YVONNE HAPKE

Identity and Integration in Europe

Personal Security and the Ties of Migrants and Majority Populations to their Country



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To my children, husband, and parents

Contents

Abbreviations

(1) Countries included in the analysis

AT	Austria	HU	Hungary
BE	Belgium	IE	Ireland
CH	Switzerland	IT	Italy
CZ	Czech Republic	LU	Luxemburg
DE	Germany	NL	The Netherlands
DK	Denmark	NO	Norway
ES	Spain	PL	Poland
FI	Finland	PT	Portugal
FR	France	SE	Sweden
GB	United Kingdom	SI	Slovenia
GR	Greece		

(2) Statistical terms

ANOVA	analysis of variance
B	non-standardized regression coefficient
β	Beta, standardized regression coefficient
CFA	confirmatory factor analysis
CI	confidence interval
df	degrees of freedom
Δ	difference
F	test statistic (with *F*-distribution)
KMO	Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy
M	mean
Max.	maximum
Min.	minimum
MSA	measure of sampling adequacy
N	number of cases
n. s.	not significant (at the $p < .05$ level)

p	measure of statistical significance
PCA	principle component analysis
r	Pearson's correlation coefficient
R	correlation coefficient
R^2	coefficient of determination
SD	standard deviation
SE	standard error of the mean
VIF	variance inflation factor
t	test statistic (with t-distribution)
χ and (χ^2)	Chi (Chi Square), test statistic (with chi-distribution)
ω and (ω^2)	Omega (Omega Squared), effect size measure associated with ANOVA
η and (η^2)	Eta (Eta Squared), effect size measure associated with ANOVA

(3) Terms concerning theory and model tests

BN	bi-nationals
FG	first generation immigrants
H	hypothesis
IG	ingroup
IM	migrant = immigrant or ethnic minority group member
INT	integration
IPT	interpersonal trust
IST	institutional trust
IR	identity resources
IT	identity theory
OG	outgroup
PT	performance trust
MA	majority population
SG	second generation immigrants
TG	third generation = third generation immigrants or member of
ethnic	minority
TH	identity threats
SIT	social identity theory
UF	unclassified foreigners

1. Introduction

Migration and asylum policy is an extremely contested political issue in contemporary Western Europe and North America. It is often a central theme in local and national elections, and it has become the key campaigning issue for increasingly powerful parties on the far right in many countries. Public and scholarly debates on immigration are now about as polarized as they possibly could be and the available arguments are "most frequently used to attain political goals."[1] Defenders of immigration claim that newcomers renew our countries both economically and socially.[2] Opponents argue that immigrants overstretch the welfare systems of receiving countries, harm national and local economies, and affect the receiving countries cultures adversely.[3]

Interestingly, when most Western countries recruited large numbers of foreign workers in the 1950s and 1960s, the public paid little attention to immigration issues, as immigration policies back then were almost exclusively determined by the political elites and their social partners; satisfying the Western economies' demand for labor and following these countries' interests in international relations. In the 1970s and 1980s, migration and asylum policy became increasingly politicized, when this form of elite policy-making could no longer be sustained:

> Immigration began to be perceived as impacting on a range of critical social questions: unemployment, the welfare state, cultural identity, and even public order. Increasing concerns about the impact of immigration were partly a function of changes in the scale and composition of flows. This period saw larger numbers of immigrants and asylum-seekers arriving from developing countries, as well as an increased proportion of women, children, and old people, who required more extensive state engagement in providing welfare and social assistance. Patterns of flows were also changing, generating concerns about controlling illegal flows and limiting abuse of asylum systems and possibilities for family reunion. Yet this growing anxiety about immigration was also a function of broader socio-economic changes linked to globalization and the changing role of the state. Insecurities about employment, welfare state reform, and collective identity were readily

[1] David M. Reimers, Unwelcome Strangers: American Identity and the Turn Against Immigration (New York: Columbia UP, 1998) 88.

[2] See e.g. Joel Millman, The Other Americans: How Immigrants Renew Our Country, Our Economy, and Our Values (New York: Viking, 1997) 316-317.

[3] See e.g. Peter Brimelow, Alien Nation: Common Sense About America's Immigration Disaster (New York: Harper, 1996) 146-151.

> channeled into concerns about immigration. In this context, political parties found they had high incentives to compete to mobilize support through promises to control and restrict migration and asylum.[4]

These identity and security concerns prevail and strongly influence current debates on immigration and integration in Europe.

1.1 Identity and security aspects in current immigration debates

Boswell observed a growing tendency in a number of Western European countries to question various assumptions made about the integration of foreigners in the second half of the past century and the policies based on them.[5] Doubts about the success of integration policies have also been fed by a number of specific events – the riots in the north of England, the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, on the United States, the murder of the Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh, the repeated uproar of third-generation immigrant youth in the French *banlieus*, terrorist attacks in Madrid, and rising concerns of Islamic fundamentalist terrorism in virtually all major European cities.

