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The Armed Forces: Towards a Post-Interventionist Era?

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Welcome Address by the Director of the Bundeswehr Institute of Social Sciences

Ernst-Christoph Meier

Meine Damen und Herren, Ladies and Gentlemen,

let me give you a warm welcome to this conference at the Julius-Leber-Kaserne in Berlin. It is a great pleasure to see so many distinguished guests participating in the SOWI.Summit2012.

Some of you may wonder about the location, the Julius-Leber-Kaserne. Well, the reason is quite simple: The Bundeswehr Institute of Social Sciences is located in Strausberg. This is a small city, about 50 kilometers away from here, and it is a fantastic place to do research, without being disturbed, while watching rabbits and deer jumping around. But the nearby capital often provides a better setting to have meetings with government officials or to hold conferences. So we appreciate the opportunity to gather at this place and to benefit from the excellent local infrastructure and support and from the proximity of this venue to the airport.

You might also be wondering why we call this conference a summit. It may appear a little exaggerated. Well, not quite. Let me put it his way: It is regrettable that in Germany military sociology is still far away from being at the center of university research and teaching, to say the least. In fact, the Bundeswehr Institute of Social Sciences is still the only institutionalized place for systematic military-related social science in Germany. By attaching the label 'summit' to this conference and, of course, by having panelists and participants of outstanding reputation we want to draw attention to a research field that is of great relevance not only to the scientific community, but to political and military decision-makers as well.

As a government research agency it is always the ambition of the SOWI Institute to not only provide ad hoc scientific expertise for ministerial decision-making, but also to reflect on and address future challenges and developments affecting our armed forces. From different perspectives it seems worthwhile to discuss the notion of post-interventionism and its implications for our security and defense policy. Military missions and operations cost a lot of money and all members of the transatlantic community face the challenge of austerity budgets for their defense spending. Owing to demographic changes most countries experience enormous challenges as to personnel recruitment and many of them have been profoundly affected by the suspension of compulsory military service. The success of recent military interventions has been mixed at best and raises questions as to the costs and casualties each

country has to bear. One result of this is very often limited public support for international missions.

At the same time the strategic context and the security environment have continued to change dramatically with new actors, a plethora of new risks, but also with advanced technologies and comprehensive civilian-military crisis management approaches. Also new forms of defense cooperation between partners are being discussed and implemented. What does this all mean for the future of military interventions? Are we entering a post-interventionist era? How will military interventions in the future look like? What are the consequences for our armed forces? What does it mean for collective action?

The strategic uncertainty of our security environment currently matches the uncertainty of the future of military intervention. It is my hope and expectation that this workshop will help to provide a little more certainty as to both issues. We have structured the conference in thematic sessions on International Relations, Operations and Missions, Technology, Soldiers and so on. This will permit a differentiated exchange of views. Tomorrow evening we will have the honor to welcome former Minister of Defense, Dr. Peter Struck, for a dinner speech. On Thursday we will close the conference with summaries of the panels and a concluding roundtable with excellent participants.

Ladies and Gentlemen, I would like to stop here. Many of you have just arrived after a long journey. We will now have a coffee break and will continue at 4.45 with the speech of a brilliant researcher from King's College in London, Prof. Christopher Dandeker. We are more than grateful that he is has agreed to open this conference with an introductory speech on the prospects of Western military intervention.

Again, thank you for coming. I wish all of you inspiring talks and discussions and an exciting time in our capital. Thank you very much for your attention.

"The End of the World as We Know it"!? On Interventionist Overstretch, Post-Interventionism and Neo-Interventionism: An Essayist Introduction

Bastian Giegerich & Gerhard Kümmel

1 Introduction

"It's the end of the world as we know it" is the title sequence from the lyrics of one major hit single of the U.S. rockband R.E.M. from their 1987 album *Document*. The song takes up and plays with notions of the apocalypse and the end of time, but is in no way fatalistic or overly pessimistic. As a matter of fact, the sequence goes on with "and I feel fine"! This is perhaps a good starting point for this introduction, because the world of international military interventions seems to have reached a turning point as well and one may well ask whether we will feel fine after this turning point.

This book stems from the perception of a widespread and manifest uneasiness concerning the business of military intervention in our times. The envisaged withdrawal of ISAF troops from Afghanistan is tantamount to the end of a long-lasting international military mission that was performed by a multinational force led by the U.S. In the meantime, the Arab Spring has persuaded Western countries into another military intervention in Libya. And, currently, the pros and cons of a military intervention in Syria are being discussed. Sudan is another case in point as are several others. It would be misleading, however, to view this in the categories of 'business as usual'. Nothing would be farther from the truth. Indeed, the West is for quite some time engaged in a deep introspection about his military intervention policies in the years to come and reflects about this.

This introspection is not constrained to certain groups in the West, be they journalists, parliamentarians/politicians, soldiers, the elderly or the youth. This introspection driven by self-doubt is, indeed, an all-encompassing one. Western military intervention policies are debated by society at large, they are discussed by the media, by politics, and, by the military itself. So it is not confined to some segments, it is a broad discussion which in turn legitimizes the notion of a ceasure we are currently in. What will Western military intervention policies look like in the future; what kind of military intervention policies is wanted and what kind of military intervention policies is financially, politically and socio-culturally possible and militarily feasible?

