STRATEGIE UND KONFLIKTFORSCHUNG

Stefan M. Aubrey

THE NEW DIMENSION OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM



vdlf

THE NEW DIMENSION OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

vdf Hochschulverlag AG
an der ETH Zürich

THE NEW DIMENSION OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

Stefan M. Aubrey

Schriftenreihe

STRATEGIE UND KONFLIKTFORSCHUNG

Hrsg. Ernst F. König, Dietmar Schössler, Albert A. Stahel

Die vorliegende Arbeit wurde von der Philosophischen Fakultät der Universität Zürich im Sommersemester 2004 auf Antrag von Prof. Dr. Albert A. Stahel als Dissertation angenommen

Bibliografische Information Der Deutschen Bibliothek

Die Deutsche Bibliothek verzeichnet diese Publikation in der Deutschen Nationalbibliografie; detaillierte bibliografische Daten sind im Internet über http://dnb.ddb.de abrufbar

ISBN 3 7281 2949 6

Table of Contents

1. Introduction 1

2. Hypothesis and Methodology 5
   2.1 The New Dimension of International Terrorism (H) 5
   2.2 The Role of Ideology in the New Dimension of International Terrorism (H1) 5
   2.3 The Asymmetrical Component of the New Dimension of International Terrorism 6

3. Definitions of Terrorism 11

4. The History of Terrorism 21
   4.1 Early Terrorist Organizations and Movements 21
   4.2 19th Century Philosophers of Terrorism 23
   4.3 From History into Action – A Four Phase Model 24
   4.4 The Internationalization of Terrorism 32
   4.5 The Munich Olympic Games Massacre of 1972 34
   4.5 Western European Terrorist Groups 36
   4.6 ETA and IRA 40

5. Typologies of Terrorism 43
   5.1 Nationalist Terrorism 43
   5.2 Religious/Cultural Terrorism 44
   5.3 State Sponsored Terrorism 44
   5.4 Left Wing Terrorism 44
   5.5 Right Wing Terrorism 45
   5.6 Anarchist Terrorism 46

6. Current Terrorist Groups 47
   6.1 Al-Qaeda 47
   6.2 Palestinian Islamic Jihad 48
   6.3 HAMAS (Islamic Resistance Movement) 48
   6.4 Hizballah (Party of God) 49
   6.5 17 November (Revolutionary Organization 17 November) 50
   6.6 Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) 50
   6.7 Jemaah Islamiyaa (JI) 51
   6.8 Armed Islamic Group 51

7. Political Islam 53
   7.1 Bridge to a New Dimension of International Terrorism 53
   7.2 Political Islam and Islamic Jihadist Terrorism 57
   7.3 Failed States as the Safe Haven 117

8. Al-Qaeda and the New Dimension of International Terrorism 145
8.1 The Development of Al-Qaeda 145
8.2 Al-Qaeda's War Aims 160
8.3 Interim Objectives of Al-Qaeda 162
8.4 Ramzi Yousef and the New Jackals 164
8.5 The Attacks of Al-Qaeda 170
8.6 The Al-Qaeda Global Network 187
8.7 Al-Qaeda – the Potential for Future Risks 205
8.8 The Permutation and Franchising of Al-Qaeda 213

9. The Financing of the New Dimension of International Terrorism 223
9.1 Financing the New Dimension of Terrorism and the Crime-Terrorism Nexus 223
9.2 The Crime-Terrorism Nexus 234
9.3 U.S. Efforts to Stem the Flow of Al-Qaeda's Financing 240

10. Validation of the Hypothetical Model ($H^1+H^2+H^3=H$) 245
10.1 H^1 – The Role of Ideology in the New Dimension of International Terrorism 247
10.2 H^2 – The Asymmetrical Component of the New Dimension of International Terrorism 249
10.3 H^3 – The Challenges of Combating the New Dimension of International Terrorism 260
10.4 The Validation of the Hypothesis $H^1+ H^2+ H^3 = H$ 262

11. Combating the New Dimension of International Terrorism 265
11.1 U.S. Counterterrorism Policy and Strategy 265
11.2 Congressional Inquiry into the 9-11 Attacks 271
11.3 Combating Al-Qaeda 273
11.4 Taking out the key Leadership 277
11.5 Eliminating Safe Havens for Terrorism 280
11.6 Combating Terrorist Financing 285
11.7 Middle East Issues impacting on the War on Terrorism 296
11.8 Maintaining the Strategic Focus in the War Against Terrorism – Some Suggested Alternatives to Combating International Terrorism 289

12. Conclusion 299

13. Bibliography 301

Chapter One

Introduction

It is difficult to measure strategic surprise, particularly if it is visited upon one's own country and it comes in the form of an unanticipated attack of catastrophic proportions. Such was the case with the attacks experienced in the United States on September 11, 2001, when four commercial airliners were hijacked by nineteen al-Qaeda terrorists and flowing into the towers of the World Trade Center, the Pentagon and a farm field in rural Pennsylvania, killing almost instantly about 2,800 people. It was a strategic surprise of the proportion not seen since the attack on Pearl Harbor, some sixty years prior. It was the bloodiest single day in American history, killing more people than died in all of America's military actions combined since the Vietnam War. Although no stranger to terrorist attacks on its own forces and interests abroad, this strike against the American heartland was unprecedented not only in size and scope, but also in the character and aims of the organization that committed this act. By 9-11, the United States and the World realized that Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda represented a departure in the familiar terrorism of old. Yet the 9-11 attacks should not have come as a total surprise, had the lessons from preceding terrorist incidents against U.S. targets been adequately analyzed and adopted.

There is a new and identifiable dimension to international terrorism, most clearly manifested by the coordinated attacks against the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001. These attacks were distinctive in scope and complexity compared to what heretofore the international community had experienced in the context of national or regional terrorist strikes. While previous attacks by internationalist terror organizations have usually been extensions of specific national conflicts, the 9-11 attacks appear to be an extension of a targeted effort against the United States by a subset of Islamist organizations which have very definable political goals as the pretext for their violence. The initial goal of these organizations (for argument's sake referred to as al-Qaeda) is the severance of overt U.S. support to Arabic Middle Eastern regimes in region, specifically Egypt and Saudi Arabia, but also other Gulf States accommodating western forces. Their intermediate goal is the toppling of these regimes, whether in Egypt, Saudi Arabia or Pakistan. Their articulated end state is the replacement of these secular regimes by Islamic theocracies, a so-called Islamic Caliphate, spanning a belt of Muslim states from North Africa to Southeast Asia.

As a consequence of this broader political orientation, this regional and trans-national application of terrorism represents a departure from the traditional national based political agenda of terror groups well known particularly in Europe in the 1960s-1990s, such as the Red Army Faction (RAF) in Germany or the Red Brigades in Italy (BR), or even the still existing groups, the Basque separatist ETA, Greece's 17 November or Irish and Middle Eastern terror groups. The new terror takes its example from the old terror in that it capitalizes on attacks against US targets, starting with Arafat's sanctioned assassination of the U.S. ambassador to Sudan in 1973, to RAF hits against U.S. military NATO and force component leaders in Europe to the killing of U.S. diplomats and military attaches in the

1970s, 80s and 90s. Most of these terrorist acts were attributable to the zero-sum game of the Cold War and financed and supported morally by the opposing bloc.