The perceived ineffectiveness of integration policies also nourish highly sensitive debates about multiculturalism and self-identity in countries such as Germany, France, the Netherlands, or the United Kingdom as people perceive a link between the level of immigration, a failure to integrate immigrants, and terrorism.[6]

Accordingly, this feeds on already existing fears from various sources, brings them into the arena of public immigration and integration debate, and by doing so often distorts the subject. The debate is also full of symbolic threats and identity issues readily flowing together:

> The West is dying. Its nations have ceased to reproduce, and their populations have stopped growing and begun to shrink. Not since the Black Death carried off a third of Europe in the fourteenth century has there been a graver threat to the survival of Western civilization. Today, in seventeen European

[4] Christina Boswell, European Migration Policies in Flux: Changing Patterns of Inclusion and Exclusion, Chatham House Papers, The Royal Institute of International Affairs (London: Blackwell Publishing, 2003) 9f.
[5] Boswell 86.
[6] Boswell 1.

> countries, there are more burials than births, more coffins than cradles. The countries are Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, and Russia. Catholic, Protestant, Orthodox – all the Christian faiths are represented in the great death march of the West. (…) Since The Death of the West was published in January 2002, the four threats to the survival of Western civilization that it identified – Third World immigrant invasions, the dying out of European peoples, the menace of multiculturalism, the rise of a world socialist superstate – have become the headline issues from Melbourne to Moscow. These mega-issues will dominate our lives as totally as did the Cold War, and how we manage them will determine whether America and the West survive. [7]

As another example, the debate about headscarves in classrooms revealed that the core of the debate was not a question of defending democratic values against Islamic extremism, but rather a reflection of social closure and an attempt for cultural exclusion of a minority culture in the name of identity:

> Die Tatsache, dass in der Debatte kaum oder gar nicht geprüft wurde, ob ein Kopftuchverbot wirklich ein unverzichtbares Instrument zur Abwehr der durchaus vorhandenen und sehr ernst zu nehmenden Bedrohung der bundesdeutschen Demokratie durch den islamischen Extremismus ist, zeigt, dass im Konflikt um das Kopftuch nicht die Abwehr des Islamismus im Zentrum stand, sondern in dieser Kontroverse je länger desto mehr indirekt die Frage oder kulturellen Identität und der sozialen Abschließung der überkommenen deutschen Mehrheitsgesellschaft politisch zugespitzt worden ist.[8]

The observed new forms of anxiety could also be linked to the decline of traditional bonds of solidarity and related collective identities such as class, church, ideology, or the nation-state. Other (collective) identities are sought instead, and may lead to "solidarity from anxiety"[9] as Beck termed it. Solidarity from anxiety is less coherent or rational than previous forms of collective identity and solidarity such as in the case of class commitment aimed a rather concrete material objects. Through the lack of clear material goals, a new solidarity or identity tends to project diffuse and rather ill-defined insecurity onto

[7] Patrick J. Buchanan, The Death of the West: How Dying Populations and Immigrant Invasions Imperil Our Country and Civilization, 2nd ed. (New York: Thomas Dunne Books, 2002) 9, 269.

[8] Antonius Liedhegener, "Streit um das Kopftuch. Staat, Religion und Religionspolitik in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland" Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft 15.4 (2005) 1197.

[9] Beck, Ulrich, Risikogesellschaft: Auf dem Weg in eine andere Moderne (Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 1992) 49.

merely symbolic targets – immigrants or ethnic minorities for example.[10] Thus, vague concerns about employment, schooling, social security, crime, or identity are transferred onto the immigration 'problem'.[11]

Infusing these fears into integration concerns is not without risks. Moreover, when immigrants and ethnic minorities are characterized as problematic, they will hardly be motivated to develop a sense of identification or loyalty to their host societies. However, effective integration relies on the sense of belonging and affinity easily undermined by incidences of racism and discrimination.[12] According to Castles, the integration of immigrants into host societies would progress far more smoothly if immigrants would not experience exclusion. That is why emphasizing the individual responsibility of immigrants for their integration may be counterproductive. Putting immigrants and ethnic minorities in a defensive position causes a more hostile and charged debate.[13]

In European countries, costs of migration have largely been focused on the abuse of asylum, irregular employment, and illegal entry.[14] These and other threat perceptions have triggered doubts about the suitability of current integration policy and the general ability of states to protect their citizens against threats posed by "outsiders." These fears have already been nurtured by a persistent anti-asylum, anti-illegal immigration discourse in the public media over the past decades. Right-wing parties seeking to mobilize support for anti-immigration issues also exploited threat perceptions and fears. The success of right-wing populist parties in elections in Austria, Denmark, France, Italy, and the Netherlands show the effectiveness of these policies in generating public support.[15] Of course, this instrumentalization is only possible because fears are not properly addressed by the other parties, sometimes due to a well-minded "political correctness". However, the electoral success of right-wing populist parties across Europe with right-wing party votes sometimes reaching heights of

[10] Ibid. 75.
[11] Etienne Balibar, "Racism and crisis" Race, Nation and Class, eds. Etienne Balibar, and Immanuel Wallerstein (London and New York: Verso, 1991) 219.
[12] Stephen Castles, "Migrations and minorities in Europe – Perspectives for the 1990s: Eleven hypotheses" Racism and Migration in Western Europe, eds. John Solomos, and Jon Wrench (Oxford: Berg, 1993) 28.
[13] Boswell 92f.
[14] Boswell 2.
[15] Boswell 1f.

more than 20 percent[16] – is also fuelled by a different development – the anti-establishment populism.[17] This populism becomes more related with migration and identity issues – the disapproval of governments unable to deal with increasing unemployment, protest against welfare and pension reforms in a number of Western European countries further contribute to perceptions of increased economic competition and fear for one's personal well-being, which in turn increases safety concerns and reduces levels of tolerance.