The hypothesis pursued here states that, in the foreseeable future, we will most likely see a different kind of military intervention policy and intervention posture of the West that will lead to different military interventions. It

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may be argued that we are witnessing the dawn of a new era, the era of military post-interventionism.

2 Interventionist Overstretch

The mission in Afghanistan may well be the high water mark of Western intervention policies after the end of the East-West-conflict. It has turned into an encompassing and ambitious peace- and statebuilding mission, a kind of mission which we may not be witness to again very soon. This upgrading in objectives covers a large part of why Afghanistan is seen as a formidable failure in public discourse.

Sure, schools and water supply have been built, policemen and soldiers have been trained, political structures have been shaped and civil society developments, precarious though, have been initiated and furthered. That is by no means nothing, but it is too little to frame the mission in Afghanistan as a success and as a victory. The Taleban have not been defeated; their return to power cannot be ruled out; the political future of the country after the ISAF troops will have left is insecure – perhaps Afghanistan may become a failing state – and the drug threat to Western youth has become even bigger within the last decade rather than smaller.

Seen in the right light, the West would have to stay much longer in Afghanistan, perhaps as long as the Western allies have stayed in Germany after the Second World War. But the West is tired and exhausted: Tired and exhausted is the leading Western power, the United States, with the Obama Administration eager to close the chapter on Afghanistan rather earlier than later. Tired and exhausted are America's partners who increasingly face problems in politically legitimizing the mission in Afghanistan to themselves and to others. Tired and exhausted are the Western armed forces, engaged in a modern complex counterinsurgency mission with high risk and small success. Tired and exhausted are the Western societies, which are preoccupied with their internal problems at home. Tired and exhausted are the purses of the West given that the West is amidst a substantial and thorough financial crisis that is far from being overcome soon. Tired and exhausted, last but not least, are the soldiers in the Afghan mission who hoped to achieve more than they did and who therefore critically view their mission. Taken together, this turns future military interventions of the West into an enterprise that is much more complex and difficult than in the past.

3 The Post-Interventionist Era

Given this interventionist overstretch, the result may well be military post-interventionism. To be sure, post-interventionism does not mean non-interventionism. In our globalized, internationalized and transnationalized world military interventions will stay with us and will be around. So we will still have military interventions in the future, but these will be different from those of the past and the present. Western military intervention policies and Western military intervention posture will be of another character and of much more modesty, or realism:

(1) Western military interventions will be even more selective than those of the past. The criterion for selection will be the respective national interest. Participation in interventions will follow the national interests of a potential intervenor much blunter than in the past – to the detriment of world society, cosmopolitan or human rights considerations.
(2) Western military interventions will be less ambitious than in the past. The inclination to pretentious and comprehensive state-, nation- and peacebuilding missions will become less accentuated. In times of austerity, the objectives of military intervention will be limited as will be the expectations.
(3) Western military interventions will be more difficult to sell to the critical Western publics. The self-referential, even egoistic attitude of Western societies will increase in times of crises. Political pressure to use the existing resources for domestic problems will increase simultaneously.
(4) Western military interventions will become even more high-tech interventions. The development of unmanned aerial vehicles, of drones, will receive a boost in order to prevent 'boots on the ground' and to keep one's own losses as small as possible to circumvent problems of legitimation and acceptance.[1]
(5) Even if Western powers are intervention-ready, these interventions may not come about due to the lack of American engagement and support. The centrifugal tendencies within the Western alliance have been becoming stronger: The United States have been shifting their geopolitical and strategic priorities to the Pacific and will demand more initiative and engagement from their partners and allies.

1 While some argue that this may lead to some kind of neo-interventionism with military interventions proliferating rather than to post-interventionism, this may not necessarily be the case. Even surgical warfare ushers in casualties which will need framing and legitimizing in Western societies.

Paradoxically, military post-interventionism does not imply that the profile of the armed forces and the soldiers will become less demanding. The hybrid soldier and the hybrid military, capable of meeting the classical challenges of defense, deterrence, and, somewhat less accentuated, attack, as well as meeting non-traditional challenges from peacekeeping to peace-, state- and nation-building, will still be needed. That is imperative given the security-political challenges of the present world risk society.

This implies that the transformation of the armed forces will be an ongoing process, superseding the goals, plans, objectives and ambitions of the present. Issues like the further reduction of military personnel, the concentration of particular capabilities, the division of labor, particularly within Europe, will become even more salient. The Europeans will meet the challenges of the coming post-interventionist era only, if they will be able to surmount their narrow national interest and generate a European interest. This requires political entrepreneurship. Welcome to the brave new world!

4 Debating Post-Interventionism

Thoughts and reflections like those just sketched have been the source of our efforts to organize a large international experts conference on these very issues. This conference, the SOWI.Summit2012, eventually took place in Berlin in June 2012. The present book is a direct product of this conference as it entails the revised and updated versions of the presentations held in Berlin. The perspectives presented and the opinions raised in this book differ quite a lot. So we really had a controversial debate on the issues of post-interventionism and this is to the advantage of the reader who will find this book rich in ideas and inspiration.