The new terror represents a new art and did not start on 11 September 2001. Its first international manifestation came on the screen with the first attack against the WTC in 1993, by Ramzi Yousef. In short order it was followed by the attack against U.S. forces stationed in Saudi Arabia with an attack against a U.S. installation at the Khobar towers. In the late summer of 1998, an organization under the ostensible leadership of Osama bin Laden (now known as al-Qaeda) mounted a series of attacks designed to sever the U.S. government links to secular Arabic states. In August 1998 near simultaneous attacks were conducted against US embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam. In October 2000, a well-orchestrated attack was conducted against the U.S. Aegis Class destroyer USS *Cole* in a Yemeni port. Most recently, (but perhaps not in the end phase) an attack was conducted consecutively and with absolute military precision against military, government and commercial targets in the Continental United States on September 11, 2001, using hijacked US commercial airliners as manned and terminally guided cruise missiles, designed to cause a catastrophic terrorist attack against civilian, non-combatant targets.

Unlike the old Cold War terrorist template of state sponsored terrorism, the new dimension of this old art follows more altruistic motives, at this instance steeped in extremist religious origins. An extreme interpretation of Sunni *Wahhabist* Islam is used by al-Qaeda as the fig leaf under which to disguise and attack the secular Arab regimes of Saudi Arabia and Egypt with the aim to sever the considerable links these governments have with the United States and with the state of Israel.

The new terrorism is not essentially state sponsored, perhaps with the exception or Iran, aiming to perpetrate its own Shi'a aims in region, particularly in Israel, in the occupied territories and in Lebanon. As such, the new terrorism also is not a benefactor of the traditional sources of revenue for their operational activities. Instead, like NGOs, they must shop around for sponsorship for their activities. Additionally, organized crime and lawless societies and countries are providing these terrorist organizations with the resource base, which they require as a source of funding for their international terrorist activities.

However, it is the international terrorist organizations, which are directing these political activities, vice crime syndicates. While the internationally coordinating crime organizations are fronting considerable resources, their aims are limited and local, vice trans-national – they lack in ideology beyond fiscal or territorial gain. Instead, it is the new breed of terrorist groups who are riding on the backbone or organized crime networks and are using this association to finance their politically inspired motives.

It is the purpose of this study to provide evidence of a new dimension in international terrorism, comparing with and contrasting from the classical forms of international terrorism witnessed during the past century. This study will introduce a hypothesis, which proposes that there exists a new dimension in international terrorism (H) that is distinct and different in scope, focus, and aim from the brand of international terrorism that challenged U.S. and

European allied leaders during the 1960s to the 1990s. This new era terrorism is more associated with long term religious and fundamentalist goals, rather than solely immediate political objectives, draws its support and sponsorship from countries and organizations not necessarily focused competitive national or alliance power politics, and is far more ruthless in targeting innocent non-combatants in achieving and advertising its goals. Absent in this new dimension of international terrorism are the ideological inspirations which defined the terrorist movements of the 1970s-1990s, particularly in Europe, aligned along the political extremes of either far right or far left, Marxist or nationalist. At the center of this new dimension of international terrorism is the role of ideology (H^1), driven by a *Wahhabist* style Islamist extremism, which challenges the United States presence in countries of the Muslim world by targeting U.S. interest abroad and in the U.S. homeland. The second aspect of in the hypothetical equation reflects the asymmetrical component of the new dimension of international terrorism (H^2). This component comes in the form of an asymmetrical threat, both in terms of composition and its operational approach to international terrorism. To counter this new dimension of international terrorism (H) and its reliance on the component strategies of ideology (H^1) and asymmetry (H^2), novel approaches and a strategic focus need to be adopted in the third and final aspect of the hypothetical equation defining the new dimension of international terrorism, that being the combating of terrorism (H^3). To prove the hypothesis, this study will examine the history of classical international terrorism, speak to its typologies, compare and contrast present terrorist groups, discuss the phenomenon of political Islam, portray al-Qaeda as the prime example an international terrorist group of the new dimension and examine the connection of organized crime and the financing of terrorism. The desired purpose of the study will be to validate that hypothesis that is represented by the equation, $H= H^1+ H^2+ H^3$. Finally, strategies for combating this new dimension of international terrorism will be discussed.

Chapter Two

Hypothesis

There is a new and identifiable dimension to international terrorism, most clearly manifested by the coordinated attacks against the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001. These attacks were distinctive in scope and complexity compared to what heretofore the international community had experienced in the context of national or regional terrorist strikes. While previous attacks by internationalist terror organizations have usually been extensions of specific national conflicts, the 9-11 attacks appear to be an extension of a targeted effort against the United States by a subset of Islamist organizations which have very definable political goals as the pretext for their violence. The initial goal of these organizations (currently spearheaded by al-Qaeda) is the severance of overt U.S. support of the moderate regimes in the Arabic Middle Eastern region, specifically Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Their intermediate goal is the toppling of these regimes, whether in Egypt, Saudi Arabia or Pakistan. Their articulated end state is the replacement of these moderate regimes by Islamic theocracies, a so-called Islamic Caliphate.

2.1 The New Dimension of International Terrorism (H)

The hypothesis proposed during this dissertation, is that there exists a new dimension in international terrorism (H) that is distinct and different in scope, focus, and aim from the brand of international terrorism that challenged U.S. and European allied leaders during the 1960s to the 1990s. This new era terrorism is more associated with long term religious and fundamentalist goals, rather than immediate political objectives, draws its support and sponsorship from countries and organizations not necessarily focused competitive national or alliance power politics, and is far more ruthless in targeting innocent non-combatants in achieving and advertising its goals.

The older (in terms of conventional wisdom) international terrorism was a combination of a bi-product of the bipolar Cold War construct and the new countries created by end of the colonial empires, post-World War Two. The goals of the conventional international terrorism, was to destabilize the governments of their respective host nations (e.g. IRA and ETA) and to destabilize the NATO alliance (e.g. RAF and BR). The ideological inspiration for the terrorist movements of the 1970s-1990s, particularly in Europe, was along political extremes of either far right or far left, Marxist or nationalist.

2.2 The Role of Ideology in the New Dimension of International Terrorism (H^1)

The new dimension in contrast derives its motivation, inspiration and ideology (H^1) from religion, in this case from a base of fundamentalist Islam. Its aim is the establishment of an Islamic Caliphate, based on *Shari'a* Islamic law and along the guidelines proposed by Iran's Ayatollah Khomeini, ultimately knitting all countries with a majority population of Muslim citizens into a cohesive bloc – an alliance of Islamic states free from the influence the United States and the West. Its scope is a combined strategy by both Sunni and Shi'a extremist

fundamentalist groups, featuring terrorist campaigns against U.S. and other western targets. Their focus is to sever the support links these Western states have with the large, predominately Muslim population, particularly Saudi Arabia (the guardian of two of the holiest sites of Islam), Egypt (a pivotal nation in region with respect to serving as a counterbalance to Israel), and Indonesia (the state with the largest Muslim population). Once the support link between the U.S. and these nations is severed, their regimes will be ripe for exploitation by internal dissent to affect a political change in government, and the goal of an Islamic Caliphate will appear within reach.