The terrorist attacks of 9/11 were not just physical attacks on the United States. People in the US suddenly felt vulnerable in a way unknown ever before in American history. 9/11 revealed that the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans no longer guaranteed homeland security. In addition, the Cold War threat of Soviet missiles having the capability to reach targets in the United States was quickly forgotten after the collapse and breakup of the Soviet Union. Terrorism is not so much a physical military threat – nobody can deny the overwhelming superiority of the US armed forces over any possible opponent in the contemporary world system. However, it is to a much larger extent a threat to American and Western identity. The new threat of Islamic fundamentalism and terrorism can be seen as a logic extension of the fault line wars between civilizations Huntington described for the 1990s: Many conflicts with multiple and complex causes start out locally and later become focused and hardened increasingly deserving to be called identity wars. The increase in violence leads the conflicting sides to redefine themselves more exclusively as "us" against "them" thus enhancing group cohesion and commitment. Political leaders appeal to ethnic and religious loyalties and a hate dynamics develops comparable to the "security dilemma" in international relations, described by Posen, in which mutual distrust, fears, and hatred feed on each other.[18] Both sides magnify the distinction claiming to be the forces of virtue whereas the others are demonized as forces of evil. The fault line

[16] John Veugelers, and André Magnan, "Conditions of far-right strength in contemporary Western Europe: an application of Kitschelt's theory" European Journal of Political Research 44.6 (2005): 839.
[17] Jens Rydgren, "Is extreme right-wing populism contagious? Explaining the emergence of a new party family" European Journal of Political Research 44.3 (2005): 413.
[18] Barry R. Posen, "The security dilemma and ethnic conflict" Ethnic Conflict and International Security, ed. Michael E. Brown (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1993) 103-124.

wars follow a similar pattern as revolutions – over time the moderates lose out to radicals.[19]

> In one way or another, diasporas and kin countries have been involved in every fault line war in the 1990s. Given the extensive primary role of Muslim groups in such wars, Muslim governments and associations are the most frequent secondary and tertiary participants. The most active have been the governments of Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Iran, Turkey, and Libya, who together, at times with other Muslim states, have contributed varying degrees of support to Muslims fighting non-Muslims in Palestine, Lebanon, Bosnia, Chechnya, the Transcaucasus, Tajikistan, Kashmir, Sudan, and the Philippines. In addition to governmental support, many primary level Muslim groups have been bolstered by the floating Islamist international of fighters from the Afghanistan war, who have joined in conflicts ranging from the civil war in Algeria to Chechnya to the Philippines. This Islamic international was involved, one analyst noted, in the 'dispatch of volunteers in order to establish Islamist rule in Afghanistan, Kashmir, and Bosnia; joint propaganda wars against governments opposing Islamists in one country or another; the establishment of Islamic centers in the diaspora that serve jointly as political headquarters for all those parties.'[20] The Arab League and the Organization of the Islamic Conference have also provided support for and attempted to coordinate the efforts of their members in reinforcing Muslim groups in intercivilizational conflicts.[21]

This diaspora phenomenon has also been acknowledged by others. Under the headline "Trennt der Glaube die Kulturen? Holland: Wir haben den Djihad im Land" (Does religion separate the cultures? Holland: We have jihad in our country), the journal of the German union of the police *Deutsche Polizei* quoted from a speech delivered by Emmanuel Sivan of Hebrew University Jerusalem at a 2002 conference on Islam:

> The Islamic terrorism is an exile phenomenon. Pay attention to what is happening here in Europe. Forget about Al-Quaida. The group has had 14 out of its 15 minutes of glory (…) the next Bin Ladens will come from the suburbs of France, London and Cologne. Germany is a center of Islamic exile. Not only Bin Laden's suicide bombers were recruited here, but also numerous

[19] Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, 2nd edition (New York: Touchstone, 1997) 266.
[20] Khalid Duran, qtd. by Richard H. Shultz, Jr. and William J. Olson, Ethnic and Religious Conflict: Emerging Threat to U.S. Security (Washington, D.C.: National Strategy Information Center, [1994?]) 25.
[21] Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, 2nd edition (New York: Touchstone, 1997) 273.

> others wait here for their call. They are young men principally who have given up life – Dead Men Walking – convinced to take those who they perceive as enemies into death with them. [22]

Even though public perception strongly links terrorism and immigrants – particularly those of Muslim faith, terrorism is not exclusively an immigration phenomenon. Instead, terrorism dwells in the midst of our societies. Many bombers are neither immigrants nor of immigrant descent whereas 99 percent of immigrants are not even leaning towards any susceptible organizations. Fear and general suspicion from the side of the majority population spoil intergroup relations and inhibit the development of mutual trust. Even though common perceptions prove rather "faulty," they have the same effects as if they were "true."