We are very grateful that the authors to this book invested their expertise, their time and their energy to contribute to this book. Also, we would like to thank the Bundeswehr Institute of Social Sciences, the SOWI, and its Director, Dr. Ernst-Christoph Meier, for the generous financial and logistical support to make the SOWI.Summit2012 and this book come true. Further thanks go to the conference team, Jana Teetz, Bastian Krause and Gregory Parsons, who enthusiastically and diligently supported the project. The same applies to Cordula Röper and Edgar Naumann who put this book in perfect shape. All this is very much appreciated!

I Macro-Level Perspectives

Post-Interventionist *Zeitgeist*: The Ambiguity of Security Policy

Florian P. Kühn

1 Liberal Interventionism, Security and Social Transformation

Over the last two decades, international security has turned into a playing field for experiments in social engineering of all sorts. Under the guise of globalized risks, the states of the Western security community (Deutsch et al. 1957; Etzioni 1965; Adler/Barnett 1998) have attempted to shape social rules and institutionalized mechanisms of state domination elsewhere, more precisely the control and monopolization of violence. To this end, military units were deployed under sometimes contradictory mandates to support political transitions or create the conditions necessary for such transitions to occur (Richmond 2005; Chandler 2009; Kühn 2010; Hameiri 2011; Dodge 2012).

The practice of intervention, however, has produced mixed results at best. While resilient social figurations have resisted, subverted, or transformed the political projects, the agents of the intervening countries have themselves undergone significant changes in organization, outlook, or political salience (Heathershaw 2009; Bonacker et al. 2010; Richmond 2011; Bliesemann de Guevara 2012b). This contribution explores the mutual effects of political adaptation and the social repercussions these political transformations have in the countries sending and receiving intervention forces. Analyzing intervention as policy tightly connected to a liberal understanding of the world and of societies, it scrutinizes interventionist policy as a technique to reshape social relations in Western countries and non-Western countries alike. It will do so putting at its center the concept of ambiguity, which helps to understand current policy making. In this light, what may look like entering a post-interventionist age might in itself be ambiguous in that interventionist practices continue unabated, but are framed differently.

2 Externalizing Costs: The Political Economy of Interventionism

From a political economy point of view, external interventions triggered by security considerations have been legitimized with the horrendous costs in terms of human suffering, refugee migration and also associated security risks to Western societies like weapons and drugs trade, organized crime,

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terrorism and the spread of disease. To counter or deter security risks, Western states have over centuries developed costly and specialized apparatuses, consisting of coercive organizations like militaries, epistemic support services such as strategic think tanks, and material supply of the means of violence, such as arms industries. At the same time, the costs of social adjustment, prescribed by a liberal idea of the state as the exclusive source of legitimate violence, has been burdened onto those societies deemed not fit to control populations. The question whose security gains interventions are directed at, thus, remains unanswered: Is it the populations in so-called weak, failing, or failed states whose everyday lives need protection, or is it the populations of the rich West who need to be protected from threats to their way of life emanating from those 'risky' areas outside the security community? (Pugh/Cooper/Turner 2008; Clapton 2009; Hameiri/Kühn 2011; Kühn 2011, 2012a)

That these areas are seen as risky is a development which followed the East-West ideological confrontation, when threats with their clearly determined origin and known and anticipated tactics and intentions disappeared. The void was filled by perceptions of risk, which is significant for its diffuseness, its unknown intentions and potential (Daase 2002: 14–16; Daase/Kessler 2007). While everyday notions of risk bear a more or less balanced relation between opportunity and danger, in this new security paradigm of risk, the latter has increasingly been overemphasized at the expense of the former.[1] For example, the Arab spring was immediately seen as risky in the way that fundamentalist governments might take over states earlier dominated by autocratic and gerontocratic regimes with outrageous human rights records – and not by many as an opportunity for democratic and, eventually, economic development.[2] This is because the whole idea of liberal peace and security is based on notions of order (Richmond 2002: 31–35) – a conservative approach contradicting liberal economic reasoning with its explorative spirit of entrepreneurism. "Maintaining order", as Richmond (2002) calls his book, in this sense comes down to preserving or re-installing state institutions, which are viewed to be containers of social relations of all sorts (Bliesemann de Guevara/Kühn 2010: 20–36). Within a risk paradigm, essentially, non-state social relations themselves are treated as being risky, and ever more intrusive

1 See Hameiri/Kühn (2011: 275–277) for a discussion of the ontological and epistemological differences of the very notion of risk as emblematic in the works of Ulrich Beck and Anthony Giddens on ‚reflexive modernization' vice versa Mary Anderson's view that risks are socially constructed or, third, technologies of government, as Michel Foucault would have it.

2 There may be other reasons to be skeptical about Middle Eastern chances for sustainable transitions, such as continuous rent dependencies (see Beck 2009).

interventions seen as laudable as long as they are expected to solve the problems of instability and disorder (Clapton 2009).