Current political jargon labels this new dimension of terrorism as *ethno-religious*, which at best is a misnomer. The term *ethno-religious* would indicate that there is a symbiotic relationship between the *ethnicity* of the terrorist group and their *religiou*s persuasion, a supposition that may have little basis in fact. Granted, all nineteen of the 9-11 terrorists were Sunni Muslims hailing from Middle East Arabic nations; fifteen from Saudi Arabia, the remainder from Egypt. Likewise, their patron and sponsor, Osama bin Laden, shares the same ethnic background and religious direction, as do most of his key al-Qaeda lieutenants. The recent bombings in Bali, however, clearly indicate that the Middle-Eastern Arabic/Sunni Muslim *ethno-religious* association is not always applicable. For example, Riduan Isamuddin (aka. Hambali) is an Indonesian by birth. Most members of the Philippine based Abu Sayyaf terrorist group are of Philippine origin. Most members and backers of *Hizballah* are Persians from Iran, who belong to the Shiite Muslim sect. Thus, the term *ethno-religious* may be an improperly used moniker for that which is too politically incorrect to state: that the largest preponderance of major acts of international terrorism of the new dimension are being committed by individuals describing themselves as Islamic fundamentalists. This is not racial or religious profiling, asserting that all Arabs or Muslims are terrorists. Rather, the preponderance of major international terrorist activities committed during the past ten years can be attributed to organizations claiming Islamic derived causes for their acts.

A parallel (and key) aim of the new dimension of terrorist groups is the eroding of U.S. support for the state of Israel, so as to diminish Israeli influence in the Middle East region. If for these new dimension terrorist movements the U.S. represents the 'Great Satan' as foretold by the Ayatollah Khomeini, the state of Israel represents nothing less that the antithesis of all they stand for – a dagger pointed at the heart of any potential overarching regional Islamic Caliphate. Integrally involved with this Islamic fundamentalist perception is the continued Israeli troop presence in the occupied territories and its aggression against the Palestinian Authority and the Palestinian people.

2.3 The Asymmetrical Component of the New Dimension of International Terrorism (H^2)

For the purpose of this study on international terrorism, a parallel "axis of evil" (to what President Bush described of in his State of the Union address in January 2002) can be constructed. This "axis of evil" rotates around the new trans-national actors in the arena; actors who may receive some state support, but who are not acting at the behest of any identified state (save for perhaps Iran, always a willing sponsor of terrorism against the U.S. and Israel). Instead, this new axis is acting as a series of linked supra-national formations,

interested in carving out a particular niche for themselves, either independently or linked together in a marriage of convenience; a construct that varies from the conventional model, that it conducts its warfare along asymmetrical lines (H^2). The design of this axis is more linked than that described by President Bush, whose participant nations are interested in strengthening their own national positions, vice furthering a more far-reaching cause. The aim of this axis is to achieve a format (perhaps a confederation) of Islamic states, unitarily linked by a system of governments subscribing to *Sharia* Islamic law as the basis of governance. The desired end-state would most probably feature a cohesive bloc that would have political clout based on a combination of not only sheer trans-regional (religiously inspired) population mass, but also considerable natural resources.

If Nassar's dream of pan-Arabism was unfulfilled, perhaps the dream of this new dimension of terrorists and its sponsoring patrons is to exploit the belt political instability stretching from West Africa, across South Asia, to Southeast Asia. Islamic Caliphate may be a term overused, due to its religious connotations, but politically the configuration of this envisioned belt of nations would comprise the key states whose populations are predominantly Muslim (and fundamentalist) in composition. Instrumental on the operational side is a terrorist axis that includes al-Qaeda, Hizballah, and key Palestinian rejectionist groups involved in the al-Aqsa Intifada. Closely linked are also extremist Islamist movements in South Asia, Africa, and Southeast Asia. Iran's role in this new dimension is pivotal and axiomatic as the ideological Islamic theocracy.

The Islamic Republic of Iran's fundamentals of revolution and its foreign policy provides the spiritual, ideological, and financial legitimacy for extremist groups based in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Pakistan, and Indonesia to prosecute their campaigns of terror. Iran's support is the glue that binds these seemingly divergent and unfocused nationalist and fundamentalist efforts together, giving them a focus on a preferred foe – the United States, its interests and allies.[1]

The latest events of international terrorist activity that have riveted our attention since the end of the Gulf War have also featured a new *modus operandi* (or asymmetry – H^2) from the heretofore known models – the avoidance of non-combatant casualties is no longer sacrosanct. Targeted killings and assassinations have been replaced by catastrophic events. Previous waves of terrorism have focused on achieving maximum publicity and shock effect by targeting high-value personalities to achieve policy changes among the intended audience, while minimizing collateral damage to non-combatants. Current terrorist attacks appear aimed at causing shock effect through the sheer mass of casualties among non-combatants, while not necessarily targeting high value political victims. Taking out the odd politician or captain of industry has been supplanted by the killing of thousands of common workers in an office building in New York or hundreds of tourists at a cultural site in Djerba or in a night club in Bali. The sanctity of innocent human life appears to be less important for the current brand of fundamentalist Islamic terrorists ostensibly fighting for religious reasons than for the Marxist colleagues during the heyday of the Cold War.

Previous terrorist strategies featured aspects of asymmetrical warfare within the parameters of great power politics. The new dimension of international terrorism features strategies of violence designed to create a competing great power entity, a fundamentalist Islamic Caliphate, as a counterbalance against perceived United States and Western European pervasive political, cultural, and commercial influence in the Middle East region and across South Asia.

2.4 Combating the New Dimension in International Terrorism (H^3)

To counter this new dimension of international terrorism (H) and its reliance on the component strategies of ideology (H^1) and asymmetry (H^2), novel approaches need to be adopted in the combating of terrorism (H^3). The "Global War on Terrorism" (GWOT) announced by President Bush after the attacks of 9-11must be fought on several levels simultaneously, using a combination of the national elements of power and in concert with willing coalition partners, most probably outside of the constructs of established and habitual institutions such as NATO or the UN. "Draining the swamp" as Colin Powell initially evaluated the situation post-9-11 will not be sufficient, but it will require a consequent dedication to a protracted war with campaigns and battles occurring sequentially and consecutively. Additionally, a country-by-country hunt for the terrorist perpetrators (such as parallels to an Afghanistan like operation) are not realistic, and will only cause terrorists to displace, to fight again another day. Rather, the war must focus on area specific, regional and global arenas in a coordinated effort. Neither can the "do it alone" approach suffice. Coalitions are the only politically and militarily acceptable options – not only UK or NATO, but non-standard partners in the affected regions. Homeland protection and deterrence are integral factors to combating terrorism.

Addressing the roots that help sustain the new dimension of international terrorism is as important as combating it, else you cannot eradicate nor prevent its recurrence. In GWOT, the "hearts and minds" campaigns need to be focused on the target and the affected regions, as well as on the coalition partners and the opposition at home.[2] (While there was widespread support for U.S. unilateralism post-9-11, the mass peace protests that occurred on the streets on most major Western nations in mid-February 2003 clearly demonstrated that there is not unconditional agreement with the American interpretation of what is necessary to win the GWOT effort.) At root of the problem of fundamentalist Muslim inspired terrorism is also the issue of the U.S. relationship with Israel and the Palestinian issue. Lack of resolution in this issue will continue to provide an irritable rub in the fight of this new dimension of international terrorism.

Notes

[1] It is perhaps a misnomer to refer to the government of Iran as a monolithic entity. Instead, Iranian politics is divided among two somewhat parallel and competing governments: a semi-secular government headed by President Muhammad Khatami, elected in 1997, and a theocracy headed by Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the spiritual successor to the founder of the Iranian Islamic revolution, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. Ensuring that neither side (particularly Khatami) strays too far from the revolutionary ideals, is the *Council of Guardians*, the iron fist of Iran's very influential clerics or mullahs. See "Special Report on Iran – Their Last Chance?", The Economist, January 17th-23rd 2004, p. 21-23.