These examples related first to Islam and Muslim minorities in Western societies. However, the phenomenon is larger and stands for cultural differences and cultural distance in general that readily serves as a marker of group boundary and important symbolic divide through which a whole variety of social, economic and political troubles is interpreted. When integration processes are then regarded from a perspective of intergroup relations, identity aspects and threat perceptions are equally important. The effects of immigration on receiving countries' cultures are widely feared by many members of the dominant culture group as they worry about the maintenance of their own values and status. Despite political correctness and rhetoric about tolerance and acceptance, immigration continues to be seen as posing fundamental threats to vulnerable groups and individuals.[23] These threats can be material referring to one's own well-being, or rather symbolic referring to social identity. Religions other than those practiced by the majority are equally threatening as they threaten its

[22] Berndt Georg Tamm, "Trennt der Glaube die Kulturen? Holland: Wir haben den Djihad im Land" Deutsche Polizei 2 (2005): 6.

[23] John W. Berry, "Understanding and Managing Multiculturalism: Some Possible Implications of Research in Canada" Psychology and Developing Societies 3 (1991): 17-49; Walter G. Stephan and Cookie White Stephan, "An Integrated Theory of Prejudice" Claremont Symposium on Applied Social Psychology, ed. S. Oskamp (Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum, 2000) 23-46.

cultural self-perception. Debates over the construction of a mosque in the center of a city are an expression of competing identities.

From an intergroup competition perspective, poorer immigrants or members of minorities can always be perceived as threatening in two ways: either as a burden on the already strained welfare system or as competitors for low skill, low wage jobs,[24] affordable housing, and other resources.[25] Even labor unions see themselves only as the representatives of the native-borns and those immigrants who are already in the system. New arrivals are perceived as competitors. The "Green Card" is thus seen as a "Red Card" for the unemployed.[26] This reaction of the labor unions is even more surprising as the "Green Card" was only granted to very highly qualified professionals, not those competing in the segments of most union members.

Attending to common fears, there is a corresponding public conviction that the outcome of "failing integration" in terms of social, political, and economic problems has to be prevented. At least partly caused be the lack of consensus on integration preferences within the receiving societies, there is a widespread uncertainty about which political measures to take. Even though there is strong evidence that integration is not at all about structural equality and personal achievement, at least in Germany politicians display little vision of considering alternative supporting measures than language courses and education in general. Therefore, for many observers the German integration summit in summer 2006 has been rather disappointing: Hartmut Esser called the outcome "politically motivated placebos which were easily agreed upon."[27] If the courses sponsored

[24] Borjas showed that immigration substantial lowers wages of low skilled native-born workers as immigration increases the supply of these workers. See George J., Borjas, Heaven's Door: Immigration Policy and the American Economy, 2nd edition (Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 2001) 66-67 and Power, Jonathan, "Immigration: It's the Working Class that Bears the Burden" International Herald Tribune 1 Apr. 2005.

[25] James S. Jackson, Kendrick T. Brown, Tony N. Brown, and Bryant Marks, "Contemporary Immigration Policy Orientations Among Dominant-Group Members in Western Europe" Journal of Social Issues 57.3 (2001) 431-456.

[26] Janine Cremer, "Zuwanderung bzw. Zuwanderungspolitik im Spiegel der Arbeitgeber- und der Gewerkschaftspresse" Themen der Rechten - Themen der Mitte: Zuwanderung, demographischer Wandel und Nationalbewusstsein, eds. Christoph Butterwegge et al. (Opladen: Leske + Budrich, 2002) 43-66.

[27] Hartmut Esser called the outcome of the German integration summit "politically motivated placebos which were easily agreed upon." (qtd. in Johanna Eberhardt, "Streit um Deutschkurse für erwachsene Migranten: Mannheimer Professor hält nur Angebote an Kinder

by the federal government benefit someone other than the language schools earning money with them, then it is those people "who have already well adjusted to living here."[28]

The same uncertainty surfaced in the highly emotional German debate on a *Leitkultur*[29] – a cultural model which acceptance by all population groups should be the basis for social interaction for and between all national, religious, cultural, and ethnic groups – displays the uncertainty how integration should be handled in a suitable, professional manner. Immigrants are asked to adjust to more than the existing laws – they are supposed to accept and to support the dominant culture's value system. Both discussions displayed public and political helplessness of the national elites in dealing with immigration and cultural diversity as the entire debate ignored that it would be unfeasible in a pluralist society to define certain features of the receiving culture as "core values, symbols, objects, narratives etc." all inhabitants would have to internalize. The debates also show the lack of a broader consensus on how the country should adjust to immigration. Thus, it is not surprising that the term Leitkultur is used in a variety of meanings and connotations of those who defend it: The original meanings as intended by Sternberger and Habermas' "constitutional patriotism"[30] and Bassam Tibi's "cultural model"[31] supposed to build a value consensus between Germans and migrants in Germany are mainly concerned with the support for the principles of individualism and liberalism.[32] More conservative politicians ask for everyone's emotional identification with the majority culture and argue that integration in modern societies is not only based on performance of the economic and political system but also depends on

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für sinnvoll - Bundesamt widerspricht – 'Programm ein voller Erfolg'" Stuttgarter Zeitung 17 Jul. 2006: 7.