What has been clear is that the social costs of security related interventions were burdened on non-Western societies, with ambitious reform projects aiming at security sectors, but generally also at modes of economic reproduction and, not least, cultural re-adjustments along liberal guiding norms (Sovacool/Halfon 2007; Bhatia/Sedra 2008: 36, 181–183; Dodge 2012; Kühn 2012b). Part of the individualization of security is that people in Western societies empathize with victims of violence, be it in countries like Syria/Libya or victims of terrorist attacks in Western capitals (Rasmussen 2003: 171). The result is a change in political pressure to address these problems in ways exceeding older paradigms of security. While those were based on deterrence and international (state) order, states have become instrumental rather than constitutive for risk deflection and management techniques (Kühn 2011).

One of the results of this development is that interventions have become depoliticized, apparently neutral exercises, creating a huge conceptual misunderstanding between recipient societies and political constituencies in deploying countries: Whereas Western societies see themselves as providing assistance towards a better, i.e. liberal, future, local communities view themselves as being subjected to transformations they did not call for and never meant to exercise (Pugh 2012). Local communities, in effect, seem to have a much better grasp of the violence and forced transformations than intervening parties who are tightly trapped in self-referential discourses and political necessities (such as budgetary restrictions, alliance politics, or tensions between ethics of conviction and ethics of responsibility) (Richmond 2011: 205–211).

Contrasting this logic is the assumption that states which are ruled democratically are a necessary condition for the peaceful conduct of international relations. Economically, democratic states are associated with markets and capitalism – however, it is surprising that democratic peace theory has assumed such salience in the academic discipline of International Relations. Thinking along the lines of democratic peace theory has in itself contradictions and ambiguities, which Müller (2002) calls “antinomies”. He points, among other problems, to the fact that democratic peace theory’s basic assumption that states are exclusive political actors on the international stage is no longer (if it ever was) valid: Over the last decades, globalization and other denationalizing effects have taken away most areas of social regulation from the state or transformed it into modes of transnational governance (Müller

2002: 47).[3] From a security perspective, to be sure, it looks different for France to elect François Hollande or the United Kingdom David Cameron compared to Egypt or Iran being ruled by Islamist parties and actors. This points to the mechanisms of perceiving risks in the first place: The states that have formed the so-called Western Security Community communicate comparably more intensely with each other than with those on the outside. This may be understood also as a Security Epistemic Community, bearing distinct ways of framing security as well as being subject to certain dynamics of the *Zeitgeist* (on the ambiguity of peace as a policy and a practice see Kühn 2012b). The obsession with terrorism which streamlined international security policy of the last decade may serve as an illustration.

3 Can Costs be Externalized at all?

Political responsibility is, for the time being, tightly bound to state mechanisms to formulate and put into practice political decisions. This has led to the narrowing down of interventionist policy to the national level, where parliamentary oversight has rolled back leverage for governments in making decisions about interventions.[4] However, once decisions to take action have been taken, international bodies are quickly mandated to do the implementing. Thus, international policy has become denationalized, located in international bodies such as NATO or EU, in effect working to deflect responsibility for fiscal and policy decisions (Bliesemann de Guevara/Kühn 2010: 192–195). However, in political discourse, this may work as long as things go according to plan; after all, legitimacy of interventions is seen to be higher when many international actors are involved.[5] Once soldiers or humanitarian

3 This extends to generating meaning for militaries which, despite significant cooperative structures in the Western context (but also including other states' militaries), rely on nationality and national states to generate meaning for what they do – their existence is contingent upon the legitimating narratives of states. Where missions are undertaken in the name of a Western, or European alliance, this legitimacy is being undermined. In other words: Are soldiers prepared to die for the European Union or the continuous existence of NATO rather than their countries?

4 Notwithstanding differences in the political systems of Western states, where French presidents have different political repertoires of action at hand as, for example, a German Chancellor or a British Prime Minister. It is here where the study of domestic politics interlinks with the study of international relations.

5 Interestingly, for the time after 2014 in Afghanistan, the political discourse circles around which kind and depth a mandate by the UN would require while the Afghan side is disregarded wholly.

workers die, once radicalism spreads, indicating ample discontent in the countries of intervention, once mission creep sets in, putting into question efforts in terms of time and money, then parliamentarians and policy makers at all levels of administrations need to address the resulting political pressures.

However, leverage to correct wrongs in policy is limited due to internationalized decision-making procedures and due to international loyalty to alliances which is sometimes regarded higher than concrete policy. This leads to a tendency to act according to the idea of 'more of the same', as could be observed in Afghanistan (Suhrke 2011: 219–228).[6] Following the optimist decade of the 1990s, when liberal ardor directed policy, and the half *angst*-driven, half radical policy of the so-called 'War on Terror' during the 2000s, there is growing sentiment now that not all which may be desirable can also be achieved, and that which can be achieved needs to be paid for. The temporal sequence of events means that Iraq and Afghanistan informed subsequent cases of security concerns such as the intervention in Libya or Syria (Pelham 2012).