[2] GWOT is the acronym meaning the *Global War on Terrorism*, a phrase coined by the Bush administration shortly after the attacks of 9-11 to portray a unified U.S. front to combat terrorism both abroad and at home. The first offensive action in GWOT was the Coalition attack on Afghanistan, which commenced on October 7, 2001, aimed at taking down the Taliban regime and attacking al-Qaeda terrorist facilities and individuals.

Chapter Three

Definitions of Terrorism

During an address in front of a joint session of Congress shortly after the attacks of September 11, 2001, President George W. Bush declared that the United States was now involved in a Global War on Terrorism (in terms of US government acronyms, abbreviated as GWOT) and that those nations not with us were (by definition) against us.

In response to the 9-11 (the favored abbreviation of the attacks against New York and the Pentagon) attacks, the definition of *terrorism* applied directly to Osama bin Laden's al Qaeda terrorist network, then headquartered in Taliban controlled Afghanistan. The immediately stated mission was to eradicate the al-Qaeda network structure; the implied mission, to neutralize the protecting Taliban regime. What appeared as missing in the fixation of GWOT centered on al-Qaeda was a precise definition regarding *terrorism* beyond the scope of Bin Laden, the persona and his network. Has the definition of *terrorism* and a *terrorist* changed or evolved since international terrorism exploded on the world stage in the late-1960s, and if so, then how?

The very basic definition of terrorism is the targeted use of force against non-combatants to achieve political aims by causing violence and death. Very few human endeavors are as constant as terrorism. The essential nature of terrorism is the abuse of innocence for political aim. That aim is to gain and maintain some form of political power, by causing a state of imbalance.[1]

Definitions delineating terrorism can be as confusing as identifying methods to wage a global war against terrorism. Consider, that wars have typically and most successfully been waged during modern times against proper nouns, usually associated with a country, Germany or Japan in World War Two, as the classic example.[2] An extension of this is when wars have been waged against specific regimes to induce behavior modification, such as countering Kim Il Sung's invasion of the Republic of Korea or the liberation of Kuwait from Saddam Hussein's occupying army.

The quotient for success is less tangible in instances where war is waged against common nouns such as the war against poverty, drugs, or crime. Opponents in these struggles are less easily definable and formulating a successful strategy to combat and defeat them is less tangible or measurable. Victory in President Bush's Global War on Terrorism may well fall into that nebulous category and may be achievable only if the tactics and strategies focus more on targeting individual terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda rather than the tactic of terrorism itself. Yet defining what a terrorist is may be more complicated than it may initially seem.[3]

The reality of terrorism has been etched into our collective consciousness long before the events of 9-11 and the public at large has a general impression that the term 'terrorism' is associated with an (usually unexpected) act of violence. Despite this, there is still a lack of

precision in defining specifically and succinctly what the meaning of the term 'terrorism' really entails. Much of this imprecision can be attributed to sound bites found in the press or in references given to this act of violence by pundits, politicians and decision-makers of all stripes and colors.[4] Examples of 'terrorism' found in daily sources of information available to the casual consumer, range the spectrum from assassination to aggression of one state actor against another. Associated activities can include hijackings, hostage situations, suicide bombings, use of mass casualty producing agents; limited only by the imagination. Indeed, any abhorrent act of violence (short of war) directed against society or its sub-elements can be perceived as an act of terrorism.[5]

It would be helpful at this juncture to examine some syntactic and institutionally accepted definitions of the terms *terrorism* and *terrorist*:

The *Oxford English Dictionary,* the pre-eminent authority on English language diction, describes terrorism and terrorists in the following words:

> **Terrorism:** A system of terror. 1. Government by intimidation as directed and carried out by the party in power in France during the revolution of 1789-94; the system of 'Terror'. 2. *gen.* A policy intended to strike with terror those against whom it is adopted; the employment of methods of intimidation; the fact of terrorizing or the condition of being terrorized.
>
> **Terrorist:** 1. As a political term: a. Applied to the Jacobins and their agents and partisans in the French Revolution, esp. to those connected with the revolutionary tribunals during the 'Reign of Terror'. B. Anyone who attempts to further his views by a system of coercive intimidation; *spec.* applied to members of one of the extreme revolutionary societies in Russia.[6]

From the standpoint of etymology, 'terrorism' was first associated with the Reign of Terror in post-Revolutionary France and 'terrorist' later with the revolutionary fervor that swept Russia in 1917-21. Both definitions introduce the concept of terrorism in a political context and it is this distinction that paramount in understanding its aims, goals, and envisioned end-state, distinguishing it from other acts of violence, criminal or random.[7]

Terrorism, as such, is a fundamentally and inherently political act, and inextricably linked to the acquisition and application of power to achieve political change. It is violence and the perceived threat of the use of violence to attain a political aim; usually a clearly and systematically planned, well orchestrated, and calculated act.[8]

Institutionally, several U.S. Government organizations have defined 'terrorism' in the following manner:

When reviewing web sites or U.S. government manuals for definitions of terrorism post 9-11, specificity is a quality in short supply. The U.S. Department of State, the lead U.S. government agency involved in the counter-terrorism effort in its May 2002 "Patterns of

Global Terrorism", provides a deliberately broad category that could encompass myriad groups, movements, or efforts at odds with the national interest.[9] The framers of the most recent Department of State document on terrorism admit that "no one definition of terrorism has gained universal acceptance" and have chosen to employ verbiage contained in Title 22, United States Code, Section 2656(f) to provide a currently politically acceptable description of this human act:

- The term "terrorism" means premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence and audience. (As a footnote, a "noncombatant" is interpreted to include civilians, military personnel who at the time of an incident were unarmed or not on duty. Mention is made of U.S. Defense Attaches Army Colonel James Rowe, killed in Manila in April 1989, Navy Captain William Nordeen, killed in Athens in June 1988, the soldiers who perished in the Labelle discotheque bombing in Berlin in April 1986, and four off duty Marines who died in a café bombing in El Salvador in June 1985. The kidnapping of Marine Lieutenant Colonel William Higgins by Lebanese Shi'a terrorists in 1989 (and his subsequent execution by hanging), the 1996 Khobar Towers bombing, the October 2000 USS Cole suicide bombing, or the 9-11 Pentagon attack and its 184 victims are missing from this description). The term "international terrorism" means terrorism involving citizens or the territory of more than one country.

- The term "terrorist group" means any group practicing, or that has significant subgroups that practice, international terrorism.

The Department of State states that this (rather limited and slim) definition has been used since 1983 for statistical and analytic purposes to define terrorism.[10]

The Federal Bureau of Investigations defines terrorism as: "…the unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives."[11]

Recognizing that that FBI's charter includes investigating and solving crimes, it is not surprising that its concern with terrorist acts also focuses on the psychological dimensions of the acts as a crime with intimidatory and coercive elements. As a law enforcement agency the FBI also does not limit the terrorist targets to individuals, but also considers property damage, for purposes of possible subsequent litigation. Taken into account the property damage of the 9-11 attacks (excluding the loss of life), four commercial airliners and several billion Dollars of property damage in Manhattan and Washington, render this into the crime of the century.