[28] Ibid.

[29] Hartmut Esser, "Was ist denn dran am Begriff der 'Leitkultur'?" Angewandte Soziologie, eds. Robert Kecskes, Michael Wagner, and Christof Wolf (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2004) 199-200.

[30] Dolf Sternberger, Verfassungspatriotismus (Frankfurt a. M.: Insel, 1990) and Jürgen Habermas, "Staatsbürgerschaft und nationale Identität" Faktizität und Geltung, by Jürgen Habermas (Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 1992) 642.

[31] Tibi Bassam, "Leitkultur als Wertekonsens" Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte 1-2 (2001) 23-26.

[32] Hartmut Esser, "Was ist denn dran am Begriff der 'Leitkultur'?" Angewandte Soziologie, eds. Robert Kecskes, Michael Wagner, and Christof Wolf (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2004) 206-207.

emotional bonds of their citizens. Constitutions and laws do not provide those emotional bonds, they do not create belonging – therefore they cannot serve as the sole foundation of social interaction between members of majority and minority groups. Instead, consciousness of belonging requires a shared cultural foundation.[33] Proponents of multiculturalism often oppose the term of a *Leitkultur* altogether.

On top of this contested understanding, there is a widespread belief in the reach of politics being far greater for the subject of integration than any other areas, which is at least true for the German case.[34] Studies however, often show how limited the impact of policies in this area actually is. To give an example, second-generation immigrant youth in France and in the UK have equally high levels of identification with their ethnic community and as nationals of their countries of origin even though both countries display large differences in views and traditions of cultural diversity and resulting integration policies. These official policy orientations apparently have no impact on ethnic group identification and thus – individual integration strategy (see section 2.1.2).[35] Of course, the belief in the reach of politics in Germany may be simply due to the dominance of the professional group of social pedagogues and social workers[36] who often hold leftist state paternalistic views constantly reinforced by the fact that their own jobs mostly depend on public funding as well as the wish to assign the meaning of importance to their day-to-day work in order to satisfy their own efficacy and positive distinctiveness needs.

The evidence that integration, its process, and success is first of all the result of the efforts of the immigrants themselves and the statement that integration cannot be politically effected[37] may appear quite threatening to these professionals. It is also of little relieve that municipal policy even though it

[33] Bertold Löffler, "'Leitkultur' im Fokus: Was der umstrittene Begriff meint, und wozu er gut sein soll" Die Politische Meinung 435 (2006): 18.

[34] Michael Bommes, "Integration – gesellschaftliches Risiko und politisches Symbol" Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte 22-23 (2007): 4.

[35] See University of Bamberg, Final Report from Project "Effectiveness of National Integration Strategies Towards Second Generation Migrant Youth in a Comparative European Perspective" (Bamberg: U of Bamberg, 2001) 63-69.

[36] Tatjana Baraulina, "Integration und interkulturelle Konzepte in Kommunen" Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte 22-23 (2007): 27.

[37] Michael Bommes, "Integration – gesellschaftliches Risiko und politisches Symbol" Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte 22-23 (2007): 4.

cannot regulate the relations between the established and newcomers, together with civil society, can influence the framing conditions under which the self-regulation of society is stimulated and unavoidable intergroup group competition for resources and recognition are channeled into civil modes.[38]

The unrealistic hope for the reach of politics is also present in the emotionally charged debate on "*nachholende Integration*" (later integration) based on the belief that the social costs of failed integration is the result on not having provided enough resources to new arrivals in the era of massive labor immigration when Germany did to perceive itself as an immigration country.[39] The high emotional charge on integration policy automatically produces disappointment as not all measures will actually work and some may even pose unintended barriers to integration.[40] Failing integration thus not only poses a threat to the identity of immigrants who have difficulties adjusting, but also to those members of the receiving society who are professionally engaged in integration policy or its implementation. The blame of political opponents who are perceived to have failed to provide the necessary resources is also an expression of coping with one's own injured identity. Ongoing denial of limitations of municipal integration approaches[41] and the backward orientation in blaming others for failures in the past, inhibit progressive policy changes.

In order to bring in some less acknowledged but nevertheless important aspects into the integration debate, the focus of attention should shift towards the individual level. So far, individual personality has been an underestimated factor in the analysis of social phenomena even though the research interest has

[38] Dieter Filsinger, "Introductory address at the Conference on the Integration and Participation of Foreigners in European Cities," Stuttgart, 15 Sept. 2003.

[39] Klaus J. Bade, "Integration: versäumte Chance und nachholende Politik" Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte 22-23 (2007): 35.

[40] Bommes 5.

