PVP D60a2/P68b3.

<sup>67</sup> PVSṬ 402,13–15: *ātmātmīyasnehaviṣayabhūtavirodhena yaḥ sthitaḥ praktikūlavartī tatraiva dveṣaḥ / tasmān nātmātmīyasneham antareṇa dveṣa iti /*.

<sup>68</sup> See AK 3.23cd.

Seeing [but desirable] qualities [to the things that he deems pleasurable to the self], he craves [for them, thinking of them as having to become] “mine,” and clings (*upā√dā-*) to the means [that are conducive] to them.<sup>69</sup>

But Dharmakīrti also holds attachment to the self to be the cause of the three different kinds of craving that the oldest layers of Buddhist canonical literature have made responsible for rebirth (*paunarbhavika*): craving for (future) existence (*bhavatṛṣṇā*), craving for sensual pleasures (*kāmatṛṣṇā*), and craving for non-existence/annihilation (*vibhavatṛṣṇā*).<sup>70</sup> According to him, craving for sensual pleasures is to be interpreted as the actions (*pravṛtti*) of living beings to secure what they hold to be pleasurable (*sukhāpti*), whereas craving for annihilation refers to those of their actions that aim at avoiding suffering (*duḥkhānāpti*). This matches again perfectly with the Vaibhāṣika account of the tenth link of dependent origination, viz. *bhava* (literally “existence”), which is to be understood as the “action which results in future existence” (*bhaviṣyadbhavaphalaṃ karma*): *bhava* refers to the actions resulting in rebirth which are accumulated by those who run around (under the sway of craving) in order to quench their thirst.<sup>71</sup> In these stanzas, Dharmakīrti brings together both meanings of *bhava*, i.e., action to secure the pleasures of the self and the (future) existence to which they inevitably lead:

The cause [of suffering] is the longing for [re]existence, because human beings reach a specific [existential] place [and condition] due to [their] hope of obtaining it. The [afore-mentioned longing for existence] is [called] the desire for [re]existence. And since a living being [only] acts with the desire to obtain pleasure and avoid suffering, these two [i.e., craving for pleasure and craving for the avoidance of suffering,] are regarded as the desire for sensual pleasures and the desire for annihilation. And since attachment to the self is the cause [of it, this dual action] pertains to everything for [the living being] who has the notion of [something] pleasurable with regard to [something] unplea-

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<sup>69</sup> PV 2.218ab (*āryā* metre): *guṇadarśī paritṛṣṇyan mameti tatsādhanāny upādatte /*.

<sup>70</sup> For references to canonical *loci* by Dharmakīrti's commentators, see PVP D79b3-4/P91a7-8, PVA 134,33-135,2 and PVV 74,10-11. For their Pali equivalent, see Vetter 1990: 87, fn. 1.

<sup>71</sup> See AKBh<sub>Pr</sub> 132,19-21 and AK 3.24ab.

surable. Therefore, craving is the basis of existence [i.e., the cause of bondage].<sup>72</sup>

## 0.2. THE “SPECULATIVE” FORM OF THE PERSONALISTIC BELIEF AND THE FUNCTION OF PHILOSOPHY

0.2.1. Buddhist treatises such as the YBhū and the AKBh regard the personalistic false view as twofold. The one we have considered so far corresponds to the *satkāyadr̥ṣṭi* in its innate or natural (*sahaja*) form, which afflicts (nearly) all sentient beings including animals such as wild beasts and birds. And since the innate personalistic belief can only be eliminated by the path of mental cultivation (*bhāvanāheya*), only *buddhas*, *śrāvakas/arhats* and *pratyekabuddhas* have rid themselves of it. The other form of the personalistic false view is of a theoretical, “speculative” (*vi-* or *pari-kalpita*) nature, and can be eliminated by the path of vision (*darśanaheya*). In its speculative form, the *satkāyadr̥ṣṭi* characterizes the outsider (*anyatīrthya*, *tīrthika*) intellectuals elaborating philosophical views concerning the self. Such is the YBhū’s account of the twofold *satkāyadr̥ṣṭi*:

What does the personalistic false view consist of? – We call “personalistic false view” the false view of, the adhesion (*\*abhiniveśa*) to and the mentalization (*sems la ’jog pa*) of a self and what [supposedly] belongs to [this] self (*\*ātmātmīyadr̥ṣṭi*) regarding the [five] constituents to which one clings (*\*upādānaskandha*). And one ought to know (*\*veditavya*) that this [personalistic false view] is twofold (*\*dvi[vi]dha*): innate (*\*sahaja*) and speculative (*\*pari-kalpita*). Among them (*\*tatra*), the innate [personalistic false view] is that of all the immature ordinary persons (*\*bālaprthagjana*) and up to wild animals (*\*mrga*) and birds (*\*pākṣin*). As for the speculative [personalistic false view], it must be seen (*\*draṣṭavya*) as that of the outsiders (*\*anyatīrthya*).<sup>73</sup>

<sup>72</sup> PV 2.183a<sub>2</sub>–185: *hetur bhavavāñchā parigrahaḥ / yasmād deśaviśeṣasya tatprāpty-āśākṛto nṛṇām // sā bhavecchāptyanāpticchoḥ pravṛttiḥ sukhaduḥkhaḥ / yato ’pi prāṇīnaḥ kāmavibhavecche ca te mate // sarvatra cātmasnehasya hetutvāt sampravartate / asukhe sukhasaṅgīṇāsya tasmāt tṛṣṇā bhavāśrayaḥ //*

<sup>73</sup> VinSg 112b6–113a1 (as quoted in Kritzer 2005: 293): *’jig tshogs la lta ba gaṅ zé na / ñe bar len pa’i phuṅ po dag la bdag gam bdag gir ba lta ba daṅ / mñon par zén pa daṅ sems la ’jog pa gaṅ yin pa de ni ’jig tshogs la lta ba zés bya’o // de ’aṅ nram pa gñis su rig par bya ste / lhan cig skyes pa daṅ kun brtags pa’o // de la lhan cig skyes*