The Department of Defense in DoD Directive O-2000.12-H describes terrorism as:

> "…the calculated use of violence or threat of violence against non-combatants to induce fear in order to coerce or intimidate governments, societies, or individuals in furtherance of goals that are generally political, religious, social, or ideological … a form of psychological warfare, and the message is often aimed at a wider audience than the immediate victim."[12]

Paul Pillar, former deputy chief of the Central Intelligence Agency's Counter Terrorism Center, the nexus organization for combating of terrorism, has defined "terrorism" as having four specific elements:

> 1. Rage.
> 2. It is politically motivated, excluding criminal violence aimed at monetary gain or personal vengeance. Ordinary crime is a part of the world in which terrorists are often involved, either through the criminal act, acquisition of resources, or cooperation with criminal organizations. It is premeditated – planned in advance, rather than an impulsive act of. However, criminal activity is not the sine-qua-non of the terrorist aim; it is always stated in terms of a higher political cause.
> 3. It is aimed at civilians as its primary target. It is different from warfare conducted against a co-combatant who is able to return fire. In this regard, the target is routinely "non-combatant" in nature, unable to respond in kind to the direct action.
> 4. The terrorist actions are conducted by sub-national groups or clandestine actors – not by a recognized armed force of another country.[13]

Professor Walter Laqueur, a well-established expert on international terrorism during the past three decades, sums it up as "Terrorism is violence, but not every form of violence is terrorism." While Laqueur also admits that the number of definitions of terrorism are manifold, the descriptor he chooses to illustrate is a 1990 Department of Defense (DoD) definition, listing terrorism as: "…the unlawful use of force, or threatened use, of force or violence against individuals or property to coerce and intimidate governments or societies, often to achieve political, religious, or ideological objectives."[14]

In searching for an accepted definition, Laqueur refers to Nietzsche as providing the clue: "…only things that have no history can be defined." Laqueur goes on to explain that during his three decade study of terrorism, there has been no single definable form of terrorism, rather there are many with a few traits in common. Today there are even more forms, so different from the strains of thirty years ago, that the term "terrorism" may actually no longer apply to some of these forms. Laqueur speaks to the "legitimacy of terrorism in certain conditions", conditions under which a group within was striking out against a totalitarian regime or brutal dictatorship under which it lived. Given the absence of most of these types of totalitarian regimes, post Cold War, this image of "freedom fighter" receives less popular credence. Instead, a new age is heralded in which a terrorist has potential access to weapons

of mass destruction and the restraints to employing these weapons are diminishing, creating a new dimension in terrorist violence.[15]

While a number of notable political scientists and analysts of terrorist trends (such as Walter Laqueur and Bruce Hoffman) argue that the new dimension of terrorism is more violent and less restrained, and driven by different actors for fundamentally different reasons than during the 1970's-1990's, one should nonetheless not dismiss previous assessments regarding the basic definitions of terrorism.

> "Many states have adopted terrorism as a tool of foreign policy. For many, terrorism represents a cheap and effective way to project power. It is a tactic that enables terrorist to shoot their way onto the world stage and, in effect, hijack the international media. In seeking to destroy freedom and democracy, terrorists deliberately target noncombatants for their own cynical purposes."[16]

Then Vice President George Bush made this statement in an introduction to a US Government publication on "Terrorist Group Profiles" in November 1988. Former Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci defined terrorism is similar terms quoted earlier from current DoD doctrine:

> "International terrorism is not a monolithic phenomenon. Terrorist groups differ significantly in terms of their aims, strategies, organization, capabilities, and a host of other attributes. They represent many disparate and often antagonistic causes, and they cover the ideological spectrum. The United States represents a prime target for terrorist groups because of our commitment to political reform and constructive change. To terrorists, reform is anathema, for it represents continuation of the system they abhor and co-opts the revolution they hope to lead. Terrorism is essentially a tactic – a form of political warfare designed to achieve political ends. The aim of such (terrorist) attacks is to discourage a US presence abroad, reduce our investments in overseas markets, and thereby erode US influence as a global power. Within the target country, the terrorists' objective is to undermine confidence in the ability of the national government to provide basic security. The aim is to create economic and political dislocation that will ultimately render the target government incapable of governing."[17]

These 1988 definitions of President Reagan's second term obviously reflect his administration's preoccupation with the Soviet Union as the "Evil Empire" and the patron of terrorist movements as combat elements of a proxy war in the larger bipolar context. As such, then Vice President Bush also refers to "freedom fighters" as fundamentally different from terrorists, in that the "philosophical differences are stark and fundamental". Bush clearly denies the adage, maintaining, "one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter". However, he gives credence to the principle of resistance movements by stating that:

> "Freedom fighters … seek to adhere to international law and civilized rules of conduct. They attack military targets, not defenseless civilians. Noncombatant casualties in this context are an aberration or attributable to the fortunes of war. They are not the result of deliberate policy designed to terrorize the opposition."[18]

The term "freedom fighter" has faded into the history books of a recently retired era of bipolar and bloc politics and can no longer be applied to the new dimensions of international terrorism, which are the subject of this study. When one strips out the politically motivated references to these "freedom fighters" from the Reagan era document, one is still left with a more clearly definitive and concrete description of "terrorism" and what a "terrorist" is than today's politically correct parlance delivers. Some key and essential elements of a workable definition of "terrorism" remain. Terrorism, today as thirty years ago, remains an act that represents the calculated use of violence, targeting noncombatants and introducing the element of fear, to coerce governments to alter policy. The audience and the message are usually beyond the scope of the immediate targeted victim.

Current crises (even beyond 9-11) have spawned additional political definitions of terrorism, in the context of specific national agenda. One particular view is offered by former Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu:

> "There is a name for the doctrine that produces this evil. It is called totalitarianism. Indeed, the root cause of terrorism is totalitarianism. Only a totalitarian regime, by systematically brainwashing its subjects, can indoctrinate hordes of killers to suspend all moral constraints for the sake of a twisted cause. That is why from its inception totalitarianism has always been wedded to terrorism – from Lenin to Stalin to Hitler to the ayatollahs to Saddam Hussein, right down to Osama bin Laden and Yasser Arafat. It is not merely that the goals of terrorists do not justify the means they choose, it is that the means they choose tell us what their true goals are. Osama bin Laden is not seeking to defend the rights of Muslims but to murder as many Americans as possible, and ultimately to destroy America. Those who fight as terrorists, rule as terrorists. People who deliberately target the innocent never become leaders who protect freedom and human rights. When terrorists seize power, they invariably set up that darkest of dictatorships – whether in Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan or Arafatistan. In short, the reason why some resort to terror and other do not is not any absence of rights, but the presence of a tyrannical mindset. The totalitarian mind knows no limits. The democratic mind sets them everywhere. [19]

Today, definitions of terrorism are as prolific as the number of terrorist groups. In his 1984 published book "Political Terrorism: A Research Guide", Alex Schmid identified more than one hundred different definitions of terrorism, obtained in a survey of leading academics in the field. Schmid introduced a complex matrix of definitional elements arrayed by frequency of occurrence. Violence and force were the most frequent components of a terrorist act,

accounting for 83.5 percent. Political, came in close second, with 65 percent. (At the time of Schmid's study, the ethno-religious factor had not yet been identified as a growing trend in international terrorism.) Fear and terror emphasized accounted for 51 percent. Schmid published a subsequent work four years later and was still not satisfied that he had arrived at the ultimate definition of terrorism.[20]

Terrorist acts are in themselves classic forms of crime: murder, arson, the illegal use of explosives but different from typical crimes because they are executed with the deliberate intention of causing pain, disorder, and terror within an organized society. Terrorism can be defined objectively by the quality of the act, not by the identity of the perpetrators or the nature of their cause. All terrorist acts involve violence or the threat of violence, sometimes coupled with explicit demands. The purpose is political. Finally, the hallmark of terrorism is that the acts are intended to produce psychological effects far beyond the immediate physical damage. Terrorists attack targets that are forbidden to military belligerents.[21]