The striking discrepancy between plans and outcomes, especially in the politics of statebuilding but not limited to it, is part of another ambiguity: Plans are directed at communities and collectives, which may have group identities and practice delineation, assuming that people of all kinds conform to individualist notions of liberalism. In this thinking the individual is the only source of political authority, the indivisible component of a sovereign and a political (and economically) rational actor. The irresolvable ambiguity of the individual and how it is being viewed when acting in accord with collectives makes directing interventionist policies so difficult (Kühn 2010: 102–111). However, because local actors are seldom taken as being on par with Western agents, interventions still unfold according to prefabricated Western concepts, simply because political resistance is limited at first: Either, 'partners' are being installed by the intervening powers, or paid for their 'cooperation', or politically organized voice against interventionist policy lacks the means of efficiently organizing such political programs. As may be observed in Afghanistan, Iraq, but also in Libya, political resistance against

6 The case of withdrawing troops, as could be observed in Afghanistan where Canada and the Netherlands withdrew combat forces before an official end of the mission even was in sight is illustrative of how exaggerated political concerns about what would happen once solidarity between members of the alliance ended; at the same time, one might argue that it demonstrates the lack of cohesive power of NATO that states can stand by a common mission without consequence.

an implemented order develops in synchronicity with military resistance (Pelham 2012).

For the armed forces, mandated and tasked to keep the order, this means that a more target-oriented structure is required – one that needs to address the discrepancy of collective action, which is often viewed as risky for the intervention and its aims, and individuals, often seen as passive recipients of developments both political and economic. At the same time, the socalled 'War on Terror' led to a misguided orientation of security policy, overestimating the unlikely at the cost of strategic orientation. To level strategic planning and military practice, which is essentially social, organizational adaptation is required at both tactical and planning levels, bearing significant consequences for both national apparatuses and security organizations such as NATO. As Theo Sommer has explained, the existing security structures need to adapt to newly recognized realities: That NATO is strongest where it works as a potential rather than where its troops are deployed, where it fosters policy making between member and associated states rather than being in charge of policy implementation (Sommer 2012).

Within the Western security community, the ambiguity of security worked well to legitimize interventions (Bliesemann de Guevara/Kühn 2011). While it remained unclear whose security was pursued, either the local populations' one or the Western societies' one, it was easier to claim that constructing states elsewhere was in the security interest of Western tax payers who essentially finance such policies: "The ethics of the Other have enabled the past problems to be rewritten as ones of non-Western state-governing capacity at the same time as denying accountability for present policy strictures. Paradoxically, the attempt to deny power and accountability has driven the extension of external mechanisms of regulation." (Chandler 2006: 95) Between Chandler's assertion and today, many more such mechanisms have been innovatively drafted, including advances in drone technology to manage – rather than address – violence.

Notwithstanding that cost factors are more closely scrutinized in times of fiscal and financial crises, two conditions are necessary for legitimizing interventions in this ambiguous way to work. First, the security of Western states and societies needs to be perceived as less problematic than without an intervention and, second, some sort of – even cosmetic – progress needs to be visible in the countries under intervention. Where human rights violations continue under international trusteeship, for example, interventions cannot claim to have solved the problem. What might be called post-interventionist policies could be a complete withdrawal of political involvement – leaving local populations (if there ever was a clearly distinguishable 'local' in a spa-

tial or social sense) to their own devices but under control of surveillance and occasional remote action.

4 Social and Societal Effects of Interventionism

Abounding social effects of interventionism are widely ignored in the political debate. One the one hand, numbers of soldiers and civilian workers encountering serious mental health problems are rising, while on the other, social transformations produce pathologies in societies where interventions take place. Among these phenomena is a transformation of political elites, which turn into coalitions of distribution rather than focusing and processing political demands of a tax-paying electorate (Suhrke 2011). Instead, in many cases, the latter turn to state institutions for employment, patronage, and opportunities of co-optation (Kühn 2010: 241–254). Despite the best efforts of the intervening parties, and contingent upon general levels of economic development, dependency structures are likely to develop during interventions and to persist well after the main phase of an intervention ends, and indeed, the main funding streams run dry. The political economy of interventions has very transformative, and in this way conflictive, effects. They are, however, seldom analyzed as many of the effects of interventionist political economy on the surface serve other means (capacity building, budget support, development of institutional structures etc.); this allows Western observers to view political-economic pathologies as secondary effects, unintended in their creation but nevertheless unavoidable 'bads' in the quest to achieve (greater) goods.

5 Interventionism Rebound: The Legacy of the Liberal World Project

In the liberal mind-set, interventions seek to create or stabilize an international order, comprised by states, which are seen as prerequisites for security and development. This understanding puts the state at the center of all social relations and tries to establish this 'state of the state' where it does not yet exist. While post-interventionism may be brought about by the politics of the purse, that is a lack of funds to conduct costly endeavors such as interventions in Afghanistan or Iraq, the basic understanding of the world as one to be shaped by human reason in pursuit of generalized norms is not likely to change. In this light, it merits discussion what 'post-interventionism' actually means; is it a change of practices or a significant transformation of the underlying ontological basics – e.g., a pluralism towards multiple forms of economic repro-

duction, social norms and forms of life? Although awareness of the political costs of interventions – for example full-scale military involvement in ending atrocities in Syria – may differ over time, leading to a low willingness to take the risks of intervention, interventionist policy as a concept is by no means discredited. The quest to right the pitfalls of interventionist practice still seems to be ongoing.