[41] For example, several German municipalities inappropriately claim isolated school projects as a full success to local integration even though school affairs lay in the authority of the federal states that often show little inclination to extend the model to all schools and even though no meaningful long-term results – such as lower drop out rates or an increase in school success by disadvantaged groups – have been achieved. The side effect of such "model projects" is to take away attention and resources for potentially more effective measures in neglected areas within the authority of the municipality.

increased over the past few years.[42] Individual experiences are often far removed from the simplicity and the polarization of public debate surrounding migration. There, one will find a more differentiated and even biased picture, for example, regarding the effect immigration experience may have on individuals: It "sometimes enhances one's life chances and mental health and sometimes virtually destroys one's ability to carry on."[43] As perhaps this is because people are different from each other, the individual personality would be a good starting point to discover why this may be the case.

Social identity theory (SIT) and identity theory (IT) are well equipped to explain integration as individual adjustment process and both integration and ethnic closure as intergroup relations. Reasoning along the lines of SIT, experiencing identity threat based on group membership will lead people to exit a devalued group for a new one, either whose status is perceived higher or which offers better perspectives and thus appears to benefit the person and its self-perception. Alternatively, cognitive resources are available, through which an individual may stay within a group of lower status and accentuate the boundaries between groups along alternative dimensions to which the devalued group status does not apply. On an intergroup level, people restore their perception of personal security by interacting within their own group and by devaluating outgroups. Thus, the withdrawal into one's ethnic community and the voicing of prejudice or resentment against other ethnic groups are very similar responses. The argument also operates in the reverse direction: Once a person feels secure in terms of actualizing high levels of self-verification, self-efficiency or self-esteem – it is prepared to encounter something new, to cross borders, and to engage with the "other". Identity security will also enhance processes of transition and adaptation to a new environment through this readiness to face it.

It is the perspective of social identity theory that seems to open up a new path for integration policy that places the individual at the center of attention and recognizes the dynamics of intra- and intergroup processes: "By avoiding the reduction of groups to individuals, it allows us to conceptualize the relationship

[42] See Beatrice Rammstedt, "Welche Vorhersagekraft hat die individuelle Persönlichkeit für inhaltliche sozialwissenschaftliche Variablen?" ZUMA-Arbeitsbericht 1 (2007) 1.

[43] John W. Berry, Ype H. Poortinga, Marshall H. Segal, and Pierre R. Dasen, Cross-Cultural Psychology: Research and Applications (New York: Cambridge UP, 2002) 285.

between individual and society, and to place theoretically the group within the individual."[44]

It is important to pay respect to the wholeness of people also in the sense Deaux argued to acknowledge permeability and interconnectedness of social and personal identity and therefore warned against their dichotomization.[45] Politicizing cultural, religious or ethnical difference is such an unwanted dichotomization. Also specific "well-meaning" integration measures for target groups based on nationality highlight singularized identities and prejudice and do not address specific life situations and the wholeness of people. Chase too, asked for a more personalized view of identity and a more social view of the self.[46] In addition, this is of particular relevance in political contexts. Thus, this work seeks to contribute to strengthen personalized views of identity and a more social perspective of the self in the present political discussion.

Additionally, a gender perspective should be adopted, not as an attribution to the time spirit of "political correctness" but rather because gender creates a category of identity gratification or deprivation that can be expected to interact with immigration experience and intergroup perception.

1.2 Object and purpose of this study

As the presented examples demonstrated, integration seems to be related to identity and perceptions of security. The prominence of immigration and integration issues in the media and political discourse also "appears to be linked to less tangible anxieties about identity and membership. These concerns have lent a more emotive quality to the debate on integration and citizenship, often obscuring the complexity of the causes of failed integration or exaggerating their impact on host societies."[47] Esser's four stage model of integration contains the identification of the immigrant with the receiving society at the highest of the

[44] Michael A. Hogg and Dominic Abrams, Social Identifications: A Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations and Group Processes (1988; London, New York: Routledge, 2001) 218.
[45] Karl Deaux, "Personalized identity and social self" Social Psychology of Identity and the Self Concept, ed. Glynis M. Breakwell (London: Surrey UP, 1992) 9-35.
[46] Jonathan Chase, "The self and collective action: dilemmatic identities" Social Psychology of Identity and the Self Concept, ed. Glynis M. Breakwell (London: Surrey UP, 1992) 101-129.
[47] Boswell 87.

four defined stages.[48] Hupka suggested to relate immigrants' and ethnic minorities' identification with the receiving society to social and political participation.[49]

Likewise, this dissertation attempts to assess the impact of identity on integration from an individual perspective. Self-perceptions have long been known to play a central role in the actual behavior of people and are prominent in present research.[50]

> Action is the social expression of identity. The only route of access to the identity of another is through his or her action, whether verbal or not. Since identity comprises emotions, beliefs, and attitudes it is a prime motivator of action. Identity directs action. This is not to deny the importance of situational constraints and stimuli in determining behavior. It is simply to reaffirm that these situational determinants gain their meaning only through interpretation within the individual's system of beliefs and values; their implications for purposive action rather than unintended behavior are, therefore, mediated by identity. Thus, the content and value dimensions of identity specify appropriate action. Moreover, the identity processes, guided by the principles which dominate their operation, will also direct action. In search for continuity, distinctiveness and self-esteem, the individual seeks to move across positions within the social matrix. In this way, action is precipitated by the requirements of identity.[51]

This dissertation will be especially concerned with the impact of the security of self-perceptions on integration thereby combining the security concept used in international relations and the psychological conceptualization of a person's mental stability and flexibility, the capability of coping with identity crises, and subjective well-being. It treats immigration experience in terms of the many adjustments to be made by the individual as a result from the experience of

[48] Hartmut Esser, Soziologie. Spezielle Grundlagen, vol. 1, Situationslogik und Handeln (Frankfurt a. M.: Campus, 1999). For more details see page 36ff. of this work.