George C. Marshall Center Professor Nick Pratt uses a Trinitarian model to lend a Clausewitzian-like analytic approach to defining terrorism. At the base of the Isosceles triangle is the target, which in a terrorist attack is always a civilian, non-military, and non-belligerent. At one leg of the triangle is the aim of the action, which is the threat of terrorist violence, or its perceived threat. At the remaining leg is the essence of the action, represented by the political power affected by the terrorist act.[22]

Professor Pratt, a retired US Marine Corps colonel who spent a sizable portion of his career in the counter-terrorism arena, borrowed heavily from another old soldier in using a Clausewitz derived approach to describe (in this case) a terrorist model. Earlier, former U.S. Army strategist Colonel Harry G. Summers used a geometrical reference from Carl von Clausewitz's treatise "On War" to develop a theory that maintains balance among a "trinity of war" – the people, their government, and their army. Summers quotes Clausewitz in applying the model to an analysis on what failed America strategically in Vietnam:

> "These three tendencies are like three different codes of law, deeply rooted in their subject and yet variable in their relationship to one another. A theory that ignores any one of them or seeks to fix an arbitrary relationship between them would conflict with reality to such an extent that for this reason alone it would be totally useless."[23]

When Summers first published his work "On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War" in 1982, it was the first US Army effort to explain what occurred in the context of the war in Vietnam when one side adhered to the Principles of War as Clausewitz describes them versus an opponent who failed to do so. North Vietnam was committed to a war by conventional and non-conventional means to pursue its national interest, while a natural friction, which existed between the American people and its Army and the friction between national security bureaucracy and our own doctrine, bound the US.[24]

The legs of Professor Pratt's Clausewitzian triangle describing terrorism are as variable as those found in Harry Summers' model. While the baseline will remain a civilian target, the legs representing threat of violence and political power affected have a corresponding cause and effect relationship to one another. What is at stake in both of these models are the relative elements of power, those of the state as well as those of the terrorist organization attacking that sovereign entity. Terrorist attacks against a state affect, impacts, and changes these elements of power, both apparent and perceived.

One last definition (for the purposes of this study) offered by The Military Conflict Institute:

> "The intentional and indiscriminate use of violence by a radical or fanatical group to inflict wide-spread casualties on innocent citizens (and government officials and military members) to demoralize, intimidate, induce psychological fear, compel submission, and subjugate them – used as a political weapon. A strategy to cause and use violent events to stimulate a feeling of fear in the citizens of a polity leading to a belief in the powerlessness of their government to protect them from future violence and to undermine political will."[25]

To add a European perspective, in 1978, Gustav Daeniker defined terrorism as: "…The systematic intimidation of governments, ruling elites, and entire peoples, through the application of (pinpoint or area) targeted violence, for the purpose of achieving political, ideological, or socio-revolutionary aims and goals."[26]

The essence of terrorism is thus to terrorize those who in the course of their daily civilian existence are least prone to expect and attack against their way of life; witness September 11, 2001, in the Towers of the World Trade Center, in the Pentagon, or aboard four commercial airliners. The perpetrator of the act of violence is the terrorist, who seeks political effect through his action. The act of violence is almost always directed against a numerically superior opponent, using the element of surprise and relying on the shock value imparted to the recipient audience. While the terrorist act may eventually result in warfare, it is normally not conducted as a military operation between two declared belligerents in a declared state of war with one another at the time of the attack. Terrorism is about attacking symbolic targets, targets that the perpetrators feel strike at the nerve center of our system, such as the World Trade Center towers and the Pentagon.

Institutionally, definitions of terrorism are important as they ultimately determine reaction in terms of counter-terrorism options and solutions. A policy-maker's definition needs to be able to rely on broad-based constituency recognition and approval to secure public sustained support for a "Global War on Terrorism". Intelligence agencies need to have policy guidelines with regard to target organizations, personalities, and countries to collect information on to support decision-maker and warfighter intelligence requirements. Law enforcement agencies will take a broader approach, examining criminal and juridical aspects dealing not only with the terrorist act, but also its link to organized criminal organizations which terrorists use as infrastructure support. More difficult is the task of the armed forces,

the warfighter, in translating the politically accepted definition of a terrorist or terrorist organization in the mission analysis of whom the enemy is and how he is to be engaged. The Taliban forces as the uniformed army of a renegade government involved in state sponsored terrorist is easier foe to operationally target than is a residual amorphous al-Qaeda resistance in transit between Eastern Afghanistan and Pakistan. Likewise, definitional nuances regarding Abu Sayyaf guerrillas in the Philippines or al-Qaeda associated elements in Indonesia or Kuala Lumpur will provide warfighters challenges not experienced since the Vietnam War. As a soldier, the task of mounting an offensive against the Iraqi army is far less complex to plan for than is the pursuit of an ill defined element of Abu Sayyaf guerrillas in the jungle of Mindanao, as are the measurable results of progress and success.

Notes

[1] Grenville Byford, "Why Winning is Impossible",Foreign Affairs, July/August 2002, Vol. 81, No.4, 34.
[2] Byford 34.
[3] Byford 34.
[4] Bruce Hoffman. Inside Terrorism, New York: Columbia University Press, 1998, 13.
[5] Attempting to find a universally acceptable definition of terrorism is probably unrealistic, due to the variety differing viewpoints and cultural perspectives. When an act of terrorism occurs, however, it is usually apparent that it is an action of violence markedly different from an act committed during armed conflict or the commission of a routine crime, such as murder. The apparent aspect involved in any act of terrorism is the aspect of theater, that is, that the particular act of violence was committed to influence an audience, far beyond the mere victim himself. Terrorism is almost never a crime of passion or an act committed for the purpose of gain, such as with criminal activity. With terrorism, there is almost always an underlying political or social motive aimed at achieving some measure of radical change. As there is no universal motive driving all strains of terrorism it stands to reason that there can be no universal solution to combating or eradicating terrorism. Thus, declaring a Global War on Terrorism is also an indistinct strategy with an equally indistinct visible endstate, other that the eradication of terrorism as a whole, an endstate as noble and desirable as an end to poverty, drugs or crime, but equally unrealistic.
[6] *The Oxford English Dictionary, Compact Edition,* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971, p. 3268, col. 216. (A further Hoffman resource is used later in this study, however, as this cited resource is the most frequently cited, it shall be referred to hereafter as Hoffman.)
[7] Hoffman 14.
[8] Hoffman 15.
[9] United States Department of State. Patterns of Global Terrorism Washington, DC: Department of State Publications, May 2002 (Abbreviated hereafter as DoS)
[10] DoS xvi.
[11] A. Nichols Pratt, address, Partnership for Peace Consortium of Defense Academies Symposium on European Security issues, organized by Swiss Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Bern, April 22-23, 2002.
[12] Department of Defense in DoD Directive O-2000.12-H
[13] Paul Pillar, Terrorism and US Policy.Washington, DC: Brooking Institution Press, 2001, 13.
[14] Walter Laqueur, The New Terrorism: Fanaticism and the Arms of Mass Destruction, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999, 7 (A further Laqueur resource is used later in this study, however, as this cited resource is the most frequently cited, it shall be referred to hereafter as Laqueur.)
[15] Laqueur, 7.
[16] U.S. Government Printing Office. Terrorist Group Profiles. Washington, DC: GPO, November 1988 (hereafter GPO), Introduction