For several reasons, mainly because the interlacing discourses of development and security are defining how we understand international relations, it seems unlikely that interventionism has already reached its 'post'- age. Rather, in the spirit of liberal invention, new forms of intervention and social re-adjustment are likely to be found. The constant reminder of the importance of resilience of local populations, but also of personnel of intervening agencies, is an indication that liberal ideas are likely to prevail. By shaping international policy in such terms, Western agencies provide a mind-set which serves as preconditions to understand reality.

It is in this spirit that strategies of resilience are being applied to Western societies alike. Elsewhere, I have argued that there is a class struggle underway from above which aims to transform traditional functions of social exchange by fostering a sense of threat within Western communities (Kühn 2012b). Mark Duffield (2011) explains how strengthening societies against threats impossible to define and to locate in space and time leads to an all-encompassing security problem being put in the center of security. He argues that a total mobilization of resources and people's complicity is necessary to enhance preparedness against threats that can no longer be predicted. Resilience as a concept and anti-climax in strategic planning calls for individual preparations and adaptation to changing circumstances (Duffield 2011: 13). Putting the burden of security on individuals, however, fails to foster a retreat of social technology. Instead, making Western societies resilient cascades into continued interventionist practices in non-Western society to become resilient against social but also increasingly environmental, economic, demographic and other risks of modernity.

6 Conclusions: Re-Conceptualizing International Relations and Security

To precisely analyze international relations and security, it might be important to re-conceptualize Western understandings of the world. Much of the canonized knowledge taught in universities and colleges still dates back to the overarching mould of the Cold War; while globalization and problems such as climate change or non-state violent actors have triggered debates on changing structures, the ontological base layers of international relations have

remained remarkably stable. To evaluate the changes in the security environment, four points seem to merit closer scrutiny:

(1) It would be high time to unfold a conceptual approach which takes into account the dynamics of social figurations beyond the state as well as power structures which cannot be denied despite the formal equality of states in the international legal system. Yet, while dominant Western states are struggling to preserve their defining features in the face of seriously structure-damaging economic challenges, analyzing international relations in terms of imperial approaches seems not to be sufficient either: Rather, looking at structures of domination, tightly connected to capital relations while transcending national borders and modes of political regulation, ought to be at the center of analytical approaches of interventions.
(2) What is portrayed in the political parlance of international institutions, the commonality of world politics, is lacking the distinct fora of political deliberation: The UN is as state-centric as world society and lacks the means for information exchange on a meaningful scale. What we can observe is a plethora of distinct, often mutually exclusive discourses about legitimacy, policy, and norms. Uproar in the Muslim world against denigration of the Prophet as well as outcries for freedom of expression: Both address home audiences or peer groups rather than being exchanges in a discourse. The same occurs on the practical level of ongoing interventions, where the merits and political calculations are debated systematically excluding the intentions of those concerned. The gap between audiences in Afghanistan, to name but one example, and Western states involved in intervention there may be impossible to bridge.
(3) For Western actors, the increasing internationalization of missions bears the political advantage of broad-based mandates and increases the intervening regime's weight; over time, however, this might turn into a disadvantage because it becomes an impenetrable network in which responsibilities for what is actually happening on the ground are unclear. Political constituencies as well as policy makers are increasingly becoming uneasy with supporting political practices that they have no say in shaping. The direct link between those paying for the results of decisions and decision making seems to be broken.
(4) Finally, a professionalization of aid workers as well as of military units engaged with what could be broadly defined as community work has taken place within the last two decades. Their practical experience gives them an epistemological advantage in shaping understanding of what is being done and how it is (or is not) working. In other words: Those involved in interventions have a prerogative in defining problems – how an

intervention is seen in the first place – and solutions – including the instruments to rectify faulty developments. With definitions of problems and the provision of the means to solve them in one hand, it becomes difficult to politically engage in discussions about their value. After all, it is impossible to distinguish which argument or practice is motivated by problems on the ground and which stem from the intrinsic interests of those propagating it. The call for more money and more time on aid agencies' side, but also the call for better equipment, more 'boots on the ground' are, in this regard, the same side of the coin.

In this sense, the age of interventions may just have begun, even though military interventions to establish political orders may be in decline. Economic commodification of land and resources (and subsequent legal regulation), people (as productive forces) and public assets may become a capitalism-driven international mode of social interaction. Short of direct coercion, interventionist practices seem to be headed for a restructuring of the epistemology of security and towards education of individuals to be self-serving and resilient. Whether this includes violent practices or leaves the transformation to the non-Western, not-yet-liberalized Other, remains to be seen. A post-interventionist paradigm, if it exists, may turn out to be a mere change of sequence, as political institutionalization may in the future follow the consolidation of economic structures rather than vice versa.