[49] Sandra Hupka, Individuation und soziale Identität türkischer Jugendlicher in Berlin im Kontext von Freundschaftsbeziehungen. Zur Integration türkischer Jugendlicher, diss., Freie Universität Berlin, 2002, online, <http://www.diss.fu-berlin.de/diss/receive/FUDISS_thesis_000000000950>, retrieved on 3 Oct. 2008. 78.

[50] E.g., Catherine E. Seta, Steven Schmidt, and Catherine M. Bookhout, "Social identity orientation and social role attributions: explaining behavior through the lens of the self" Self and Identity 5.4 (2006): 355-364.

[51] Glynis M. Breakwell, Coping with Threatened Identities (London: Methuen, 1986) 43.

massive societal change[52] which may be more appropriate than just discussing favorable conditions bringing about identity change in terms of national or cultural belonging.[53] Using identity and identification beyond the meaning of adjustment in one single category even though it may be a "master" identity[54] – such as ethnicity or nationality – creates the chance to adopt a more complete and more dynamic model of the self and to recognize the multidimensionality of integration. Hupka's idea – even though straight forward at first glance – disregarded the possibility that political and social participation are stronger affected by other categories than national identification. While nationality or ethnicity might yet deliver the material for very powerful identities "because in many contexts they override all other characteristics of the person"[55] – they are still only two among others. Landes noted, "Culture does not stand alone."[56] Analyzing the identity structure behind integration may actually be of greater relevance than more or less incidental meanings of collective, group or personal identities and allegiances, whose significance for individuals cannot easily be assessed and may vary. Looking at identity security is also much different from the factors widely believed to facilitate integration, but often provide only unsatisfactory explanations for minority underachievement – such as education and mastery of the immigration country's language.[57]

As groups play an important role in both one's self-perception and coping with identity crisis, intergroup relations will be given room in this analysis, even though the main unit of analysis will be the individual. It will be reasoned that

[52] Lada Timotijevic, and Glynis M. Breakwell, "Migration and threat to identity" Journal of Community & Applied Social Psychology 10 (2000): 355.

[53] Examples for research on national or ethnic identity transformation in the context of migration see Gaby Voigt, Selbstbilder im Dazwischen. Wie afghanische Migranten ihre Identität konstruieren, diss., Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg, 2001 (Frankfurt a. M.: IKO-UP für Interkulturelle Kommunikation, 2002); Regine Penitsch, Migration und Identität: Eine Mikrostudie unter marokkanischen Studenten und Studentinnen in Berlin, Berliner Beiträge zur Ethnologie, vol. 2 (Berlin: Weißensee Verlag, 2003).

[54] Sheldon Stryker, "Identity theory: developments and extensions" Self and Identity, eds. Krysia Yardley, and Terry Honess (New York: Wiley, 1987) 89-104.

[55] Ibid.

[56] David Landes, "Culture makes almost all the difference" Culture Matters: How Values Shape Human Progress, eds. Lawrence E. Harrison, and Samuel P. Huntington (New York: Basic Books 2000) 3.

[57] See Lawrence E. Harrison, "Why culture matters" Culture Matters: How Values Shape Human Progress, eds. Lawrence E. Harrison, and Samuel P. Huntington (New York: Basic, 2000) XXI.

identity security not only affects integrative attitudes directly but also indirectly via ingroup-outgroup perceptions. In this context, identity security will be expected to relate to ethnic closure in the case of the receiving society and strong exclusive ethnic ingroup orientation in the case of the immigrant and ethnic minority population. There will also be a positive relationship between the degree of ethnic orientation of the immigrants and members of ethnic minorities and the perceived xenophobic attitudes and behaviors of the receiving society. On the other hand, ethnic ingroup orientation of immigrants and ethnic minorities may also trigger higher levels of ethnic closure.

The perspective of social identity theory seems to provide a new path for understanding integration and formulating policy for placing the individual at the core of analysis (the immigrant as well as the neighbor as a member of the receiving society) and for recognizing the dynamics of intra- and intergroup processes. "By avoiding the reduction of groups to individuals, it allows us to conceptualize the relationship between individual and society, and to place theoretically the group within the individual."[58] In terms of majority-minority relations with an emphasis on immigrants or national and ethnic minorities, integration can either mean to cross group boundaries by moving from a minority group to the majority group which is generally associated with the term of assimilation. Alternatively, the accentuation of a new – inclusive category can be meant with which both groups then identify and each group still maintains its original group identity as an expression of dual or even multiple identities. Instead of emphasizing a strict assimilation pattern in reality, one has to take into account that certain conditions allow immigrants today to maintain identification with their country of origin and to develop a strong sense of belonging to the host country. Nevertheless, ethnic community orientation may still create barriers to integration.