[17] GPO, Preface.
[18] GPO, Introduction.
[19] Benjamin Netanyahu, The Wall Street Journal, April 19, 2002, "The Root Cause of Terrorism."
[20] Pratt.
[21] Pratt.
[22] Pratt
[23] Carl von Clausewitz. On War, Ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret. (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1976), p. 89
[24]Harry Summers. On Strategy II: A Critical Analysis of the Gulf War. (New York: Dell Publishing, 1992.)
[25] Roger Mickelson. "War on Terrorists", Chairman The Military Conflict Institute, Albuquerque: November 15, 2001, p. 1.
[26] Virginia Bischof. "Auswirkungen des Terrorismus un Extremismus auf die Schweiz.", July 2001 <http//www.presdok.ch/sicherheitspolitik/artikel/leitartikeljuli2001.htm>

Chapter Four

The History of Terrorism

4.1 Early Terrorist Organizations and Movements.

Terrorism has been a politically inspired action closely associated with warfare throughout much of history, European, Middle Eastern, or Asian. Used by state actors, state supported actors, and non-state actors, terrorism was recognized as a preferred way to achieve political goals short of resorting to combat on the battlefield.[1]

The concept of terrorism is neither a new phenomenon nor a creation of the 20th Century. Until the early years of the last century, terrorism was directed against ruling 'tyrants', a style of violence whose roots date back to Biblical times and were sanctioned by respected Greek philosophers such as Plutarch and Aristotle. The first example of a period wave of terrorism was during the reign of the *Hashishim* (the Order of the Assassins) in northern Iran from 1047 to 1296, aimed at the ruling elites. A similar example of assassination attempts to influence policy can be found in European history between 1860 to 1914, culminating with the murder of the Austrian heir to the Hapsburg crown, Archduke Franz Ferdinand (along with his wife), an event which proved the catalyst for the outbreak of World War One.[2]

The Order of the Assassins is an interesting study in the analysis of a previous terrorist model, for it introduces the concepts of both religious inspiration, self-sacrifice, and the promise of salvation and reward in the afterlife. The Order of the assassins was an offshoot of the Ismailis, a Muslim sect headed by Hassan I Sabah from the Shi'a center of Qom, one of the holiest sites of today's Iran. First localized in the mountainous region or northern Persia and concentrated against local fortresses, the order later focused it efforts on major Persian urban centers. The first such victim during the assault on the urban centers was the Sunni Chief Minister of the Sultan of Baghdad, Nazim al Mulq, targeted as an enemy for his religious persuasion. The movement spread through Persian Syria and Palestine, targeting mainly Sunnis, but also Christians, including Count Raymond II of Tripoli and Marquis Conrad de Montferrat, who ruled the Kingdom of Jerusalem. In a harbinger of currently accepted tactics, Montferrat was murdered by a group of emissaries disguised as monks.[3]

In terms of relative impact, the Order of the Assassins was small and remained localized. Despite enduring over a century the order had little lasting effect. Perhaps the main contribution was the introduction of the strategy of the terrorist disguised – the *taqfir*, or deception – a devout emissary on a suicide mission with guaranteed rewards of joy in paradise in the afterlife. While the Order of the Assassins faded into insignificance by the time of the Mongol invasion of 1270, the particular *taqfir* characteristic of self-sacrifice to further the greater cross is now again a feature during the new dimension of terrorism.[4]

In particularly European history witnessed its share of palace intrigue and assassinations during the religious upheavals of the 16th and 17th Centuries. Likewise in Asia, in India and China, there were secret sub-societies who executed political inspired murders to overthrow existing regimes, political skullduggery marking all eras of history. While these Chinese triads had their own sub-culture, replete with mystic medical and ritual practices, there were

not the ascetic millenarians as the Order of the Assassins were believed to be, and have more in common with Mafia type organized crime organization than with modern day terrorists.[5]

'Terrorism' as a concept first became part of the modern European vernacular in late-18th Century France, during the latter stages of the French Revolution. In contrast to its current negative connotation, terrorism was used as an instrument of the state to reestablish order after the upheavals and uprisings following the storming of the Bastille and toppling of the Bourbon dynasty. Maximilien Robespierre helped establish the Committee of General Security and the Revolutionary Tribunal (in today's terms a peoples' court) as an instrument of governance. His *regime de la terreur* was designed to consolidate the new government's power by intimidating counter-revolutionaries and enemies of the people. Robespierre's committee was accorded wide powers of arrest and judgment, putting to death by guillotine all those who were identified as impediments to the new order. The brutality of this new system of state justice serve as a lighthouse conveying a guiding to all who might wish to oppose the regime or desire a return to a monarchical system of government, dubbed the *ancien regime*. Robespierre's 'reign of terror' left 40,000 of France's citizens dead in its wake; the very people in whom he attempted to instill the values of virtue and democracy and save from the tyranny of monarchy. Robespierre appealed to "virtue, without which terror is evil, without which virtue is helpless". He proclaimed that, "terror is nothing but justice, prompt, severe, and inflexible; it is therefore an emanation of virtue". Like with many other revolutions, the excesses of Robespierre's 'reign of terror' eventually consumed itself. In an act of self-preservation, extremist elements joined moderates to repudiate Robespierre's *regime de terreur*, delivering him to the same fate as befell so many of France's citizens during those heady days. While the end of institutionalized murder had ended in post-revolution France, the new term of 'terrorism' was inexorably associated with the abuse of office and power.[6]

One of the immediate outcomes of the French revolution was an anti-monarchical sentiment that spread throughout Europe. The resultant age of nationalism with its notions of statehood and citizenship based on the rights and dignity of the individual citizen, rather than royal or noble lineage, resulted in political movements that brought about the creation and unification of new nation states such as Germany and Italy, in the wake of former empires. The socio-economic change brought on by the industrial revolution created new 'universalist' ideologies such as Marxism and its communist offshoot, born of the alienation and exploitative conditions characteristic of 19th Century Dickensian capitalism. From this milieu there came a new age of terrorism, evoking the same revolutionary and anti-state or regime connotations in 1848 that again emerged 120 years later in the modern Western European terrorist movements.[7]

Laqueur refers to the 19th Century, with its movements of nationalism and social ferment, as the birth of 'traditional terrorism', featuring the widespread emergence of both modern and guerrilla warfare. While guerrilla warfare grew out of the Napoleonic wars in Russia and Spain, spreading to parts of Asia and Africa, they reached their highpoint in the aftermath of World War II with the deterioration of the European colonial empires. However, Laqueur maintains that terrorism as we know it in the European context grew out of the secret

societies of Italian and Irish patriots, manifesting itself also in the Balkans, Turkey, Egypt, and among extreme anarchists, convinced in strategy by deed. Among these various national focused movements of the late-19th Century, the Russian terrorist groups are conspicuous as being particularly active and successful. Terrorism in the era before World War I was not a widespread issue among the far left, who were focused wide ranging political and philosophical platforms, favoring collective actions such as strikes, demonstrations, and insurgency. Despite the fact that the right represented the establishment in power and the left was the agent of change, neither Marx, nor the anti-Marxists gave much credence to 'the philosophy of the bomb'.[8]

4.2 19th Century Philosophers of Terrorism.