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Soldiers Drawn into Politics? Civil-Military Relations, Hybrid Military Spaces and the Future of Interventions

Chiara Ruffa, Christopher Dandeker & Pascal Vennesson

1 Introduction

In January 2012, a video depicting U.S. soldiers urinating on Afghan dead bodies was released. Mr George Little, a Pentagon spokesman, declared that the footage was "utterly deplorable", and this was followed by similar statements by other high-ranking U.S. government officials (Bowley/Rosenberg 2012). The behavior of these soldiers had dramatic political consequences for the reputation of U.S. soldiers abroad and for their credibility and legitimacy in respect to military operations in Afghanistan. In addition, it had a negative impact on the diplomatic relationship between the U.S. and the Afghan government as well as on the reputation of the U.S. in international politics. Leaving aside the deviant behavior of soldiers in operations – often made public by the media, such as, among many examples, Abu Ghraib (2004–2006), or the tortures perpetrated by Italian soldiers against Somali civilians (1992–1994) or the above-mentioned episode (2012), soldiers take tactical or operational decisions that can have wide political consequences. For instance, when they decide to coordinate with other actors deployed in the field, when they launch (or do not) joint projects with humanitarian actors, when they decide where to patrol.[1]

Does soldiers' behavior on the tactical level have greater political consequences now than in the past? Has anything significant happened in the behavior of soldiers, structure of command, or simply in the types of interventions that makes these decisions so political? Is it the kind of decisions taken that have changed or the consequences of these tactical and operational actions that have become bigger and more political? This chapter asks what it means to argue that soldiers are increasingly 'drawn into politics': it investigates elements of continuity and change in the relation of soldiers to politics in recent interventions (Iraq and Afghanistan) in comparison with the past. Ideally, with this objective in mind, one should systematically analyze and compare patterns of interventions in old and new operations and infer from these whether soldiers are more 'drawn into politics' than in the past. But this chapter has a more modest objective: it provides a preliminary assessment of

1 By political decision we mean a decision that has consequence for or related to the government or the public affairs of a country and we see it as opposed to strategic, operational or tactical.

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such a phenomenon mainly to envision potential scenarios of likely future military interventions. This chapter starts from a small tactical event that has major consequences for the foreign policy of a country and is an investigation of this what has been referred to as the compression in the levels of war and the extent to which it is a novel phenomenon (Dandeker 2006: 225).

We argue that five patterns have accentuated this phenomenon of soldiers being 'drawn into politics'. Two patterns are conceptual and refer to: on the one hand, an ongoing stretching of what we mean by soldiers 'drawn into politics'; on the other hand, a profound disconnect between the literature on domestic civil-military relations and the literature on soldiers' interaction with other actors in operations. The other three patterns have to do with the characteristics of current operations: first, the military space has become more hybrid; second, existing operations have specific new objectives; third, soldiers have increasingly more room for maneuver.

We structure our discussion in five steps. In a first step, we conceptualize and think through what intermingling between soldiers and politics means. In the second, third and fourth, steps we investigate the practical sides this phenomenon: we ask whether a pure military space exists, how specific characteristics of recent operations have contributed to the blurring of roles and we analyze what dispersion of military authority has implied operationally regarding effectiveness and mission accomplishment. In a fifth step, we advocate for greater synthesis in the literature and speculate what the consequences may be should that take place; finally, we draw some conclusions for the practice and the future of interventions.

2 Conceptualizing 'Soldiers Drawn into Politics': The Strategic Corporal 2.0

The phenomenon whereby soldiers in operations are increasingly intertwined with politics can take different forms and is not new:

(1) Soldiers in operations take decisions that are intrinsically political, meaning that they affect the functioning of local politics. For instance, in United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), peacekeepers had to decide with which mouchtar to cooperate or whether to deliver aid to a church or a mosque. These were decisions directly affecting local politics.
(2) Soldiers in operations may take tactical or operational decisions that may have political repercussions. These refer to day-to-day activities and they comprise s probably the majority of actions we are looking at. This parallels the idea of the strategic corporal.

(3) Soldiers in operations may behave in a deviant way, and in breach of ius in bello Just War principles (tortures, urinating, burning the Quran): If information is leaked to the media, their behavior can have diplomatic consequences.
(4) The actions of soldiers in operations can have political consequences as they have always done. As Clausewitz wrote: "Policy, of course, will not extend its influence to operational details. Political considerations do not determine the posting of guards or the employment of patrols. But they are more influential in the planning of war, of the campaign, and often even of the battle." (Clausewitz 1976: 606) This means that policy may not or should not determine posting of guards but posting of guards can have political consequences.

Our perspective parallels but does not coincide with the concept of the strategic corporal. Partly a product of the changes in the media, the strategic corporal is not new since it has been noted since at least the first Iraq war (1990/1991) and the Bosnian conflict (1992–1995). While we think this has been amplified by recent phenomena (media, new kinds of operations), we do not know how systematic the 'politicization' of soldiers is and whether it is going to endure. Still, scandals "like those perpetrated at Abu Ghraib and Camp Breadbasket therefore became of disproportionate importance to civil-military relations" (Strachan 2006: 74). It is thus important to explore the root causes and what they mean for domestic civil-military relations. In particular, it is important to note that we are discussing situations in which soldiers are, allegedly, more involved in politics abroad, in their theaters of operations. By contrast, the bulk of the civil-military relations literature is about the involvement of soldiers in politics at home (in domestic politics).