To sum it up, this work seeks to explore the meaningfulness of a concept of identity security for understanding integration of immigrants and ethnic minorities including attitudes of the receiving society towards immigrants and thus intergroup relations. The individual will serve as the unit of analysis focusing on what integration actually means to and may require of an individual

[58] Michael A. Hogg and Dominic Abrams, Social Identifications: A Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations and Group Processes (1988; London, New York: Routledge, 2001) 218.

human being. In doing so, this dissertation will start out at the core of the person – its identity by specifically looking at aspects of identity that increase an individual's feelings and perceptions of identity security via the security of this person's identity and will work with a "generous" definition of integration to accommodate different interpretations and individual preferences.

1.3 Research approach and methodology

Wanting to cover the aspect of multiplicity of identity – a quantitative research approach will be adopted. Much is already known from qualitative research in sociology, anthropology, and political science about the meanings of master identities such as ethnicity, nationality, religion, culture or gender in the context of migration situations.[59]

A quantitative approach can better address the more complex structure of the self which simultaneously consists of many identities and their possible interplay with the other identities has often been ignored in research on migration, integration, and ethnic minorities. Not only are empirical tests with real world data quite unusual in identity research, the application of identity theory to

[59] The rich literature on singular identities and their effects on social and political phenomena from recent years includes for example: Stanley Feldman, and Leonie Huddy, "Racial resentment and White opposition to race-conscious programs: principle or prejudice?" American Journal of Political Science 49.1 (2005): 168-183; Catarina Kinnvall, "Globalization and religious nationalism: self, identity, and the search for ontological security" Political Psychology 25.5 (2004): 741-767; Daniel N. Posner, "The political salience of cultural difference: Why Chewas and Tumbukas are allies in Zambia and adversaries in Malawi" American Political Science Review 98.4 (2004): 529-546; Claudine Gay, "Putting race in context: Identifying the environmental determinants of Black racial attitudes" American Political Science Review 98.4 (2004): 547-562; Christopher M. Frederico, "When do welfare attitudes become racialized? The paradoxical effects of education" American Journal of Political Science 48.2 (2004): 374-391; Astrid Wonneberger, "The invention of history in the Irish-American diaspora: Myth of the great famine" Diaspora, Identity and Religion: New Directions in Theory and Research, eds. Waltraud Kokot, Khachig Tölölyan, and Carolin Alfonso (London: Routledge, 2004) 117-129; Donald R. Kinder, and Nicolas Winter, "Exploring the racial divide: Blacks, Whites, and opinion on national policy" American Journal of Political Science 45.2 (2001): 439-453; Konstantinos Goutovos, Psychologie der Migration: Über die Bewältigung von Migration in der Nationalgesellschaft (Hamburg: Argument-Verlag, 2000). For a good review of the identity literature before 1997 see Deborrah E. S. Frable, "Gender, Racial, Ethnic, Sexual, and Class Identities" Annual Review of Psychology 48 (1997): 139-162.

political phenomena also fits in a desideratum in empirical political research: Hill et al. found prevalent identity theories to be hardly applicable to empirical research.[60] However, as I do not agree with this point of view, I believe that quantitative research is indeed a feasible option once sufficient answers are found to the existing problems[61] for the application of a theory primarily built by means of laboratory experimentation to "normal" survey data. I will attempt this with a limitation of the identity concept to security concerns and a merger of different research branches offsetting the deficiencies of one another and allowing for greater applicability.

A quantitative study of social identity in a real world setting (using *survey data* instead of narrow experimental designs or for that matter a small number of qualitative interviews and using a *large data set representing a great social diversity* versus focusing on strictly limited social groups presented through rather small case numbers) will increase the meaningfulness of results and promises not only to shed some light on answering the question how integration works, but it may therefore produce findings better positioned to impact decisions on policies or policy adjustments in the future.

A cross country analysis will be performed on European countries where immigration related threats and anxieties have become more prominent in public discourse and political agendas within the past few decades. Particularly for European countries, migration and asylum policy has increasing relevance for national security considerations. Several national immigration and integration policies in Europe are currently under construction – and so are immigration regulations and programs for social integration by the European Union. In the light of demographic and economic challenges, it is often argued that the future of these societies depends on how immigrants' integration progresses. Proposing an alternative model to explaining integration and ethnic closure also intends to

[60] Paul B. Hill, "Kulturelle Inkonsistenz und Stress bei der zweiten Generation" Generation und Identität: Theoretische und empirische Beiträge zur Migrationssoziologie, eds. Hartmut Esser, and Paul B. Hill. Studien zur Sozialwissenschaft 97 (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1990).

[61] Huddy identified the following problems for the application of SIT and IT on quantitative empirical research: 1) Existence of identity choice; 2) Subjective meaning of identities; 3) Gradations in identity strength; and 4) Considerable stability of many identities. See Leonie Huddy, "From social to political identity: A critical examination of social identity theory" Political Psychology 22.1 (2001): 127-156.