Laqueur highlights what he refers to as two 'philosophers of mass destruction', who represent two exceptions to the aversions of causing casualties in the course of terrorist actions in the late 1900's. Karl Heinzen and Johann Most were two German radicals who pioneered the philosophy of employing weapons of mass destruction as part of a systematic doctrine of terrorism. Both emigrated from their native Germany to the U.S. and were theoreticians (vice practitioners) of the craft of violence they recommended in their writings.[9]

The radical democrat Karl Heinzen blamed the revolutionaries of 1848 for not having demonstrated sufficient resolve or ruthlessness in the cause. He saw the adaptation of technology to produce mass destruction weapons in the form of rockets, land mines, and poison gases to destroy whole cities, advocating prizes for research is such areas as the poisoning of foodstuffs. Heinzen felt his cause for freedom could not prevail without resorting the drastic means of violence through the use of poison or explosives. Heinzen's driving force was to create and safeguard the individual freedoms of man and to employ force where necessary. After settling in the United States, he became an extreme spokesman for abolitionism and woman's rights and a strong backer of Abraham Lincoln in the preservation of the Union. Likewise, he became an early opponent of Marxist, which Heinzen regarded as just a new form of slavery.[10] While Heinzen advocated the use of force in the form of mass destruction as a means to an end, the envisioned end-state in his mind was the preservation of a democratic state and not of anarchy.

His fellow countryman of a younger generation, Johann Most, was not a patient believer in gradual organizational change, maintaining that people were always ready for revolution; all that was needed was a small, determined minority to show the way. Most perceived the political environment in almost Hobbesian terms as barbaric and only able to be changed by equally barbaric force. As Heinzen, Most was a believer in revolutionary change to free the masses from tyrannical rule, advocating the killing of these rulers by dynamite and poison, fire and sword. Most also realized and appreciated the importance of mass media in conveying the message. Emigrating to the U.S. in the early 1880s, he founded his New York based newspaper *Freiheit*, which became the foremost anarchist organ of its time. Early in his stay in the U.S., Johann Most worked in an ammunition factory in New Jersey, later pioneering the concept of the letter bomb and even envisioning aerial terrorist attacks, well before the age of aviation. One of Most's lasting contributions to the field of terrorism was in

publishing a slim volume on revolutionary warfare, which later became the inspiration of the handbook of the American Left in the 1960s, *The Anarchist's Cookbook*. While there have been similar handbook style texts published, most trace their origin back to Most's work[11]

The third of the 19th Century theorists on terrorism was Michael Bakunin, who gained his experience in revolution in his native Russia, in the German revolution of 1848, as well as in France and Switzerland, during that era of upheaval. Bakunin published his manifesto *Principles of Revolution* in 1869, declaring that Russian soil could only be cleansed by violence and the use of force. His later published work *Revolutionary Catechism* served as a guide for rules of engagement for terrorists. Bakunin presented a terrorist in anonymous terms, serving a cause rather than self interests; always focused on the revolution. In providing tactical guidance on disguise and infiltration techniques, he took the Islamic *taqfir* and portrayed it in a Russian guise. All manifestations and institutions of the establishment (army, bureaucracy, church, and royal palace) were legitimate targets for total destruction according to Bakunin's catechism. The highest representatives of these institutions would prove to be the highest profile potential targets. As with his brethren 'philosophers of mass destruction' Heinzen and Most, Bakunin was also a theorist, rather than a practitioner of terrorism. Neither possessed the stamina nor ruthlessness to carry out the ambitious programs they advocated in print or word.[12] Nonetheless, their words carried weight and emphasis, inspiring generations of likeminded compatriots of the late-19th and the 20th Century who would not shy from translating the prosaic 'fire and sword' into cold, hard terrorist actions to achieve their political aim throughout the European historical chapters up to the end of the Cold War, with spill-over effects into the Middle East, Central and South American and post-Colonial Africa and Asia.

4.3 From Philosophy into Action – A Four Phase Model

In a post 9-11 Current History article on the historical implications of terrorism, David C. Rapoport recognizes that September 11 marks an important date in the long history of terrorism, due to the scale of violence, the staggering loss of life, and the innovativeness of the type of attack, using a hijacked airliner as a cruise missile against non-combatant targets. The attacks of 9-11 produced a reaction that may well have lasting implications on the future character of international relations, but should be studied in the context of the history of terrorism and how this has evolved over the past two centuries.[13]

As with Hoffman and Lacqueur, Rapoport draws on the example of the Robespierrian twist on the French Revolution as the example in which terrorism entered the modern vernacular as a tool to establish a democratic order, usurping the elements of the state as instruments to accomplish a desired political end-state. Ordinary rules of evidence were discarded as impediments to establishing the new order and conventional notions of guilt and innocence became irrelevant. It was state sponsorship of terrorism as a tool of internal control, rather than just an implement of foreign policy, later to be repeated on large scales on National Socialist Germany, Stalinist Russia, Mao's China, and a host of lesser nations.

Rapoport established a model for the historical development of terrorism from the late-19th Century to the present. His model cuts across national as well as international movements, spans the political ideologies of left and right, and introduces the ethno-religious dimension we are now facing. Of the four successive, overlapping and major waves of terrorism that have influenced world history since the 1880s, each spans about one generation in duration; the fourth started in 1979 and is still active. In some cases, such as the Irish Republican Army, terrorist organizations have been able to continue into successive waves.[14]

The first wave in Rapoport's model was stimulated by the political and economic reforms initiated by Russian Tsar Aleksander II. Dissatisfaction with an insufficient reform process and with a repressive regime led to a systematic assassination campaign targeted against the ruling elites and other prominent officials. The invention of dynamite by Alfred Nobel saw the use of the bomb as the weapon of choice. The terrorist was also set apart from the ordinary criminal as he was normally killed in the attack as well, rendering him a martyr for the cause, precisely at the very time in history when mass daily newspapers reached a large public.[15]

An Armenian movement began in the 1890s and spread to the Continent, simultaneous with the establishment of several Balkan groups (Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Movement 'IMRO', Serbian Black Hand, and Young Bosnia) that grew out of the boundary states of the former Ottoman Empire. In Western Europe, anarchist organizations used assassinations of key leaders in an attempt to further the cause of universal suffrage. In the 1890s, a wave of assassinations claimed the lives of French President Sadi Carnot (1894), Spanish Prime Minister Antonio Novas (1897), Austrian Empress Elizabeth (1898), and Italian King Umberto I (1900). In 1901, U.S. President William McKinley was assassinated by an American anarchist; the third American president assassinated out of political ideology since the ends of the Civil War. At the turn of that century, the topic of terrorism preoccupied politicians, law enforcement officials, journalists and author, from Dostoevski to Henry James.[16] The wave of political assassinations culminated with the assassination of the heir to the Austrian-Hapsburg Throne, Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his wife, by a Serbian anarchist in Sarajevo in June 1914, an event that served as a catalyst to the outbreak of World War One.

Rapoport identifies the second wave of terrorism as commencing shortly after World War One and cresting in the 1960s. The principle stimulus for this wave of terrorism ironically was also reflected in the wars aims of the allies of both world wars – national self-determination. As states such as Israel, Algeria, Yemen, India, Pakistan, and Cyprus gained their independence based on the promises issue by the Allies under the Atlantic Charter, these same Allies were a bit more reticent in propagating these freedoms, once the war concluded. Consequently, the ambivalence of the former colonial powers concerning the legitimacy of the newly founded states made them targets of the resultant terrorist violence. The mechanisms of law and order of the former colonial powers, the largely indigenous raised loyalist police forces, proved inadequate to the task and the regular armed forces subsequently inserted to contain the insurrections contained the wrong force mix to combat the guerrilla like hit and run tactics employed by the insurgents.[17] The cycle of tactics of