The debate about the relative importance of the strategic corporal as against the tactical colonel reflects this increasing intermingling of soldiers in politics. This is the result of a combination of two constituent elements, of what has been called a "dialectic of control", dispersion and micromanagement (Dandeker 2006). Dispersion occurs when the military authority is dispersed across levels of command; while micromanagement refers to a growing tendency of centralizing control (Dandeker 2006: 239f.). Dispersion and micromanagement lead to a compression of the three levels of war, namely strategic, operational and tactical (Dandeker 2006: 240). While these two elements may seem at odd with each other, they are in fact connected. Micromanagement matters as much as dispersion. The tensions between micromanagement – which refers to a centralized control and a top-down process – and diffusion (and what Dandeker calls the dialectic of control) lead to inconsistencies between orders given from the top (without in-depth knowledge of the context) and diffusion of the level of command. While potentially effec-

tive for operational activities, micro-management risks being potentially very frustrating when soldiers have to carry out activities that range from humanitarian tasks to building bridges because they need to assess on the ground where this is needed.

The idea of the strategic corporal was introduced by an officer who, at the time, was commander of the U.S. Marine Corps. His main point was to describe a scenario in which a junior officer was caught in a "three block war" in which a soldiers or a unit could be delivering aid, keeping conflict parties apart, returning of fire to an attack (Krulak 1999: 18). Since the junior officer decisions were likely to have dramatic consequences he advocated better training for junior officers. Relaunching the debate, King thinks that a tactical colonel rather than a strategic corporal would have the appropriate degree of expertise. According to him, in order to have soldiers with an appropriate degree of preparation, it would be best to position colonel in tactical position than the contrary (King 2003: 22).

3 An Increasingly Hybrid Military Space

In recent years, soldiers have become more involved in politics while in operations. In the field, soldiers have often to take political decisions or at least decisions with direct political consequences. For Samuel Huntington, the core problem of civil-military relations is to adjust and balance two imperatives: On the one hand, the functional imperative, i.e. providing military security against threats; and, on the other, the societal imperative, i.e. making sure that military institutions reflect or at least do not undermine social forces, ideologies, and institutions dominant within the society (Huntington 1957: 2f.). His preferred way to ensure civilian control is "objective control" (Huntington 1957: 83–85) which means maximizing the professionalism of the military. The military should not get involved in institutional, class and constitutional politics. Huntington's idea was that the military should preserve their professional autonomy and keep separate from civilian values. "Huntington's account is rooted in the idea of what might be termed a 'pure military space' occupied by a military profession using legitimate violence to achieve victory." (Dandeker 2010: 19)

But the idea of a pure military space was challenged already by Janowitz. In his critique of Huntington, Janowitz anticipated that the idea of a pure military space was redundant. Military personnel had to be sensitive to a political context as in his classical example on the military under the Nazis in Germany: "Was the German general staff 'professional' when it blindly followed orders which had little or no military purpose?" (Janowitz 1960: 6) The blurring of a civilian and a military space had already been made clear

by Janowitz. But this interconnectedness has become more evident with new kinds of operations and at junior levels of command – a consequence of the compression of the levels of war. New kinds of operations (such as the 'three block war' portrayed by Krulak) put greater responsibilities on the shoulders of junior officers that had to take decisions on the spot often with dramatic diplomatic consequences.

Contemporary operations present characteristics that diverge considerably from what Huntington had predicted: That politics is a civilian sphere that was tasked with the 'art of war' – the world of the ends or value objectives of war – and that the military strictly focused on the 'science of war' – providing the military means to achieve these objectives (Dandeker 2010: 19). But in contemporary operations many elements are at odds with Huntington's idea of professional autonomy: Soldiers are tasked with activities that are often not strictly military; in their areas of operations they are tasked with interacting with local communities and taking decisions that matters for local politics.

4 New, Different, More Complex Operations and the Lost Meaning of Victory

In the past 20 years, the number of out-of-area operations has increased all over the world. These operations have become more diverse, ranging from peacekeeping to counterinsurgency, and more complex with a wide array of actors ranging from private to public, from military to humanitarian, such as NGOs, Private Security Companies, governmental agencies and conventional armies and the media. Also, operations have on average lasted longer: most Western countries involved in the NATO mission in Afghanistan have had soldiers deployed for more than 10 years (Uppsala Conflict Data Program 2012). Similarly, in operations such as Kosovo, Bosnia, the Democratic Republic of Congo or Liberia, soldiers have been involved since the mid-1990s and battalions of various sizes are still involved there. Also, it has become apparent that operations are easier to launch than to draw to an end (possibly with a successful outcome). Governments in an age of austerity have become more cautious about being involved in interventions and "stability operations have dropped off the radar for many analysts and commentators" (Baumann 2012: 33). And one can reasonably ask whether a mission, such as the one in Afghanistan, has or will have been [after 2014] s worth the effort (Ruffa 2012a).

Soldiers have had to interact more closely with other actors, namely civilian actors, other militaries as well as with international headquarters. The operational environments have changed profoundly. During conventional